Munitions in a Joint-Environment: Observations from a Physisict-turned-21M from Ex KEY RESOLVE
By: Capt Ryan Chapman

Theoretical Framework for Building Logistics Enterprise Confidence in Partner Forces: The Afghan Case
By: Capt Philip Lere

Repair Network Integration: Resolving Repair Constraints Through Depot & Field Collaboration
By: Maj James P. Chevalier, Brian R. Ward, & Suzanne E. Woerl
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On the Cover

Soldiers with the 101st Combat Aviation Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) and Airmen assigned to the 22nd Airlift Squadron, 60th Air Mobility Wing stationed at Travis Air Force Base, Calif., load an HH-60 medevac Black Hawk helicopter, Sept. 26, into a C-5M Super Galaxy at Campbell Army Airfield. The helicopter is one of eight aircraft the division deployed to Puerto Rico on Wednesday, Sept. 27, 2017. ANDREW MCCLURE/U.S. ARMY
Esteemed Members,

I hope this message finds you well and preparing to attend the 35th Anniversary of the Logistics University and Symposium at the Gaylord Convention Center, National Harbor, MD!

The shores of the Potomac will provide a backdrop for attendees to participate in training on-site at LOA University, as well as hear from senior leaders from across the Department of Defense and industry. We are elated that Secretary of the Air Force Heather Wilson, will join us on the final day to provide comments and present lifetime achievement awards. Members will also have the opportunity to meet with career functionals, engage in thought-provoking breakout sessions and countless networking opportunities. We are now an Air Force approved event so there is still time to register and reserve your seat at the premier logistics professional development event of the year!

Since the Summer ER, your executive board has also been busy welcoming new Executive Board members, preserving logistics heritage and bolstering our non-profit status on a national level. This issue of the ER features some of these achievements and much more, but here’s a glimpse.

Executive Board election results are in! Please join me in welcoming Carol Howitz as National President-Elect and Laura Holcomb as the newly elected Chief Financial Officer. Their respective terms will commence immediately following the 2017 Logistics Symposium. Laura and Carol are extremely capable, long time LOA supporters and we are very, very happy to have them on-board.

On 13 October 2017, the LOA Executive Board was honored to have Team Sheppard, senior Air Force logistics leaders, industry partners and the local Wichita Falls community attend the Crew Chief statue dedication in honor of Lt Gen Leo Marquez. Lt Gen Cooper, Brig Gen Jolly, yours truly plus Ms. Patricia Knighten, daughter of Lt Gen Marquez, provided comments highlighting Gen Marquez’s legacy and the historic significance of the occasion. The statue is just the beginning of LOA’s strategic partnership with the maintenance and logistics
schoolhouse and was made possible by very generous industry, chapter and individual sponsors. You may also appreciate that earlier this year, Sheppard AFB honored Lt Gen Leo Marquez by renaming the main avenue on the base after him.

We are proud to report that LOA has received a clean audit opinion, validating that we are operating in accordance with industry-accepted accounting practices! The audit results allowed the Board to apply for and successfully become part of the Combined Federal Campaign! That’s right, now you can directly contribute to the Logistics Officer Association through charitable donations during the CFC open season. The CFC listing further cements our status as a non-profit, and will also strengthen our ability to enhance existing professional development programs including education scholarships and webinars. Many thanks to our current CFO, Brad Leonard, project officer, Tammy McElhaney and the Chapter Presidents for their hard work achieving this significant milestone for LOA. This year’s CFC slogan is “Show Some Love” so please stay tuned to social media for more details on how you can show some love to LOA.

Finally, it has been an incredible two years serving as your LOA National President. I am extremely grateful for LOA true believers at all levels, from the selfless, dedicated National and Executive Board to the innovative, energetic and inspirational Chapter Presidents around the globe. I also have to thank the Past Presidents and esteemed group of Senior Leaders for their guidance and support. It has been an honor and a privilege to serve LOA in this capacity. I pray all of God’s blessings upon you and the Association.

Sincerely,

Col Dennis P. Dabney, USAF (Ret)
President
Greetings Log Nation!

After 16 years fighting the Global War on Terror (GWOT), we have become extremely efficient supporting rotational and sustainment operations in support of the fight against Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs). The Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) construct has been highly effective in preparing our Airmen to deploy worldwide and securing the Air Force mission and those of our mission partners. Our Airmen are making the mission successful even as we have seen force reductions and a continued, significant demand in the CENTCOM AOR. Air Force Logisticians have provided the “jawbone” for the GWOT fight and established efficiencies to meet the needs of Combatant Commanders even under a constrained environment. The success of the AEF has been a direct reflection of the flexibility and expertise within the Logistics community.

Although we continue to support the VEO fight through the AEF construct, we also recognize the need to prepare for the future fight by analyzing mission requirements and determining the most effective force presentation model for combat support and combat service support forces. As we shift our focus to tomorrow’s potential fights, we continue to rebuild full spectrum readiness to ensure the Air Force is prepared to operate globally, effectively and lethally within a competition and deterrence framework against a peer or near-peer adversary. With the last 15 years focused on the VEO fight, we must shift our intellectual efforts back toward preparing for a Major Combat Operations (MCO). The challenges posed by MCO are different, and in some cases will be more difficult than most currently serving Airmen have seen in their careers. This sight adjustment represents a significant departure from today’s environment in how we conduct operations for planning, to posturing and readiness, through sourcing and execution. MCO require our operational units to prepare to deploy as part of their home wing – one origin, one destination – and support the iron home and away. Preparing for a MCO is not new – this force presentation concept was our baseline prior to 9/11. We do not plan to revert to outdated capabilities; we are reinvigorating a MCO mentality designed to face peer and near-peer adversaries swiftly
and effectively with Agile Combat Support as the key determinate of projection of combat power against those threats.

In the past, Phase I and Phase II exercises were a regular, common event across all installations with a MCO response mission. These exercises ensured we were prepared to meet the MCO mission set by deploying large portions of a single installation to operate together in a deployed environment. Regularly ensuring our installations could mobilize to meet DOC statement or OPLAN response times not only guaranteed proficiency of the mobility machine, it also allowed our Airmen to have a greater understanding and appreciation of the true nature of MCO strategies and processes. Additionally, Airmen gained the necessary hands-on experiences required to deploy and operate in a contested environment, including Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) threats. The “MOPP dance” was being done at every fighting wing, by every Airman and provided a realistic learning environment at home station.

The efficiencies we have built to meet the CENTCOM and AEF requirements required a degree of “leaning out” of our deployment concept. Splitting complete capabilities into component UTC parts, many down to its component AFSCs by skill level, assisted sourcing and execution actions for enduring operations in the longest continuous conflict in our nation’s history. However, the current force presentation, where many UTCs are tasked to form a single capability is too cumbersome to meet the demand of MCO requirements. We must take a hard look at how we are presenting forces to the Combatant Commanders to ensure we are identifying complete capabilities designed to move at the squadron, group and wing levels.

The POL community, as an example, currently has numerous UTCs covering many of the job tasks they perform. UTCs exist for supervision, varying degrees of flightline support, cryogenic laboratory, and fuels storage. These are effective when executing rotational sourcing to minimize impacts against home station operations. They enable the requirements to be spread across the total force easily while keeping a baseline of forces available at home to conduct the day-to-day needs of the garrison mission. However, they do not support a construct requiring the wing, group and squadron to rapidly deploy as teams.

The future state will present a complete POL capability to the maximum extent possible, with a significant reduction in the number of UTCs presented. Within the LRS, POL exists as a flight and the capability will be presented as such. The POL flight commander down to the A1C distributing fuel to aircraft will be the same in the AOR as at home. The whole of POL’s combat capability can be presented in a few UTCs rather than the “a la carte” listing presented today in the UTC libraries. POL teams will be connect-
ed across their duty sections and flight, the same way they exist today in garrison.

This change allows for squadron commanders to effectively manage their resources with the knowledge that those will be the resources available to them while deployed to the maximum extent possible. The squadron will be prepared to simply change the scenery at the office; not the mission, names and faces in which so much time and resources have been invested to maximize mission effectiveness. This will paint a clear picture of what we do to the operational planning community and streamline Organize, Train, and Equip (OT&E) actions for squadron commanders. With fewer splits in functional capability, the Air Force will be suited to retain the operational benefits of home station relationships and shared experiences that translate into increased combat effectiveness.

Our ability to adapt to changing threats and ready ourselves to meet MCO mission requirements is a crucial piece of ensuring we can fly, fight and win against any enemy. Logistics is the driving force behind projecting combat airpower and guarantees the security of our nation in any environment. As we refocus ourselves to the MCO mindset, we will be readying ourselves to answer the call when the full force of air-power is necessary at a moment’s notice while still executing today’s mission requirements. The first step is to re-adjust our behaviors and instincts and re-learn the logistics skills necessary for mass movement. With the right frame of mind, we can begin to evolve our force presentation with new priorities being considered to meet the fight of the future. This perspective is imperative and the success of the mission depends on our carrying out these actions swiftly and seamlessly. I am confident we will meet these challenges, both new and old, as we always have and always will.

Lt Gen John B. Cooper,  
Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Engineering, and Force Protection  
Headquarters US Air Force, Washington, DC
LOA is now part of the Combined Federal Campaign!

"Show some logistics love by giving to the Logistics Officer Association through the CFC. Our designation number is #53503.

**LOA CFC #53503**

#LOALove #ShowSomeLoveCFC”
If you are a current civilian looking to change jobs or seeking promotion, a military member considering life after your service in uniform, or a private industry Logisticians considering a civil service role; chances are you will have to interview for that job. There are a lot of different ways that process can unfold, but this article focuses on the typical guidance given for an Air Force civil service interview. These are some tips and things to consider to aid you on that first step to a new work experience.

When you are selected for an interview you may feel like you are halfway to the job of your dreams (or at least the one you applied for). However, without proper preparation, nothing could be farther from the truth. It is important to know as much about the process and your work experience as possible. Interviewing is both an “art” and a “science”. The “art” aspect is reflected in how to best articulate who you are and how that aligns with the specialized experience of the job itself. The “science” comes in your preparation on both the needs of the organization to which you are applying and your own experience. While this may be true for all types of interviews, this article covers the traditional interview process adopted by the Air Force and in use by the Logistics community. In this traditional interview process, you will have a set amount of time to review questions and then a set amount of time to answer those questions with very little to no feedback; it is primarily a monologue. There are some organizations and positions that use another approach, namely a behavior-based interview that does include more follow-up questions, although most still follow the traditional interview approach.

As you are applying for jobs, look at the Duties; Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities (KSA); and specialized experience required for the job. You should take some time to make sure that your resume is tailored to those aspects, and includes any related experience you may have. This area should also include the job series and grade level for each aspect of your work history, and if not completed as part of Federal Service, then the equivalent level and/or military rank associated. You should also include all of your relevant credentials, along the lines of the Logistics Anchors. The Logistics Anchors include depth and demonstrated proficiency in a single area, breadth in another complementary area, education, professional certificates, and professional military education. These are the baseline differentiators that
will help you get to the interview and set you apart from your competition. You will also use this information to guide your interview preparation.

While you only have a short time, generally 15 minutes, to review the specific questions prior to the interview, you can make the most out of your prep time by understanding the questions that may be asked ahead of time and also by knowing your own experience. Think about your experience and the type of experience that might be required for a position for which you would submit an application. Start to develop some “stories” that you can tell in just a few minutes about that experience. Prepare these stories along the Context, Action, Result (CAR) or Situation, Task, Action, Result (STAR) method. You want to consider the specific actions you yourself took, even if the overall effort was handled by a team. This will ensure that you talk about the person interviewing – you – and not the team.

These should be good examples of work you completed, with enough background to explain why there was a need for the action, and the result of those actions (money or time saved, mission completion, etc.). It is best to have several good, relatively recent examples that you can easily share and explain within just a few minutes. You will be “on the clock” and timed, so own the time given and use it to your advantage. While perhaps not specifically scored, doing well with the time limits also shows your time management skills.

As to the questions themselves, they will vary from job to job. However, there are some common themes that you can expect. In some organizations, there will be a short introductory question similar to “Tell me about yourself.” Sometimes you will see point values associated with the questions. If there is an opening, ice-breaker type question like this, it generally is not scored. Therefore, think “elevator speech” style for an answer; something short that perhaps reflects unique attributes you possess or items you want to highlight on your resume that may not be used in subsequent ques-
tions. Do not spend a lot of time on an ice-breaker type question. From there on out, you will want to make sure that you are referencing the question you are answering. If someone doesn’t read it to you, make sure it is clear which question you are answering as most organizations will only accept your answer if specifically referencing that question. Even if you answer it later on during another question or in your wrap-up, if you don’t reference it to a specific question, it may not count. You can expect there will be a question related to the technical aspects of the job, those Duties, KSAs, and the specialized experience. Further, expect some questions on how you work with others, whether it be from a teaming approach, conflict resolution, or from a supervisory or leadership standpoint. For a supervisory question, consider the differences between supervision and leadership and your own personal leadership style or philosophy. Many interviews will also want to know about your communication skills and experience. These you can prepare for well in advance and have your “stories” outlined beforehand to help you quickly recall them, naturally, without reading a script.

Once you have combed through your record, previous awards, summary of past jobs, and resume, you should take time to practice answering sample questions. Ask your supervisor, mentor, or someone in your network to hold a mock interview, or conduct your own interview in a video so that you can critique yourself afterwards. You want to have as much prep work done as possible before you are even selected for an interview. I recommend that you only have an outline of potential answers, not a speech, as panel members can usually tell, either visually or by tone of voice, if you are reading answers and this tends to leave a slightly negative impression. If you have most of this prepared ahead of time, you can use your prep time to verify that you understand exactly what is being asked and that you are addressing all parts of the questions. You will have time to compare which prepared examples you can use to best answer the questions provided. If you don’t have experience in something overly specific it is “OK”, but try to answer in such a way that you understand the topic and/or that you have experience in something similar. Remember that the questions can be multiple questions in one, and they do get more difficult the higher you go up the pay scale!

There are some basics to all organizations that can help you through this process. If you put yourself in the hiring manager’s place, they want someone that will be low maintenance and low risk – someone who can get the job done. They want the best, while also getting someone that will fit in the organization, contribute, enjoy what they do, and also won’t cause problems. Demonstrate this by articulating your experience and demonstrated success in multiple situations – those most relevant to the job at hand, even if they were accomplished in a volunteer capacity or other unique situation such as part of a professional organization or teaching.
Your preparation will show how much you want the job, and it will allow you to convey your energy level and enthusiasm for selection. The experiences you have are the foundation for continued success, and a track record of progression and continuous self-improvement can be additional indicators of future performance should you be selected. In an interview setting, consider the oxymoron I attribute to a former Executive Director: being “pride-fully humble” as well as being honest with your answers. You want to show what you have authentically accomplished and what you can bring to the new position.

There are some other basics to consider, such as avoiding acronyms to ensure the panel knows what you are trying to communicate and to rehearse where you will be going (if not a phone interview) so that you can arrive early. If it is a phone interview, make sure you have a quiet location without distractions. Don’t make any assumptions that the panel may know you, an organization, or a position you once held; if you don’t say it in the interview, it likely won’t count. Avoid negativity or denigrating someone or something else with your answers. If you are asked for a negative example, be honest and try to put a positive spin on it. As an example; “I can be a procrastinator, so I create my schedule in advance so that I don’t run out of time and I have successfully turned in all projects without being late.” Consider appropriate attire, your body language, respectful speech, and eye contact. Convey the best possible you, but not someone you have made up.

Overall, make sure that the job is a good match. You want to make sure it is a job you feel confident that you can accomplish, that you will have a meaningful role. If not, it may not be the right position or the right time for you, even if you are qualified. You are not just being interviewed, you are also measuring whether or not you want the job. Success does not always mean you get the job and failure doesn’t necessarily mean you didn’t. It is a learning opportunity for when you are the right person, for the right job, at the right time. Until then, always ask for feedback. And it doesn’t hurt to be grateful for the time spent on your application, either.

For additional words of wisdom/do’s and don’ts/tips and tricks, directly from a current Air Force Senior Executive Service member, Mrs. Lisa Smith, check out the video on Interviewing at the following link:


If you have any further questions or concerns, please feel free to contact the Logistics Career Field Team at afpc.logistics.cft@us.af.mil, DSN 665-2365/Commercial 210-565-2365.

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Repair Network Integration: Resolving Repair Constraints Through Depot and Field Collaboration

The Repair Network Integration (RNI) Initiative is one of several ongoing Enterprise Logistics Strategy efforts. For a basic primer on RNI concepts and metrics, please reference the RNI articles that appeared in the Spring and Summer 2017 Exceptional Release. This final article highlights recent efforts to align Repair Network (RN) activity with existing depot processes and constraint resolution efforts.

One of the keys to successful repair network management is networking the enterprise. Networking means connecting maintenance locations that have shared equities and providing enterprise visibility to a central point of contact, the Repair Network Manager (RNM). This connection enables RNMs to review enterprise information necessary to best utilize the Air Force’s available repair capacity and thus maximize support to the Warfighter. The effort reviewed in this article is a small step to connecting the RN across the enterprise (field and depot). This effort has the potential to significantly decrease Repair Cycle Time (RCT) and in some instances reduce MICAPs.

The RNI vision always included both intermediate and depot repair facilities; however, in 2014 the Logistics Board approved a phased implementation plan focused on networking field repair capability [base backshops and Centralized Repair Facilities (CRF)] first. In 2016, the HAF/A4 and the commanders of Air Force Sustainment Center (AFSC) and Air Force Life Cycle Management Center (AFLCMC) agreed to begin the next steps toward increasing collaboration across the repair enterprise to include both depot and field locations.

Following this agreement, the Enterprise Repair Constraint Resolution Working Group (ERCR WG) was established in August 2016. Its objective was to identify ways for the field and depot to better leverage the capa-
bility and capacity of existing RNs. A multi-day workshop was then held in Dayton, OH, and facilitated by the RNI Program Management Office (PMO). Participants included SAF/AQD and FM, AFSC/LG, 635th Supply Chain Operations Wing (SCOW), 448th Supply Chain Management Wing (SCMW), business office representatives from Ogden and Tinker Air Logistics Complexes (ALCs), logistics staff from Air Combat Command (ACC), Air Force Global Strike Command (AFGSC), Air Mobility Command (AMC), AFLCMC, and the Logistics Directorate of Headquarters Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC).

Using continuous process improvement methodologies, the working group identified two initial scenarios to better leverage the RN:

1. Decreasing instances where Intermediate Level (I-Level) repairs are sent to the Air Logistics Complexes (ALC) due to a local constraint.

2. Leveraging condition code F (unserviceable) assets awaiting induction for depot maintenance when specific criteria are met (i.e., low asset availability, MICAPs).

With the above opportunities in mind, the working group identified four lines of effort to investigate further:

**Executing the Lines of Effort - NRTS Analysis and Engaging the RNM**

To accomplish the first two lines of effort in Figure 3, the RNI PMO established a team of representatives from the ERCR WG and each MAJCOM to conduct an analysis of “Not Reparable at This Station” (NRTS) data to estimate how often I-Level reparables are sent to depot for repair due to local repair constraints. This is important because I-Level repair can generally be accomplished much faster than Depot Level repair because the item will not be completely overhauled. Therefore accomplishing I-Level repair, when possible, reduces RCT and gets critical items back into the hands of Mission Generator faster.
NRTS-1 is an Action Taken Code (ATC) recorded in retail supply records, indicating a repair cannot be completed at I-Level because it exceeds Technical Order (TO) authorization. However, the analysis demonstrated this code was used frequently at some repair nodes on National Stock Numbers (NSNs) with a high rate of repair at other locations in the field. The data call supported the analysis and found that many items were sent for Depot Level repair coded with NRTS-1, when the actual cause was a local repair constraint versus exceeding TO repair authorization. The analysis included:

- NRTS-1 actions taken among 48 high-driving hydraulic NSNs which represented 87% of all NRTS-1 actions in the hydraulic enterprise
- Data for a one year period (Sep 2015 to Sep 2016) and 115 backshop locations worldwide
- Data call feedback received from 55 backshops across ACC, AFRC, AMC, ANG, PACAF and US- AFE

Results: Analysis, as shown in Figure 4 below, indicated the majority of NRTS-1 actions occurred due to temporary local constraints such as lack of manpower, tools, test equipment, or piece parts, rather than exceeding TO authorization.

This analysis confirmed the need to collaboratively engage in constraint management, and highlighted an opportunity to use the enterprise perspective of a RNM to explore options to redirect work to other I-Level locations when local repair is temporarily constrained.

RNMs have made periodic review of NRTS activities as part of their routine, engaging field locations when they detect an increase in NRTS actions that may be mitigated by temporarily redirecting work.

The above NRTS analysis sparked a second study chartered by the 635 SCOW to identify the potential benefit of optimizing field repair through lateral repair. Analysts explored the potential inventory savings...
and backlog reduction if I-Level repair constraints were resolved through lateral support rather than NRTS’d to depot.

This analysis:

- Included 300+ NSNs currently repaired at the hydraulic CRF at a rate of roughly 75%
- Assumed entire hydraulic repair enterprise could achieve an average repair rate of 75% by resolving constraints and/or redirecting work laterally around those constraints

Results: The results were compelling and demonstrated a repair rate of 75% across all field locations would yield:

- A 66% drop in expected backorders
- Decreased RCT (notionally, average of 64 days RCT via a depot to an average of 5 days RCT in the field)
- A pipeline inventory reduction of $16M

Another benefit of optimizing repair in the field is providing the right workload to the right level of repair, assisting both field and depot maintenance in doing their part to repair priorities for the enterprise.

This study did not disregard the potential for transportation costs to increase. The analysis assumed some items would still be NRTS’d to depot after being shipped for lateral repair. This cost would account for less than 1% of the potential savings from inventory reduction.

An Example: The RNMs at the 635 SCOW have taken these concepts from theory to practical application. Recently, RNMs identified an opportunity to re-direct I-Level KC-135 hydraulic components from the AFCENT AOR to available I-Level capacity at the Hydraulic CRF at Offutt AFB, NE. The volume of work re-directed is relatively small, but RCT stands to decrease from 42 days to roughly 7 days.

Executing the Lines of Effort - Process Map and Financial Map

Complementary to the first two lines of effort in Figure 3, the second two address instances in which I-Level work is still incorrectly NRTS’d to depot or other mitigating factors. The ERCR WG members from the 448 SCMW set out to establish a repeatable process which could be used on an exception basis to redistribute carefully selected “Condition Code F” (unserviceable) assets from DLA warehouses to the field for I-Level repair. The team mapped and vetted the process and an update to 448 SCMW Operating Instructions is in work. The process to move items from DLA warehouse will only be pursued when:

- RO fill rate for an asset falls below 60%, or
- Serviceable supply on-hand falls below 30 days on items with high rate of field repair

When this occurs, RNMs assist in determining a location with available capacity to execute the repair(s) and an Item Manager (IM) will initiate shipment of the part to the appropriate location. If the field repair location is able to repair the item, then a “Condition Code A”
(serviceable) asset is turned back to supply and ultimately shipped to the highest priority requisition, putting a serviceable critical part in the hands of a Mission Generator faster.

The ERCR WG acknowledged this process would involve multiple financial transactions as inventory changed possession. To ensure charges and reimbursements did not negatively impact the Air Force Working Capital Fund (AFWCF) or violate statutes, financial analysts from Headquarters Air Force and Headquarters AFMC mapped the transactions that would occur. Analysis confirmed current financial policy provided appropriate accounting for these transactions. Established accounting procedures properly track inventory changes, and there are no negative effects to local inventory AFWCF level accounting.

**Next Steps**

The ERCR WG successfully identified and implemented ways to better leverage the RN through increased collaboration between I-Level repair locations and depot repair facilities (see Figure 5). This analysis highlighted opportunities to increase I-Level repair success through RNM collaboration and constraint resolution. This work has the potential to reduce RCT and potential backorders. Additionally, the ERCR WG identified and documented a process to leverage the RN when the enterprise could benefit from distribution of select I-Level reparables from DLA warehouse to the field and confirmed there are no negative financial impacts.

The lessons learned by this working group will be applied to other Product Repair Groups (PRGs) beyond hydraulic components, and other ongoing Enterprise Logistics Group (ELG) capability initiatives will be informed by the collaborative and responsive methods developed by this team.
How can you engage?

- MAJCOMS can engage field units and emphasize the importance of correct NRTS code usage and ensuring repair cycle records are accurate via collaboration with their local LRS.

- MAJCOMs, and local commanders can encourage nodes to leverage the RNMs at the 635 SCOW to assist in resolving constraints for I-Level repair.

- Logistics stakeholders can engage RNMs or the RNI PMO to bring forward opportunities to better utilize the AF’s existing capacity to resolve issues.

The RNI Team is working hard to identify new ways to increase support to Mission Generation using the AF’s existing resources. The effort highlighted in this article made a small change in the Hydraulics Network, but has big impacts in terms of support to Mission Generators and AF Logistics. The RNI Team will continue applying RNI principles to put the next small change with big AF impacts into action. To get engaged or learn more about RNI impacts, contact the RNI PMO with any questions at AFMC.RNI.PMO@us.af.mil or visit our SharePoint site: https://cs.eis.af.mil/sites/10252/default.aspx

For more information on each RN PRGs:

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Name: Garrett Canter

LOA Chapter: Wasatch Warriors

Position: President

Hometown: Tallahassee, FL

College(s): United States Air Force Academy

Degree(s): B.S.; MBA

Family (names): Wife - Capt Holland Canter (64P)

Professional Duty Title: USAF Logistics Career Broadening Officer

First Duty Location and Duty Title: Holloman AFB, NM / Deputy Flight Commander, Materiel Management, Materiel Maintenance Support Squadron

What do you like most about being a loggie?

Working with the Air Force’s greatest resource, its people. Logistics covers such a large spectrum. There are so many different things to be a part of and at the foundation of it all, are amazing people.

What are you most proud of in your time on active duty?

The instances where I was able to help someone get accepted to OTS or get a job they always wanted. For me the greatest accomplishments are those times when I can help break barriers.

As a recognized leader in your local LOA Chapter, what activities/events are you most proud of?

We have had many great events in the short time since the chapter turned over. The most memorable are always our DV luncheons. However, I am most excited about the future and helping the AOA chapter get started here at Hill.

What trips and tours do you plan on taking with LOA?

There are lots of opportunities to tour many of the Air Force’s contractors and corporate partners in the surrounding area. We look forward to taking advantage of those opportunities.

Do you have any shout-outs?

My awesome wife, Holland. While supporting me in whatever I want to get into, she also finds the time to have her own amazing career. She truly makes me a better person every day.
Focus on a CGO

Name: William “Bill” Borowski
LOA Chapter: Wasatch Warriors (Hill AFB)
Position: Treasurer
Hometown: Buffalo, NY
College(s): Indiana University South Bend / West Texas A&M
Degree(s): B.S. in Biology / MBA
Commissioning Source: OTS
Family (names): (Wife) Annie
Children: Nathaniel (5), Madilyn (4), Lincoln (5 months)
Technical Training: LRO Basic Course
Professional Duty Title: USAF Logistics Career Broadening Officer
First Duty Location and Duty Title: Malmstrom AFB, MT / Vehicle Management Deputy Flight Commander

What has been your proudest moment?

Professionally, my proudest moment actually happened just a few months ago during my career broadening rotation in the 309th Commodities Maintenance Group at Hill AFB. Recently, the C-5 fleet was grounded by the AMC/CC due to two incidents where the nose landing gear failed to properly extend. The root cause was the failure of the Ball Screw Drive Assemblies that have not been procured or overhauled for years, and there were just a handful of serviceable assets available for the whole fleet. With no options to procure additional assets in the near term, my team in the 331st Commodities Maintenance Squadron worked closely with AMC/A4, the 417th Supply Chain Management Squadron, the 309th Aerospace Maintenance And Regeneration Group, and DLA Aviation and Distribution to rapidly develop a limited repair capability that previously did not exist for these assets. It was a true team effort with engineering developing a new repair process, rapid procurement of piece parts, tooling, and equipment for repair, and technical experts turning wrenches to complete the repairs. In the end, we were able to repair 104 Ball Screw Drive Assemblies to return the entire C-5 fleet to operational flying status in just 6 weeks and just in time to enable their use in the relief effort for Hurricanes Harvey and Irma. Now that’s what I call Agile Logistics Support!

How do you keep your leadership skills honed?

I’m a visual learner, so the first thing I do is look for leaders that I want to emulate, leaders that make me think “Wow! That’s the kind of leader I want to be.” I seek out mentoring relationships with those kinds of leaders and try to incorporate their leadership skills into my skillset. Second, I solicit feedback from peers and trusted subordinates on my leadership skills and where I can improve. I also read a lot of leadership articles in the journal Harvard Business Review. One thing I’ve found though is that not all leadership techniques work for everyone. If you try to force a leadership technique that is in direct conflict with your personality, it probably won’t go as well as you intended. Find the right mix of leadership skills that work for you.

What leadership skills/traits are most important to logistics officers?

The most important leadership skill for logistics officers is to find the right balance between trusting your people and probing further with questions. As an LRO,
I will manage a diverse set of logistics functions over my career, and I will never be the expert. If you trust blindly, you’ll eventually get burned. But if you are constantly digging too deep, your team will feel micro-managed. Finding the right balance is critical to leading an organization. Second, I believe strongly in leading by intent. Again, I will never be the expert as an LRO, so I avoid telling my team exactly how to accomplish a task. Instead, I provide them my intent of what I want to accomplish and a vision of the end state, and I let them tell me how we’re going to do it. Third, interpersonal relationship skills and negotiation are important. There will always be organizations outside your control that impact your ability to execute the mission. Building relationships and successfully influencing other organizations to improve their support to your mission will pay dividends.

**What are your personal aspirations?**

Most importantly, to be the best husband I can to my wife and the best father to my kids. While in Utah, I’m also looking forward to developing my snowboarding skills.

**Do you have any shout outs?**

First and foremost to my beautiful wife Annie who keeps me going strong and is an amazing mother to our 3 kids. I also want to give a shout out to MSgt Justin Tayler, who really mentored this young butter bar in my first assignment and set me on a path of success.
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Military logisticians from western countries are increasingly finding themselves in the far-flung reaches of the globe assessing, advising and assisting foreign militaries in the development of logistics capabilities. Often, both the logistics policy makers and practitioners find themselves immersed in environments replete with a great deal of uncertainty for which their previous logistics experience has not prepared them. Advising foreign militaries on logistics is a capability that is rapidly growing in importance and it is worth preparing logisticians with a framework for navigating the complexity of the advisory undertaking. A central precept in logistics is the imperative to create or maintain confidence within the supply chains. Confidence, as the logistics scholar-practitioner Henry Eccles described, is the level of trust between the creators of the logistics requirements and the system’s ability to meet the need. Eccles further proposed that confidence in supply lines leads to supply discipline while the lack of confidence in the supply chain drives waste, mismanagement, and ultimately failure of the combat forces. The Coalition advisory effort in Afghanistan is a useful case for testing supply chain advisory strategies and can yield useful lessons for future efforts. For practitioners and policy makers, managing uncertainty related to duration of the advisory commitment, careful selection of types and volume of equipment for the partner, and a better institutional understanding of how cultural context shapes potential outcomes is of critical importance in building confidence within partner nation logistics enterprises.

The Afghan Case: A Crisis of Confidence in Afghan Army Logistics

Afghan Army logisticians and the tactical commanders they support do not have confidence in their logistics system. There are three factors that foundationally affect confidence within the Afghan supply system that the Coalition can readily impact. These apply specifically to Afghanistan, but could be more broadly applied and considered in other cases. The first factor is uncertainty over how long the Coalition will remain in Afghanistan. The second is the quantity and intricacy of the equipment provided to Afghanistan. The final factor affecting confidence within the Afghan logistics community is a lack of trust among Afghans themselves;
something that is often observed by Coalition advisors but difficult to understand and overcome. While there certainly are multiple other variables of complexity, such as corruption, illiteracy, and the insurgency itself, these are not as easily affected by near-term Coalition logistics advisory efforts. Level of commitment, type and volume of support, and local context are the key measures in most logistics advisory missions that can be influenced within the supply chain community.

**Short-term commitment drives uncertainty**

To the Afghans who are used to thinking in terms of decades or longer, the logistics commitment has seemed relatively short-term or at least uncertain, even after 16 years of war. This has contributed significantly to the lack of confidence. The uncertainty inherent in the partner force is often detected by Coalition advisors and described as “hedging.” Hedging, or protecting against unknown negative outcomes, is a common and often unconscious method for dealing with uncertainty that can be observed anywhere from commodities trading, to parenting, or, in this case, in the execution of logistics in Afghanistan. While the duration and intensity of Coalition involvement is determined outside the logistics community, it is still critical to acquire and then provide available information to the Afghans about the strategic logistics situation. While full reassurance is not feasible, building a shared long-term planning process with the Afghans is a step towards rebuilding confidence. This is more challenging than it sounds because the Coalition is not often fully aware of all the various inputs that are on the way. Additionally, Afghan culture does not align well with western tendencies for detailed planning in logistics. Afghans prefer to think and plan in blocks of time measuring in the hundreds of years in contrast to western logistics planners who generally see anything beyond two fiscal years as “long-term.” Despite cultural incongruities, a shared perspective has to be developed to help lessen the uncertainty of support timelines.

Another aspect of the Coalition advisory mission that reduces confidence in the supply system is the short duration of advisors’ tours. This hampers the advising mission by making it difficult to build long-term relationships with the counterpart. The constant churn of advisors leaves many Afghans with noticeable advisor fatigue and this prevents the development of long-term trust. It is conceivable that after 15 years of war an Afghan logistician may have dealt with dozens of advisors. Many Afghan logisticians even fondly remember their old Soviet advisors. Based on long experience dealing with advisors, Afghans tend to have a good grasp on how to extract the results they want from the Coalition. Afghans often seem to have a relational advantage from long experience as the host nation that most advisors simply cannot match for lack of experience in this arena.

In contrast to the brief tours of the Coalition, the Soviet advisors often stayed in Afghanistan for three
to four years and generally enjoyed rank parity with their counterparts. While the Soviets had their own struggles with logistics, their advisory mission was successful at implanting their processes deeper into the Afghan logistics system than the Coalition has so far. This potentially indicates that tour management is closely tied to influencing the Afghan logistics enterprise towards the desired outcomes.

The limits of the Afghan logistics system are hard to convey to the broader policy making apparatus because Coalition logisticians are often incentivized to portray a rosy picture of the Afghan supply system. The tricky part of advising is that Coalition officers, especially from the US, are graded by the performance of the Afghans they advise, which is often poor from a western perspective. While this is somewhat unfair to the advisor, it tends to create an environment where unpleasant realities are ignored or suppressed long enough for the advisor to depart the country. The incentive to portray progress in the Afghan system is almost irresistible and often unconscious, but it certainly is a factor that obscures a realistic assessment. It also drives advisors to take a far more active role in controlling the foreign supply chain, which in turn tends to impede learning in the partner-nation logisticians. Longer tours and even repeat tours could help slow this cycle down by preventing short-term thinking up and down the advisory chain of command. Decoupling individual advisor performance from the behavior of the host system could also help change the incentive structure.

Advisors should serve a minimum of one year in country with a serious effort undertaken to reward and recruit the brave souls who can handle more. US programs like Afghanistan-Pakistan (AFPAK) Hands have helped some in this regard and other civilian “reach back” logistics programs are being implemented. However, rigid personnel systems often inhibit the utility of these types of programs by limiting their scope, size and career incentives to the member. Extracting flexibility from a bureaucratic personnel system is a complex problem in-and-of itself, but it is one that must be looked at as an indirect approach to build confidence in host nation supply systems. The broader implication is that effective tour management is an important factor in the advisory framework.

Quantification of Supply and Advanced Technology in the Afghan Supply Chain

Related to the problem of short-term military intervention has been the Coalition tendency to inadvertently overwhelm the Afghan system with large quantities of supplies. The political uncertainty surrounding support to Afghanistan induces the Coalition to send as much materiel as possible as quickly as possible in an effort to meet strategic timelines for Afghan progress and western withdrawal. While the overall effort is based on assisting Afghanistan, it is carried out based on political conditions in western capitals with little thought given to
Afghan capabilities to manage the inputs. Unfortunately, both the quantity and technologically advanced equipment that often arrives is beyond the Afghan’s ability to adequately absorb into their system and operate effectively. The effect has been to reduce the Afghan-led distributions to a trickle while piles of poorly managed supplies line the warehouses throughout the country.

Finding and bringing uncounted supplies into the record-keeping files has absorbed a significant amount of advisory effort that could have been focused on other aspects of the supply system. The Coalition has taken steps to try and address property accountability through the use of automated data systems. However, these new processes, among many other challenges, do not address the strategic problem of overall incoming supply volume or the types of supplies flowing to the Afghans.

Many types of spare parts for vehicles and equipment requiring regular software upgrades are particularly problematic for an illiterate, unwired army. The supply chain is clogged with equipment that is too advanced for the Afghan Army to use and maintain so it is simply stockpiled along the line and eventually lost or stolen. The Afghans are partly to blame for wasteful stockpiling, but the Coalition certainly bears much responsibility for setting-up a logistics agenda that was too ambitious for the host nation. The Coalition induced quantity and complexity; and the Afghan tendency for strategic hedging limit the effectiveness of the supply system.

As an example, High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs) have been fielded as the primary combat vehicle for the Afghan Army. The trucks are frequently down due to lack of maintenance and when missions are canceled there is little appetite for tasks that don’t involve American style-HMMWV tactics. A mechanized, modern army is not possible for Afghans right now and their supply chain is not ready for that kind of warfare. Despite years of investment, the Afghan Ministry of Defense’s maintenance capability is still struggling to sustain the expensive HMMWV fleet. A basic understanding of the Afghan military and logistics context at the outset of the conflict could have yielded a better advisory and supply model, something applicable to future advisory missions. For Afghanistan, perhaps a force more reliant on foot power or the small, cheap 4x4 trucks would have been more appropriate and effective for the circumstances. While this approach involves tactical tradeoffs, little assessment was done to determine what was logistically reasonable for the Afghan Army. Much of the US provided equipment, including the HMMWVs, is beginning to stack up in “boneyards” throughout the country right alongside the old Soviet equipment that suffered a similar fate. It has even been suggested that camels or donkeys would have been a better mobility option that was more in keeping with the nature of the Afghan military.

Another clear example of overreach is in the
Fielding of equipment that requires regular software upgrades to function. This has been particularly obvious in some of the pieces of counter-IED and communication equipment. These items are fielded to Afghan units with no advisor support at the tactical level. It becomes almost impossible for this equipment to be updated independently by the Afghans in the field, and getting them back to a Coalition node for upgrade is just as difficult. This eliminates the utility of the item while needlessly consuming limited management and transportation resources.

A comprehensive reassessment of what the Coalition is buying should reveal some areas where volume and complicated technology could be reduced. While assessments are sometimes carried out they seem to result in even higher supply volume and more advanced equipment being touted as the solution for Afghan logistics challenges. Retooling the purchase program with current Afghan capabilities in mind should streamline the supply chain and make it easier to restore confidence in the system. At the very least, an analysis of the last 15 years of support could provide a rudimentary perception of what is working and what is failing for the Afghans. Simple supply lines seem to be all Afghanistan can handle right now.

Critical to the broader logistics advisory community is the idea of tailoring supply chain solutions to the circumstances of the host nations. Failure to do this makes it difficult to improve the confidence and functions of the supported logistics enterprise. The watchword for logistics solutions should rest in a proven concept of warfare: “simplicity”

Confidence Among Afghans

The most complex aspect of the logistics system in Afghanistan is the lack of confidence the logisticians and commanders at all levels of the Ministry of Defense (MOD) have amongst themselves. Afghans notoriously fail to trust each other in what should be routine supply interactions. The lack of confidence is often seen but rarely understood on a deeper level. The first step in countering this dynamic is to invest effort to understand it. Indeed, the multiple ethnic divisions are but one variable among many others, and the Coalition has only a basic understanding of the human network involved in logistics in Afghanistan.

While most advisors can readily identify if their counterpart is Pashtun, Hazara, or Tajik, few are aware of the myriad of other divisions that often cut across ethnic lines. Most advisors are likely unaware of which political party or leader a given officer may support; or perhaps what sub-tribe he belongs to and who its rivals are and why. These are important pieces of information in building influence across an enterprise in Afghanistan. The best advisors begin to see the vague outlines of the power relationships towards the end of their tours and this valuable insight is often lost upon their redeploy-
ment. Particularly in Kabul, key logistics positions are routinely bought; creating a disparate and competing set of priorities among the various patronage networks vying for influence. The level of knowledge to effectively navigate the complex human terrain is not captured and analyzed in the logistics institution.

One way to address the gap in human network understanding is to embed a permanent human terrain team or similar analytical tool within the strategic logistics advising community. A human terrain team, often led by a professional anthropologist, focuses on gathering and assessing key demographic data points that can shed light on cultural perspectives of the population. In essence, they study culture. Previous human terrain efforts in Afghanistan focused on demographically “mapping” specific regions and networks for targeted development or village stability operations. The intent was to inform commanders on the best way to engage the people in those areas, something the logistics advising community could employ with good effect. Even if the cultural analysis capability does not take the form of the human terrain team it is worth exploring how to both gather and institutionalize the necessary cultural information for effective advising. This data will vary from country to country, but the value of the data itself is not often integrated into advising strategy. A good analysis of the people involved in the logistics enterprise could help advisors see more clearly the hidden power dynamics among the Afghans they advise. Armed with a more thorough picture of the relational networks, Coalition advisors will know where confidence building is possible and avoid lines of effort where it is unlikely.

Restoring confidence in a supply chain is no simple task, and one that will increasingly fall on a small cadre of logisticians called to do the work far from home. In the Afghan case the Coalition can tailor its efforts by improving inclusiveness in planning with Afghans and lengthening advisory tours. Simplifying the supply chain and adjusting it to an Afghan context will make it more manageable for both the Coalition and the Afghans. Most importantly, all advisory efforts should be grounded in a deep cultural understanding of Afghan logisticians. As confidence in the supply system is slowly built positive strategic opportunities will become available for the long-term stability of Afghanistan.

The global efforts to inculcate host nation logistics enterprises with confidence will revolve around many of the same factors seen today in Afghanistan. First, the commitment of western countries in the overall advisory mission can vary based on many circumstances, most of them political. Logisticians should include their counterparts as much as possible in the long-term planning. Perhaps even more importantly, the advisory mission must be staffed with individuals that are specifically selected for their cultural prowess and relationship building skills. Confidence, at its core, is about relationships.
One aspect of advising that is more directly controlled at the policy level is the type and amount of equipment sent to the host nation. Without a serious effort to evaluate and assess the host’s ability to absorb and utilize the weapon systems a significant amount of supply risk is being injected into the system. Confidence is difficult to build in an environment where the host nation is struggling under complex supply systems demanded by western policy makers as was seen in Afghanistan.

The most complex task of the advisor is to build confidence within an enterprise among the host nation logisticians. Cultural context and a myriad of other factors just beneath the surface need to be understood at an institutional level so policy makers can properly allocate scarce advisory resources. In essence, institutional understanding of how to function cross-culturally needs to be grown within the advisory community at large.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Capt Philip Lere is an USAF logistics officer and former AFPAK Hand. He has advised Afghan logisticians at the tactical and strategic levels during two tours in Afghanistan. He has a Masters in International Relations from the University of Oklahoma and a Masters in Strategic Security Studies from the National Defense University in Washington DC.
After 18-hours of traveling from Sacramento to Daegu, Republic of Korea (ROK) and receiving my second Army hour-long in-brief, my mind began to fade away. I thought back across my eight years of service to where I started my career, the Air Force Research Lab, Munitions Directorate, working in a geographically-separated section that filled bombs with new explosive formulations in hope to find the next “holy grail” of boom. It was there, as a Lieutenant, that I had my first real interactions with enlisted troops, specifically AMMO troops, who expunged what little “scientist culture” I had in me, and taught me to become the officer I am today. Times at Eglin were simple, we worked hard producing test munitions, but by virtue of being separated from our leadership, we were rarely noticed.

Fast forwarding four years to my time at Beale AFB, no longer am I a scientist playing AMMO, I am a fully career broadened, badge-wearing 21M. Yet, this concept of out-of-sight, out-of-mind endures for my 64 Airmen and me. The Air Force, by virtue of their name and mission, prioritizes flying above all, it is something I have grown up seeing, and grown up valuing as well. As a result, organizations such as munitions, are often forgotten about until their shortcomings affect the flying schedule.

About a year into my time at Beale AFB, an opportunity arose to participate in Exercise KEY RESOLVE. I knew little about the exercise, and asking around drove grand stories about sleeping outdoors and wearing chemical gear. Regardless of the account, the common theme existed of how amazing and fond people’s memories of the ROK were. Snapping back into the US Army briefing, looking to my left and right I see a Marine and a Sailor who look equally as exhausted and annoyed as I, we hear the same phrases repeated word for word, each of us thankful for our choice of service. It is upon hour 19 of traveling I finally am introduced to my bunk and crash.

Upon waking up the next morning, I report into my unit. I see familiar uniforms, although different badges, as a majority of the Air Force Officers are logisticians. I am actually the only munitions CGO from any service participating in the exercise, so while my unit, the Joint Logistics Operating Center – Korea (JLOC), had several different roles for CGOs, I was locked into
my munitions sect, however this time, in-sight and very much in-mind.

I was thrilled to meet my team of fellow munitions operators, we had a Navy O-4, Marine E-7, and an Air Force O-5. They were pleased at introductions to hear they were getting a munitions officer, however those smiles turned upside down in seconds upon hearing terms like, “career-broadener, physicist, and one-year of experience.” Regardless of the judgement, our team instantly bonded, spending our first few days in theater exchanging stories and learning about each of our service’s munitions. One particular thing we trained on, before the exercise kicked off, was our Battle Update Briefing to the Army Brigadier General (BG) who was in-charge of the JLOC. Each briefer lined up, prepared to give a 30-second elevator speech, and my day shift counterpart and mentor, the Air Force O-5, assured me I would be taking the first briefing.

The exercise kicked off much like how a severe weather warning causes popups and annoying sirens to blare on co-workers computers. By virtue of simulated ICBM strikes from North Korea on Seoul, we found ourselves in the middle of a “war.” Our early-war role was to track expenditure rates for munitions to fuel resupply. However before our first shift ended we were met with an Emergency Munitions Transfer Request (EMTR) from the ROK. While the US holds stockpiles of munitions on the Korean Peninsula, designed to fuel the first few days of war against North Korea, the ROK’s munitions reserves are not as deep. Their strategy is to purchase US munitions to fill their gaps. The EMTR is the staffing avenue for a quick sale of US munitions to the ROK in a time of need.

As I stood in line at my first Battle Update Briefing, I stepped forward and began to speak confidently about Patriot missile levels, knowing this was the BG’s main concern this early in the war, as Patriots are our defense against North Korea’s onslaught of ICBMs. Knowing he was Army, I took a chance and got in the weeds on the types of Army Patriots, letting him know we had less of the more efficient PAC-3 variants, than the less effective GEM-Ts. I received a nod, a moment of humanity, so I pressed, briefing him on the EMTR status. Here I was completely taken aback as I fielded questions on each service component’s status with providing us updates. He told me to give him regular updates in his office as we get them.

Aside from tracking munitions levels and EMTRs, the other main focus of my job was to push items through the Joint Materials Priorities Allocation Board (JMPAB). To understand what a JMPAB is, think back to Patriot Missiles. If the Patriot levels are low in the Korean Peninsula, a JMPAB is pushed from United States Forces – Korea (USFK) up to United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) requesting more. In this scenario, let’s assume PACOM has other Patriots, but they are guarding critical areas such as Anderson AFB,
or Japan. From here PACOM will route the request up to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), who will analyze US stockpiles from across the globe and decide if a resupply is required. Let’s assume they decide to pull Patriots from Kuwait based upon a perceived lesser threat from Iran vs. North Korea. My role here was to create and staff this request from USFK up to PACOM, then to the JCS. Once the JCS approved, I handled the logistics to get the items from United States Central Command into the Korean Peninsula and become functional by the US Army.

Throughout the two week exercise we ended up pushing two JMPABs and three EMTRs. I was utterly amazed and how fast staffing worked during a time of simulated war. There was one evening, during the exercise, where I was able to get three General Officers’ signatures in under 30 min. I walked in, gave an elevator speech, and walked out. Each General Officer valued how important munitions resupplies were in a war and gave our munitions team full support and these munitions request were prioritized and accomplished in minimal time.

This was actually the first exercise where an EMTR was staffed and signed by General Brooks, the USFK Commanding 4-star General. The documents originating from my munitions work station influenced policy discussions between General Brooks and the head of the ROK military. Army officers not only valued and cared, but were evaluated on their munitions’ efficiencies. Munitions in a joint environment were as important as flying was on an Air Force installation. This was such an amazing experience for any Air Force 21M officer, especially a career broadened one.
The Logistics of Landing and Painting the First RQ-4 Global Hawk at Robins AFB

By: Harriet Dunn

Weapon System Background

The RQ-4 Global Hawk is a high-altitude, long-endurance, Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) that provides military commanders with Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) over large geographic areas. The superior performance of the Global Hawk’s system significantly enhances the US military’s ability to prevail in all types of operations from sensitive peacekeeping missions to full-scale combat. It provides a clear picture of enemy positions to prevail over hostile forces. The Global Hawk platform was purchased as an “off-the-shelf” asset and is now transitioning from field-to-depot-level maintenance requirements.

Last year Robins AFB was asked to completely repaint an Air Force RQ-4 Global Hawk in order to make the aircraft more aerodynamic and improve fuel efficiency. While a freshly painted aircraft is aesthetically pleasing it is, more importantly, essential to prevent corrosion and keep the aircraft operating at full mission performance.

Logistics = Success

The logistics required to land the first Global Hawk at Robins AFB presented a wide variety of challenges. In order to rapidly identify and resolve those challenges, the Warner Robins Air Logistics Complex (ALC) formed an enterprise Integrated Product Team (IPT) composed of 22 organizations and over 150 Airmen that met weekly to identify and resolve issues as needed to ensure mission success.
Airfield Management: Obtaining the proper credentials from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) was mission essential. The FAA required an approved Letter of Agreement (LOA) and Certificate of Authorization (COA) to fly the Global Hawk into Robins AFB. The LOA is an agreement between Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport and Robins AFB allowing the Global Hawk to fly into Robins AFB and the COA allowed Robins to use Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport airspace within specific timeframes. The process for obtaining the LOA and COA was lengthy and had to be coordinated through the FAA and was approved prior to fly-in.

Fuels Management: The Global Hawk requires JP-8 fuel exclusively and cannot use Jet A fuel stored and maintained at Robins. The 78th Logistics Readiness Squadron completed a comprehensive fuels management plan for a short term and long term solution; using a fuel truck with JP-8 fuel in the immediate and coordinating the funding and construction of a new JP-8 fuel storage tank to begin in late 2017 to support future Global Hawk requirements.

Facilities and Capabilities: Besides finding the ideal facilities to accommodate painting an aircraft with the wingspan of a C-130 and length and height of an F-15, a skilled and adaptable workforce was also essential to success. The Robins AFB avionics mechanics, painters and ground-handling specialists required formal training plans prior to performing the work. The 402nd Aircraft Maintenance Group (AMXG) developed formal training plans for all skills required and partnered with Edwards AFB, Beale AFB and Northrup Grumman to ensure success. Airmen from the 402 AMXG went to Beale AFB for On-the-Job Training (OJT) on ground sup-
port handling. The 9th Aircraft Maintenance Squadron ground support team at Beale AFB provided oversight to qualify Robins AFB aviation mechanics for ground handling of the Global Hawk and facilitate on-site inspections as needed. A team of painters, planners, program managers, engineers and quality assurance specialists went to Edwards AFB for hands-on training with members of the 452nd Flight Test Squadron. The team painted a Global Hawk as part of their OJT training at Edwards AFB and the aircraft performed better than ever; climbing to full altitude in 51 minutes, 45% faster, while providing a 10% fuel savings. Recognizing these gains on every flight contributed directly to improved mission performance and capability.

Game Time

During the early morning hours of May 24, 2017, a RQ-4 Global Hawk was successfully flown from Beale AFB to Robins AFB, marking the first arrival of an UAV to an ALC. All of the efforts and contributions from the enterprise team were put to the test and passed with flying colors and the level of cross-organizational collaboration entered a second-phase.

Airmen from Beale AFB were at Robins AFB to assist 559 AMXS ground-handling personnel with the first landing and servicing of the Global Hawk and provide OJT on the aircraft recovery process. Northrup Grumman personnel, who have been supporting the platform since inception, partnered with aircraft painters in the 558th Aircraft Maintenance Support Squadron at Robins to train them on the wing contour build-up process and how to apply leading edge tape. Airmen from Beale also returned in early July 2017 to provide further OJT on launching the Global Hawk from Robins back to Beale.
Results and Way Ahead

Due to the extensive and exhaustive work of logistics professionals across numerous organizations, the first Global Hawk painted at Robins AFB was completed in 38 flow days with no injuries, incidents or quality escapes. The Global Hawk program office now has a supportable capability at Robins AFB for future requirements and the Airmen of the Beale and Edwards Squadrons can provide increased airpower for their supported mission partners.

The ground support team was here in the early hours of 24 May 17 for the first landing to assist the Beale with capturing the first Global Hawk to performed servicing (log downloads, erasures, cooling, etc.). Robins personnel were paired with Beale personnel to help further their training from the ground support. Robins and Beale teamed up again for the launch on 30 Jun 17.

Having this Global Hawk maintenance capability at Robins AFB enhances fleet management, improves aircraft performance, and secures Robins AFB as a vital mission capability in support of USAF and Department of Defense operations worldwide. Robins AFB is the first installation to have a building-based Launch and Recovery Element, allowing the aircraft to take-off and land from this location. While a programmed depot maintenance requirement for Global Hawk has not been established, the Air Force recognizes that having an organic maintenance capability for Global Hawk enhances our ability to manage the fleet and keep this resource flying.
Linking Past to Present – LOA
Chapter Lives Day in the Life of WWII Combat Mission

By: Maj Jose Perez IV

18 year-old Staff Sergeant Glen Alfter and the crew of the B-17 Bomber, “Big Stupe V”, along with 22 other aircraft of the 384th Bomb Group, circled overhead at RAF Grafton-Underwood just before their Wing and Division assembly and ultimate push into German-occupied territory. The B-17 Flying Fortress aircraft and their P-47 Thunderbolt escorts would fly toward Schweinfurt, Germany, but not before encountering heavy German Luftwaffe resistance. The events that would unfold on 13 April 1944 for SSgt Col Frank Alfter (USAF, Ret) describes the 384th Bomb Group missions in front of the NMUSAF’s B-17 “Shoo Shoo Shoo Baby”.

Col Frank Alfter (USAF, Ret) describes the 384th Bomb Group missions in front of the NMUSAF’s B-17 “Shoo Shoo Shoo Baby”.

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Alfter and the crew of “Big Stupe V” are nothing short of true courage. This brave story of the greatest generation was recreated for the Logistics Officer Association Wright Brothers Chapter by none other than the son of SSgt Glen Alfter and National Museum of the United States Air Force (NMUSAF) Volunteer, Col Frank Alfter (USAF, Ret).

Col Alfter led the small “Staff Ride” of LOA members through the recreated NMUSAF’s 8th Air Force Control Tower & Nissen Hut located near the air park. “Flying was a dangerous business and operations required meticulous coordination,” said Col Alfter. “These towers were designed to provide weather and coordination for the pilots and crews of hundreds of aircraft headed into combat over Europe.” The recreated control tower features meticulous recreation of weather equipment, tools and navigational maps; as well as an elaborate control room from where aircraft were tracked and communications monitored when departing and approaching the airfield. “Frank shared many of his father’s experiences as a B-17 tail gunner flying the contested skies of Europe and the events on the way to Schweinfurt, Germany on 13 April 1944,” said Col Jeffrey Decker, Wright Brothers LOA Chapter President. “Employing our 8th Air Force tower re-creation and the B-17 “Shoo, Shoo, Shoo Baby” as a backdrop, Frank brought to life what his father and so
many other young Americans experienced during the Second World War.”

Col Alfter served 33 years in the Air Force as an Aircraft and Munitions Maintenance Officer. During his assignments to both the United Kingdom and Germany, Col Alfter and his family were able to “walk the same ground” and, combined with a Pentagon assignment had access to The National Archives in College Park, Maryland which rounded out the rest of the story. And subsequent contact with a German friend, while assigned to Ramstein AB, provided the Luftwaffe side of the story.

“We’re so pleased that Col Alfter took the time to share his detailed research and his father’s incredible experiences with the LOA Chapter,” said Col Decker. “The Wright Brothers LOA Chapter is aimed at not only developing and networking our logistician members, but also providing the link to our heritage and the efforts and sacrifices of our Airmen and logisticians like the crew of “Big Stupe V” and the 8th Air Force.”

For additional details on the Wright Brothers Chapter of the Logistics Officer Association, interested logisticians (and prospective members) can contact Mr. James “Jim” Marsh at james.marsh.3@us.af.mil or visit the Wright Brothers Chapter website at [https://org.eis.afmc.af.mil/sites/HQAFMCA4/WPAFBLOA/default.aspx].
A/TA and Logistics Officer Association Sign Strategic Partnership

The Airlift/Tanker Association and the Logistics Officer Association are pleased to announce they have signed a strategic partnering agreement to share and collaborate on best practices, lessons learned and create opportunities to enhance membership value in each organization.

For more information on how to participate in Joint Working Groups in order to improve each of these great organizations please contact:

Lt Col Jon David DuVall, USAF (ret)
LOA, Chief Operating Officer

and/or

Col Mike Cassidy, USAF (ret)
A/TA Secretary

ABOUT A/TA

The Airlift/Tanker Association is a nonprofit professional organization.

The Vision of A/TA is: “To be the World’s Premier Professional Association for the Air Mobility Community Embracing Innovation and Operational Excellence…Serving Locally, Engaging Globally, Ready for Tomorrow.”

The Association’s Mission is: “To Work Across the Air Mobility Enterprise to Promote a Deeper Understanding, Appreciation, and Reinforcement of Air Mobility Heritage, Culture, Values, and Relationships.”

Finally, the Association has three Strategic Objectives: 1. Support and Develop Mobility Airmen; 2. Preserve Air Mobility Culture, Heritage and Values; 3. Strengthen Air Mobility Bonds.

Learn more about the Association at the A/TA website: www.atalink.org.

ABOUT LOA

LOA is a non-profit organization comprised of over 4,000 military officers and civilians in the Logistics, Acquisition, and Technology career fields around the globe.

The purpose of LOA is to enhance the mission of the United States Air Force and the Department of Defense (DoD) through concerted efforts to promote quality Logistics, professional development of logistics, acquisition and technology officers, and an open forum for leadership, management and technical interchange. For more information about LOA visit www.atloa.org.
The last 16 years saw an enormous surge in contracting activity supporting worldwide combat and contingency operations. At one time, USCENTCOM reported a 1-to-1 ratio of contractors for every Soldier, Sailor, Marine, and Airman in the AOR. This surge proved instrumental to military operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, Djibouti, the Gulf States, Haiti, Japan, and numerous other deployed and garrison locations. Naturally, this dynamic change in operations brought attention to the situation. However, while it’s only been in the last decade or so that contracted support has made headlines (primarily for its associated costs); contractors have been involved in numerous military operations as far back as the Revolutionary War (to include both World Wars, Korea, Vietnam and the first Gulf War).

The skills, services and manpower that contracted support delivers provide seamless sustainability and flexibility for a wide variety of military operations. Current and future operations will continue to leverage these effects of contracted support, so it’s imperative that modern and joint Air Force logisticians understand Operational Contracting Support (OCS) in order to be effective, efficient and adaptable.

Look Back:

When Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM kicked off, the services possessed limited amounts of contracting and logistics professionals with the depth and breadth necessary to process the “tsunami” of contracted support requests and requirements in the AOR. Faced with a deficit of subject matter expertise, workload was shifted to personnel without the necessary training. As a result, activities oversight was not robust. This void created a situation where irregularities and illegal activities occurred, prompting an investigation by the Gansler Commission (named after the former Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (AT&L) Dr. Jacques Gansler). The Commission, appointed to review contracted activities linked to wartime operations, noted multiple shortfalls in its final report. In particular, the severe shortage of contracting-trained personnel spurred the Army to establish the OCS Course taught by the Army Logistics University (ALU) at Fort. Lee, Virginia to codify and formalize training for non-contracting personnel conducting outsourcing of unit requirements.

The Procurement Process:

Every procurement of contracted services goes through five basic steps: requirements development, funding, solicitation and award, management, and closeout. The chart below illustrates a simplified visual of the five step process. Areas the Gansler Commission revealed to have the greatest weakness are highlighted in red and amber. Additionally, the organization and position responsible for each step of the processes was identified (i.e. Resource Manager (RM), Contracting Officer (KO), and Contracting Officer Representative (COR)).

Within the requirements development step, the requesting unit nominates a COR and drafts the Performance Work Statement (PWS), the Independent Govern-
ment Estimate (IGE), the Letter of Justification (LOJ), a Purchase Request (PR), the Quality Assurance Surveillance Plan (QASP). The requesting unit also maintains responsibility for funding the contract, which it typically accomplishes through a budget analyst or RM. The warranted KO owns the solicitation and award phase. The COR then oversees execution during the contract management phase.

Who In Your Unit Knows How to Write the Requirements?

Looking at the previous chart, you notice a question mark at the beginning of the process. This represents who in the unit is trained to develop and draft the requirement. Prior to standing up the OCS Course, units generally started requirements development by saying “We don’t have anyone trained to do this.” In the absence of an OCS trained member, the unit tasked the COR—who may have had only nominal formal training—to develop unit requirements. However, the COR is responsible for managing contract performance, not developing requirements. This resulted in improperly written requirements, multiple reworks, and high levels of frustration. The OCS Course intends to produce a cadre of graduates capable of providing overall subject matter expertise in order to facilitate smooth requirements development and contract execution to effectively meet mission objectives.

So who helps develop requirements in your organization? Your technical SMEs are vital to requirements development. Pull your SMEs together and leverage their experiences to articulate what services you want and how you want them done. List what AFI s, OIs, and laws you must comply with, and define relevant, achievable, and measurable metrics used to assess the contractor’s performance.

OCS training applies in the deployed environment as well as in garrison. The procurement processes are basically the same whether you are at Bagram AB, Nellis AFB, Fort Hood, Naval Station Norfolk, or Joint Base Lewis-McChord. Minor differences exist in spending thresholds as well as staffing and documentation, but the process at its core is a standard and repeatable template. Contracted support is now the norm in garrison. Look around your installation and ask yourself who cleans the buildings? Who maintains the grounds? Who instructs the class? Who provides gate security? If it is not a uniformed Airman, then there’s a high probability it’s a contractor. Garrison outsourcing requires the same amount of effort and oversight as expeditionary or contingency contracting. Poorly written and managed requirements do not magically cost less money or cause less frustration just because they occur in a serene home station atmosphere.

Although you may perceive OCS as only applying to wartime contracting, looming budget reductions and force shaping perennially on the horizon signify outsourcing—both in garrison and contingency environments—will be a growth industry that places a premium on the Operational Contracting Support skill set. For the joint logistician, this knowledge can only make you more effective and arm you with options to use as operations evolve.

FAQs:

Q: I’m an Air Force logistician. Why should I care about Army OCS?

A: Air Force logisticians have many opportunities to deploy to the joint environment. The Army may have the contracting lead at your location because of the preponderance of forces in the AOR. OCS gives you the knowledge required to understand the processes involved so your unit can “get what you pay for.”

Q: What factors could potentially drive me to seek contracted solutions?

A: Though we’ve talked about various effects OCS provides, we can use Afghanistan as a specific example.
In 2015, POTUS mandated a Boots on Ground (BOG) cap of 9,800 military personnel. To meet the BOG cap, each service determined which functions they could execute only by combat forces and which they could outsource or “send over the horizon.” They concluded a significant portion of the tail (support functions) could be contracted. Specific to the Air Force, the 455th Expeditionary Aerial Port Squadron (EAPS) and 455th Expeditionary Logistics Readiness Squadron (ELRS) at Bagram and Kandahar contracted various functions reducing a majority of their military manpower footprint. The Airmen that remained focused on contract management and oversight (COR duties) and those specific tasks inherently military.

Q: This sounds like the Contracting Squadron’s job. Why would I get involved? Don’t I just tell contracting what I want?

A: Yes, there will be KOs on or around your base. Remember though: KOs aren’t responsible for deciphering and interpreting what you want and what you wrote down in your PWS. Try to assume the KO is the very best at soliciting and awarding contracts but knows nothing about the services you are requesting. If your PWS is vague, broad or confusing, the probability of you being satisfied with the contracted support you receive is low. Who would you blame? Whoever built the requirements and submitted the PWS. Don’t build your own nightmare!

Q: Can I build a generic PWS and then direct the contractor as we go along once they are in place and I can gauge their performance?

A: You take tremendous risks in terms of lost time and mission degradation if you don’t write a concise and comprehensible PWS. If the requirements package and PWS aren’t accurate, the contractor may start work without adequate equipment and manpower. Can you adjust this? Yes, officially and legally through a contract modification. However, it may take weeks and months to work through the KO and even more time for the contractor to procure and mobilize additional personnel and assets. The contractor should only fulfill what they are contractually obligated to do. If you pressure the contractor to go beyond the agreed terms and conditions, you can illegally obligate the US government to pay for services. Depending on the circumstances, the cost can be passed on to the commander and/or the person who initiated the action. Yes, you can be responsible for paying a contractor out of your own pocket!

Q: It looks like we are paying a premium for contracted services. Are there other benefits we are getting that I may not realize?

A: Yes, you may pay a premium that will make you cringe, but that pay ensures a contractor assumes risk and responsibility while leaving military forces with the flexibility to deploy, redeploy or not deploy at all. There are also tertiary benefits:

- Contacted support is scalable and tailorable to your operating environment.

- Contracting from the local area can have a positive economic impact.

- It saves wear and tear on DoD equipment.

- It reduces the demands on military personnel in AFSCs with high deployment tempos and low dwell times.

- There is a big picture opportunity cost. Contracting support services allows the DoD to use finite military personnel, assets and weapon systems in higher priority or more hostile operating environments.

- The price tag for contracted support accounts for equipment maintenance, disposal, transportation, hiring, etc. The burden is now on the contractor to achieve an affect through a safe, moral and legal means.
Q: Is it a 1 for 1 ratio when I swap military for contractors?

A: Rarely. Depending on how the PWS is written and how the contractor hires, trains and employs its work force, you may actually see increased manpower while transitioning from Airmen to contractors. For example, you previously may have run an aerial port with 70 Airmen for a working MOG of two aircraft. The contractor who won the award may bring in 90 personnel to replace 65 of those Airmen. In this case, you have contracted an effect: to sustain the MOG of two. How the effect is achieved relies on the contractor.

Q: Who should I appoint as my COR?

A: Do not treat the COR responsibility as just another additional duty relegated to the lowest ranking available subordinate. It is strongly recommended you pick a person who is intimately familiar with the terms and conditions of the contract, has some level of technical proficiency in the contracted functions to determine if objectives are met, and is above reproach. A lot of dissatisfaction in contracted support stems from weaker CORs “pencil-whipping” positive assessments when in fact the contractor is failing. This makes it difficult to hold the contractor accountable when historical documentation states that their performance is satisfactory or in some cases outstanding. Other newsworthy situations occur when CORs misuse their positions to receive monetary benefits in exchange for privileged information or favorable ratings. Choose a COR who demonstrates integrity and who you trust to consistently monitor the contractor.

Q: Does the DoD or Air Force have a pool of contractors standing by for us to tap into?

A: The short answer is yes. There are two major programs, the Logistics Civilian Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) run by the Army and the Air Force Civilian Augmentation Program (AFCAP). Both of these programs merit their own article, but the effects are evident. At a major base in Iraq, LOGCAP alone gave US military forces more than 30 battalions (roughly 30 squadrons) worth of surge contracted sustainment capability. When you are in the deployed environment, engage with your KO to leverage these readily available sources of support.

Q: What are some of the governing regulations or references for OCS?

A: Joint Publication 4-10 Operational Contracting Support, the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), and Army Manual 715-9 Operational Contracting Support Planning and Management.

Q: When is the OCS course held and how do I sign up?

A: The following contacts

- Course schedule: https://www.atrrs.army.mil/
- Course director: Mr. Anthony Hicks
- ALU website: http://www.alu.army.mil

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