By: Lt Col Philip Lere
Mastering the dark art of logistics requires understanding the difference between problems that are complicated and those that are complex. A complicated problem is linear and predictable while a complex problem resists linearity and is fraught with uncertainty. Logistics in war is always a complex problem. In the world of complexity logisticians and commanders are asked to sustain combat forces under unknown and even unknowable circumstances. Many military logistics organizations are designed to resolve complicated problems and struggle to adapt when the environment turns complex. The early logistics education of military professionals within these organizations equips them well to resolve complicated problems, but there is a need for learning how to manage complex problems. Applying problem-solving techniques from the complicated world to a complex problem is a risky endeavor that often leads to suboptimal outcomes and even maladapted organizational structures. To survive in the world of complexity military logisticians need to acquire new techniques of complex problem solving-John Boyd’s ideas on decision making and “orientation” are a good start— and apply them to logistics challenges.
Logistics in war is always a complex problem.
Reserve Citizen Airmen from the 944th Maintenance Group work on an F-35 fighter jet on the flight line at Luke Air Force Base, Ariz., Sept. 8, 2024. Their efforts ensure the aircraft are mission-ready under the intense Arizona sun. (U.S. Air Force photo by Tech. Sgt. Tyler J. Bolken)
Complex problems are different than complicated problems. Complicated problems are linear and the parameters of a problem, say maintaining an aircraft or the vehicle fleet of an armored division, are known. A certain amount of money, manpower, and parts applied over time leads to a predictable outcome, often with little variance around a mean. Friction exists, but its boundaries are generally well understood. An F-35 is a complicated machine, but with the right engineers, the right mechanics, and the right checklists, this extremely complicated piece of hardware (and software) can be predictably disentangled from error.
A complex problem is non-linear. The parameters and even definition of the problem are ambiguous and ever changing,[1] There are unknowable variables and the variables interact rapidly with unexpected consequences. The challenge of enterprise-level logistics command and control during war is an example of a series of tasks rooted firmly in complexity. What works for one situation or problem set may not work in another. The potential level of friction is unbounded. Maximum effort applied against a problem might not change anything while small, subtle changes could tip the entire problem into a new state of chaos. In complexity there is no standard operating procedure, no right or wrong, and what appears inconsequential today might destroy you tomorrow.
Complexity in Logistics: An Approach
The first step in problem-solving is understanding the nature of the problem by identifying aspects of both the complicated and the complex. Organizations often use specific language or “frames” to describe challenges and this often drives certain problem-solving approaches.[2] Military organizations typically apply a frame that gives practitioners little room for ambiguous and uncertain language even if the nature of the problem is complex and requires significant exploration of the unknown. For our purposes, it suffices to say that any framing approach that fails to take into account the complex aspects of a problem could struggle to create viable options for system survival. An example of the sinister mixture between complicated and complex challenges is logistics command and control. On the one hand, this task involves some complicated but core logistics work like measuring inventory or estimating average historical consumption rates. On the other hand, logistics command and control also delves into managing, structuring, and influencing relationships between organizations and people, a complex set of tasks. Should logistics echelons be functionally controlled by a central authority or dispersed across command authorities? Do commanders trust they can get what they need to fight and how will that confidence, or lack thereof, impact the employment of the force? How will logistics command and control interactions change as the enterprise is stressed by war? Problems involving relationships are almost always complex, especially as the size of the logistics enterprise and the number of stakeholders and variables increases. A successful outcome in logistics during war hinges on coping with and managing the complex problems more so than the complicated ones. Preparing for one is not the same as preparing for the other.
The complicated world of military logistics is replete with useful information for tackling the myriad of processes facing the practitioner. Standard operating procedures are the focus of most early logistics training. However, techniques for operating among complex problems are less well-known in the logistics community and are not frequently part of formal training. To present useful thoughts on the subject of complexity we turn to some of the concepts put forward by the American strategist John Boyd.
Figure 1. The OODA Loop in Logistics [3]
Boyd is well known for developing the “Observe, Orient, Decide Act” (OODA) decision process (Figure 1). He envisioned this process as a never-ending “loop” that best permits the individual or the organization to “survive on its own terms” in a hostile environment.[4] The core of his work rests on how one understands the environment during the “orientation” phase[5]. Here, the logistician can assimilate some useful insights to apply to complex logistics challenges.
The “orientation” phase is the critical point where mental models and perceptions of the world evolve to meet environmental challenges, or where the mind withers under information assault. In the realm of the merely complicated the logistician can typically tailor interactions with the environment for predictable logistics outcomes through standard operating procedures. But in the realm of complexity the interaction with the environment becomes less predictable despite programmed responses. The process of shaping perspectives that eventually drive decisions manifests itself in the orientation phase. A “good” orientation allows a logistician, or a logistics organization, to better allocate resources to meet needs at the right time. A “good” orientation makes you slightly better than a competitor at predicting logistics success despite complexity, risk, and danger. The environment of war is still chaotic and unpredictable, but one need only be marginally better at surviving than an adversary.
Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) at Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar, provides command and control of air power throughout Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, and 17 other nations. The CAOC is comprised of a joint and coalition team that executes day-to-day combined air and space operations and provides rapid reaction, positive control, coordination, and de-confliction of weapon systems. (U.S. Air Force photo by Tech. Sgt. Joshua Strang)
Another idea from Boyd’s work that is useful to the logistician is the concept of implicit guidance and control. Implicit guidance is often an unwritten set of rules that govern organizational behavior across echelons and it links the orientation phase with every other step in the process. The level of implicit control and guidance within the organization will set the tone for how it is “oriented.” In Boyd’s work, “good” implicit guidance and control is a rethinking of the traditional military command and control process. In complex environments, especially war, direct logistics command and control often becomes problematic as the speed of events and uncertainty in the environment overwhelm centralized decision-making structures. The assumptions that underpin many standard operating procedures, especially those developed for complicated problems, are quickly overtaken by dynamic change emerging from complex problems. To counter this, effective implicit guidance and control is designed as a “bottom-up” instead of “top down” approach to decision making. Decentralized systems have a tendency to perform better in complexity because they can “sense” changes in the environment and reorient the system to new information.[6]
Implicit guidance is often an unwritten set of rules that govern organizational behavior across echelons and it links the orientation phase with every other step in the process.
Going deeper into the orientation phase, Boyd explained it as a cross-referencing connection between our cultural traditions, genetic heritage, previous experience, new information, and analysis and synthesis (analysis and synthesis is a specific thought method Boyd advanced). Each factor connects to the others within the mind of the individual or the organization to create mental schemata or paradigms that in turn affect behaviors and perception.[7] The person or organization that best adapts and creates new mental models in the orientation phase will stand the best chance of coping with complexity. For military logistics, an effective mental orientation is one that allocates scarce resources effectively for the survival and effectiveness of the combat force.[8] Measuring combat effectiveness is itself a complex challenge, but it seems useful as a starting point for guiding a logistician’s efforts at both self-reflection and institutional understanding.
Internal Harmony and External Friction
Boyd proposed that a survival edge would accrue to an organization that could be unpredictable towards its adversaries while at the same time minimizing internal friction, or being more predictable internally. A good portion of Boyd’s work focused on creating unpredictability and uncertainty for an adversary (external). Much of the work in military logistics organizations centers on producing predictable outcomes across an enterprise (internal).
Boyd proposed that a survival edge would accrue to an organization that could be unpredictable towards its adversaries while at the same time minimizing internal friction, or being more predictable internally.
CSAF Action Orders image courtesy of af.mil. (Photo contributor Graphciu)
The organizational structures required for internal predictability are often different than the ones required to create external friction against an adversary. Internal predictability often drives a mechanistic and hierarchical approach to organizations as logistics leaders seek predictable outputs from the system.[9] Rigid hierarchies can produce linear logistics outputs in many contexts but linear thinking required within these organizations often ignores or undervalues external factors in the environment. This becomes risky as the demands on the organization transition from complicated to complex, or from peace to war. Boyd’s idea on the orientation phase of decision making offers a good starting point to determine if the organizational structure is capable of reacting to dynamic change in the environment. Can it “learn?”
Logistics, like the combat forces themselves, must originate from places unexpected to the adversary. This mental transition is difficult for an enterprise that is mostly focused on delivering predictable support. Logistics is often the nexus for balancing the capacity to be unpredictable and aggressive against an adversary, while at the same time being predicable and responsive to internal sustainment needs. If logistics cannot harmonize the internal and external needs, it is a clear signal of danger to the system. This is one measure for how the orientation phase is shaping logistics outcomes and can be a sign to an astute commander that risk to the system is accumulating.
Implications: An Education for Complexity
At both the organizational and individual level the mental agility required to operate in complexity starts with learning. The new mental models acquired from learning are what underpin successful logistics in war because they enable a “good” orientation to the environment, that point of balance between external and internal needs. The failure to learn is the beginning of the end as dynamic change assaults the senses and decision-making fails to produce outcomes that move the organization or individual into a favorable position to survive. The survival edge erodes without constant learning.
Learning organizations are adept at managing the orientation phase of the OODA loop to shape and be shaped by the environment as the situation unfolds. The challenge for military logistics organizations comes in part from organizational structure. Most are hierarchical “machine-like” organizations designed to create the predictable internal outcomes mentioned earlier, but they often are ill suited to sensing and changing with the environment. One helpful metaphor of the learning organization is that of the brain with innumerable connections between neurons constantly firing and looking for new patterns.[10] This structure is less about hierarchy and more about maximizing connections to “see” patterns. Borrowing again from organizational metaphors, most military logistics organizations seem to prefer the rigid metaphor of the machine with its predictable inputs and outputs. Machines are best suited for complicated environments while brains are best suited for complex ones. Remaking, rethinking, and reorienting the image of an organization is no easy task. Perhaps the best hope of creating an organization that learns is to focus on how the individuals inside the organization learn and how they are taught. Do they have the mental tools to make and understand decisions beyond the merely complicated? Can they learn?
American military logistics education is often focused on internal outcomes and problem-solving methods borrowed from the realm of the complicated. This forms a good basis for internal predictability but it does not go far enough in addressing the nature of complexity and its impact on logistics, especially in war. Complexity in war demands that military logisticians also think about how their actions can be aggressive and unpredictable against an adversary in order to maximize survival potential. Most formal logistics training offers the leader little help for operating in a complex environment. Department of Defense decision-making models like the Military Decision-Making Process or the Joint Planning Process, which have some utility for complex environments, are part of general military education but often occur later in the career of a military officer. Neither one is specific to logistics planning and decision-making.
Image courtesy of Shutterstock. (Photo contributor Lidia Efimova)
The educational gap between early and mid-career is due at least in part to a false belief that complex problems don’t appear until later in a career. While senior logisticians are certainly facing complex problems, the problems of junior logisticians are growing increasingly complex as well. The separation between “complicated” tactics and “complex” strategy is disappearing in today’s interconnected world. Many formal logistics courses are not configured for this change.
To help build resilient enterprises the military logistics community could identify and reward “reflective practice” early in a logistician’s career.[11] Reflective practitioners are able to orient and reorient within complex challenges to create viable options for organizational survival and success. Reflective practitioners are grown through a combination of informal self-study, formal training, and, most importantly, the actual practice of the art of logistics. With a mix of formal instruction and informal training opportunities logisticians could emerge into their mid-career stage with an understanding of planning and a mindset more capable of coping with complexity. Mostly importantly for education like that to work, the logisticians have to want to learn. Top-down enforced learning is of less value than bottom-up enabled learners.
Reflective practitioners are able to orient and reorient within complex challenges to create viable options for organizational survival and success.
Early formal instruction in logistics could include decision-making models like the OODA loop or the Dr Jeffrey Reilly’s Operational Design to expose students to basic techniques for attacking complex challenges.[12] Students could be exposed to dynamic logistics scenarios in virtual environments and through group interaction to give them time to internalize many of the methods for coping with complexity. The case study method is an undervalued teaching approach in formal military programs. These scenarios would have no “right solution” but would instead focus on thought process and creativity under dynamic change. The goal of complexity education should be to curate an active thought life, or “reflective practice,” in much the same way the OODA loops demands constant reorientation of the mind.[13] To borrow again from Boyd, “Terrain doesn’t fight wars. Machines don’t fight wars. People fight wars. It’s in the minds…that war must be fought.”[14]
“Terrain doesn’t fight wars. Machines don’t fight wars. People fight wars. It’s in the minds… that war must be fought.”
– John Boyd
Short courses on complexity offered in the civilian sector could also be made available to military logisticians. This approach is more informal and could add important cognitive diversity into military circles. Perhaps a “complexity apprenticeship” for a few interested, willing candidates that exposes them to strategic complex problems in short bursts a few times per year could be enough to shift the cognitive function of the organization as a whole. Face-to-face sessions could mix with virtual ones to enable longer exposure in the “apprenticeship” over time. Emerging large language models also present interesting opportunities for self-learning. Instead of waiting for logisticians to reach intermediate or senior professional military education they could start early in their careers after just a few years in the service. This stimulates learning but does not pull them away from operations for long periods, or impact their promotion opportunities under current organizational constructs.
Updating both the formal and informal approaches to complexity education is just one way to help create a culture that is adaptive. Education is not the same as knowledge, so it is important to identify leaders who have the drive to grow and develop new mental models. These “reflective practitioners” can form the creative nerve center of an organization that is capable of coping with complexity, and they should be placed in positions to impact the whole.[15] Boyd’s OODA loop gives logisticians one possible mental process for surviving and thriving in a complex world, and there are surely others. The important idea behind understanding and attacking complex challenges is the constant search for new perspectives that drive better results for the warfighter. Strategic advantage accrues to the organization that can master the orientation phase of Boyd’s decision loop. Boyd would surely agree that the survival of the force depends on the minds of the people in the organization and how well they can cope with the dangers of complexity.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Air Force, the Department of Defense, or the US Government.
About the Author
Lt Col Philip Lere is a Logistics Readiness Officer and is currently an instructor at Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama.
Works Cited
[1] Roberts, Nancy; Wicked Problems and Network Approaches to Resolution, International Public Management Review, 2000
[2] Morgan, Gareth; Images of Organization, 2006
[3] Image of Boyd’s OODA loop https://globalguerrillas.typepad.com/globalguerrillas/the-ooda-loop.html
[4] Osinga, Frans; Science, Strategy, and War; Routledge, 2007
[5] Ibid Osinga, p 230
[6] Ibid Osinga, p200
[7] Boyd, John R; A Discourse on Winning and Losing; Air University Press, 2018 p385
[8] Eccles, Henry; Logistics in the National Defense, 1947. Eccles theorized that combat effectiveness was the ultimate goal of military logistics.
[9] Morgan chapter on machine metaphor
[10] Morgan p 71 chapter 4
[11] Paparone, Chris; Topic, George; From the Swamp to the High Ground and Back; Logistics in War, 2017 https://logisticsinwar.com/2017/05/13/from-the-swamp-to-the-high-ground-and-back-educating-logisticians-to-operate-in-complexity-part-one/
[12] Reilly, Jeffrey; Operational Design; Air University Press, 2012. And Army Design Methodology http://data.cape.army.mil/web/character-development-project/repository/atp5-0x1-2015.pdf p13
[13] Ibid Paparone, Topic
[14] Boyd quote https://www.usafa.edu/app/uploads/Harmon54.pdf
[15] Ibid Topic/Paparone https://logisticsinwar.com/2017/05/13/from-the-swamp-to-the-high-ground-and-back-educating-logisticians-to-operate-in-complexity-part-one/