By: Lt Col Ryan VanArtsdalen

Bunker Buster Away: An F-15E Strike Eagle deployed from the 492nd Fighter Squadron, Royal Air Force Lakenheath, England, releases a GBU-28 “Bunker Buster” laser-guided bomb. The 492nd deployed here for the Air-to-Ground Weapons System Evaluation Program mission commonly known as Combat Hammer. The GBU-28 was designed and first used during the Persian Gulf War in 1991 to destroy hardened targets such as bunkers and underground command centers. (US Air Force photo by Tech. Sgt. Michael Ammons)

The Gulf War of 1991 marked a pivotal moment in modern warfare through the transformative use of Precision-Guided Munitions (PGMs) to achieve strategic objectives.[i] For the first time, airpower demonstrated true pinpoint accuracy, drastically reducing collateral damage and accelerating victory.[ii] This breakthrough was not sudden—it was the result of decades of innovation in both technology and doctrine. While aircraft often take center stage in airpower discussions, the real game-changer was the precision of the munitions they delivered. After all, when you order pizza, you care more about the pizza than the delivery car. It’s time we shift our mindset—airpower is no longer just about airplanes, but about achieving strategic effects through precision weapons.

The success of PGMs in the Gulf War set a new standard for airpower, highlighting the principles of precision, efficiency, and adaptability. Through a case study of the Gulf War and an analysis of the evolution of PGMs, this article argues that PGMs represent the most strategically effective use of airpower in history and continue to define how the Air Force prosecutes wars well into the foreseeable future. Unlike the indiscriminate combined bombing offensives of World War II, PGMs have demonstrated their strategic value by prioritizing quality over quantity in targeting, shortening the duration of conflicts, and reshaping military doctrine to emphasize precision, reduced collateral damage, and the rapid achievement of objectives.[iii] These lessons are critical to understanding contemporary warfare and underscore the need for continued innovation in airpower capabilities to prepare for future conflicts.

Precision in the Gulf War

The Gulf War marked a significant evolution in warfare by introducing PGMs as a more effective way to achieve political and military objectives. For the first time in history, air strikes on an enemy’s centers of gravity could bring it to its knees without messy ground battles while reducing civilian casualties.[iv] Desert Storm was the proving ground for this new capability. In August 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait, prompting a swift international response. Saddam Hussein did not expect the United States to risk war and swiftly take over Kuwait’s sovereign territory.[v] The United States rallied coalition forces with the strategic goal of using airpower to weaken Iraq’s military capabilities and establish air superiority ahead of ground operations. General Schwarzkopf’s campaign plan centered on five key air operations. First, achieving air superiority was essential to ensure land operations could proceed unimpeded by Iraqi resistance. Second, strategic attacks targeted Iraq’s command and control systems to disrupt political and military objectives. Third, supply interdiction aimed to cripple Iraq’s logistics by halting the transportation of vital resources such as food, water, and spare parts. Fourth, direct force attacks focused on destroying large enemy ground formations and armored units. Finally, the Air Force would provide critical Close Air Support (CAS) to coalition ground forces during the invasion phase.[vi] All of these have elements of Airpower precision involved or are critical to their success.

The Bush administration added two political objectives for military leadership, which included minimizing US and Coalition casualties and collateral damage resulting from military attacks and taking special precautions to avoid Iraqi civilian deaths. The president believed low casualties would be essential to securing and maintaining US public support and discourage unnecessary external involvement.[vii] The combination of military and political objectives narrowed in on one central decisive factor—precision would be critical to the success of the entire operation. The theory behind precision attacks emphasized that effects-based targeting could deliver faster results on the battlefield. Striking critical centers of gravity became central to crafting an effective and efficient air campaign. PGMs achieved this airpower objective by enabling simultaneous attacks instead of the traditional sequential approach, where targets had to be destroyed one at a time before advancing.[viii] By combining stealth capabilities with PGMs, fighter and bomber aircraft could evade Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAMs) and reach their objectives with precision.[ix] This approach also required fewer resources, as evidenced by the coalition’s reliance on F-117 twin-engine strike aircraft equipped with PGMs rather than traditional heavy bombers to penetrate contested airspace. Notably, except for a limited number of F-16 sorties, only the F-117s with PGMs were authorized to strike targets in downtown Baghdad due to contested airspace and the need to limit collateral damage.[x] PGMs allowed for accurately targeting high-value assets, significantly shrinking the weapons’ center error of probability, and reducing the risks to civilian populations and allied forces. Remarkably, these precision strikes achieved simultaneous objectives within the war’s first few hours.

Precision technology was first introduced during the Vietnam War when F-4 aircraft used Laser-Guided Bombs (LGB) to destroy bridges and railroads between China and Hanoi in 1971.[xi] One bridge in particular, which had withstood numerous conventional bombings, was finally brought down by a single LGB.[xii] Although the technology was in its early stages, military leaders quickly recognized its game-changing potential. By the 1980s, significant investment in precision weaponry had transformed military strategy, culminating in its full-scale deployment during the 1991 “Shock and Awe” campaign over Iraq.[xiii] LGBs and Tomahawk cruise missiles were used to strike critical Iraqi infrastructure, such as bridges and roads, to achieve strategic objectives.[xiv] This shift from reliance on mass airpower to precision and stealth fundamentally altered the strategic and tactical character of war. Instead of prioritizing large aircraft formations to dominate the skies as in World War II, resources were redirected toward fewer, more advanced weaponry that maximized accuracy.

A US Air Force F-117A Nighthawk is towed in front of a destroyed aircraft shelter at Ahmed Al-Jaber Air Base, Kuwait, on March 8, 1998. F-117A Nighthawk stealth fighters have been deployed to Kuwait in support of Operation Southern Watch which is the US and coalition enforcement of the no-fly-zone over Southern Iraq. The Nighthawk is attached to the 8th Fighter Squadron, 49th Fighter Wing, Holloman Air Force Base, N.M. The aircraft shelter was destroyed during the Gulf War. (Image courtesy of defense.gov)

The success of Desert Storm was rooted in well-defined political and military objectives, which heavily relied on precision attacks. The effectiveness of these new tactics, techniques, and procedures, guided by emerging doctrine, was decisively demonstrated during the war. Precision air strikes at the outset of the Gulf War disrupted the flow of ammunition and food while crippling Iraqi command and control capabilities, forcing a rapid surrender.[xv] The ability to achieve both political and military objectives hinged on precision strikes that paralyzed Iraqi leadership and rendered their forces ineffective. This approach delivered unprecedented results, marking the beginning of a new era in strategic bombing. It showcased how modern warfare could leverage precision to conduct smaller, faster, and more focused campaigns, shaping the future of military strategy.    The transformative use of PGMs during the Gulf War continues to shape contemporary warfare. Since Desert Storm, PGMs have evolved significantly and are now a cornerstone of modern airpower. They have been utilized in nearly every major military campaign, including Kosovo, Bosnia, Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Yemen, and others.[xvi] One of the most profound implications of PGMs is their effectiveness in asymmetric warfare, where precision is critical for achieving strategic objectives while minimizing civilian harm and maintaining public support. For example, in 2022, Osama Bin Laden’s military chief was targeted and terminated by a LGB dropped by an Air Force F-15E in what was considered the longest-duration fighter sortie ever recorded at nearly 16 hours long.[xvii] In another airstrike, more F-15Es used PGMs to destroy three al Qaeda houses in a row with pinpoint accuracy, leaving two nearby burlap tents belonging to the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization unharmed.[xviii] The modern American way of war substitutes ground troops for airpower, exposing the least amount of troops as possible to enemy contact—and we do that by killing and destroying things made possible with precision weapons.[xix]

Implications for Contemporary Warfare

While precision remains a hallmark of strategic airpower, its effectiveness will diminish if the United States fails to prioritize innovation. Peer adversaries like Russia and China have developed advanced Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) technologies that create extensive threat zones, forcing US aircraft to operate from greater distances.[xx] In the highly contested environments of Great Power Conflict, the advantages of the Gulf War era will no longer apply, necessitating significant updates to doctrine and technology. To prepare for future conflicts, the USAF must invest in stealthier, long-range precision munitions capable of achieving their objectives even in heavily denied areas. While bombers may face challenges reaching targets due to A2/AD defenses, advanced stealthy, hypersonic, and/or Artificial Intelligence swarm munitions can still deliver precision strikes from a distance. Training exercises, such as Red Flag, which once prepared forces in the 1980s to counter SAMs with PGMs, must also evolve to meet modern threats.[xxi] However, as stand-off precision weapons grow more advanced with classified tactics, employing them in close-range scenarios easily observed during training may compromise operational security, necessitating more exercises in Red Flag electronic simulators. These efforts will be vital to maintaining the relevance and effectiveness of precision munitions in the face of emerging challenges.

The Hypersonic Air-breathing Weapon Concept (HAWC) is being developed for DARPA and the US Air Force (USAF). (Photo courtesy of Raytheon Technologies Corporation)

In conclusion, PGMs have fundamentally transformed the landscape of modern warfare, offering unparalleled accuracy, efficiency, and adaptability. They have redefined the role of airpower, enabling rapid achievement of political and strategic objectives. From their successful implementation during the Gulf War during the “Shock and Awe” campaign to their widespread use in contemporary conflicts in the Middle East, PGMs have changed airpower strategy. Still, it’s time to rethink that strategy with effects-based weapons, given Great Power Conflict landscape. In the race for airpower, without precision is like a surgeon without a scalpel—ineffective, and the consequences could be fatal.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Air Force, the Department of Defense, or the US Government. 

About the Author

Lt Col Ryan M. VanArtsdalen is an Air University Fellow at the Air Command and Staff College. He began his Air Force career in 2004 as an aircraft maintainer before being commissioned as a Munitions and Missile Maintenance Officer in 2011. His career includes assignments across six Major Commands, NATO, Headquarters Air Staff, the Joint Staff, and deployed in support of OEF/OIF. He most recently commanded the DoD award-winning 3rd Munitions Squadron. He graduated from the Air Force’s premier Logistics Career Broadening Program (LCBP) and the Advanced Maintenance and Munitions Operations School (AMMOS).

Works Cited

[i] John Andreas Olsen, ed., A History of Air Warfare (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2010), page 177.

[ii] Robert Pape, “The Limits of Precision‐Guided Airpower,” Security Studies 7, no. 2 (1997), page 93.

[iii] Phillips Payson O’Brien, How the War Was Won: Air-Sea Power and Allied Victory in World War II (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2015), pages 268-269.

[iv] Pape, The Limits of Precision-Guided Airpower, 93.

[v] Olsen, A History of Air Warfare, 177.

[vi] Ibid., 177-178.

[vii] Ibid., 179.

[viii] Deptula, David Lt Gen (ret), “Lessons From Planning/Executing the Desert Storm Air Campaign,” Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, (United States Air Force Academy: Colorado Springs, CO), slide 12.

[ix] Olsen, A History of Air Warfare, 184.

[x] Ibid., 188.

[xi] Ibid., 120.

[xii] Ibid., 121.

[xiii] Laslie, Brian D., “The Air Force Way of War: U.S. Tactics and Training after Vietnam,” (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2015), 131-133.

[xiv] Laslie, The Air Force Way of War, 135.

[xv] Olsen, A History of Air Warfare, 197.

[xvi] Endicott, Judy, “Raid on Libya: Operation EL DORADO CANYON,” in Short of War: Major USAF Contingency Operations, 1947-1997, ed. A. Timothy Warnock (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 2000), 149.

[xvii] Olsen, A History of Air Warfare, 262.

[xviii] Ibid., 263.

[xix] Benjamin Lambeth, The Unseen War: Allied Air Power and the Takedown of Saddam Hussein (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 2013), page 143.

[xx] Bickers, David, “Understanding the Vulnerabilities in China’s New Joint Force,” Joint Force Quarterly 103, 2021), page 85.

[xxi] Laslie, The Air Force Way of War, 113.