By: CMSgt Wayne Shaw
A damaged B-17 Flying Fortresses sits on the flightline of RAF Alconbury May 27, 1943, after an explosion. Nineteen U.S. Army Air Force 95th Bombardment Group airmen were killed and 21 others were injured when a 500-pound bomb detonated on the flightline. A memorial plaque was placed in their honor at Alconbury Airfield May 27, 2013. (Photo courtesy AFRA)
Abstract
Future high-end conflicts with peer competitors will expose the USAF to unprecedented levels of Wartime Resource Attrition (WRA), defined as the loss or degradation of personnel, equipment, and logistical resupply. Although strategic directives like Accelerate Change or Lose, and recent initiatives such as Exercise BAMBOO EAGLE and Agile Combat Employment improves readiness and operational capabilities, they do not fully address unit adaptation to sustained resource degradation. This paper examines historical personnel and aircraft losses, projected attrition in a potential conflict with China, and limitations within the US Defense Industrial Base (DIB). It argues for incorporating combat attrition events into the Flying Hour Program (FHP) to provide realistic, measurable training for logistics and maintenance communities. Three Desired Learning Objectives (DLOs) are proposed: pushing decisions to the lowest competent level, communicating changes in capability, and identifying single points of failure. Scenarios demonstrate the challenges of operating under WRA, emphasizing decision-making, critical thinking, and adaptability. This study highlights the necessity of preparing Airmen to sustain lethal air power in contested, resource-constrained environments, ensuring mission success despite degradation of personnel, equipment, and logistics.
Introduction
“Tomorrow’s Airmen are more likely to fight in highly contested environments and must be prepared to fight through combat attrition rates and risks to the Nation that are more akin to the World War II era than the uncontested environment to which we have since become accustomed.”[i] Since the publication of Accelerate Change or Lose by retired General Brown, the USAF has made significant progress in preparing for this potential conflict. Exercise BAMBOO EAGLE is a recurring exercise that simulates realistic threats, testing our command and control, and multi-domain operations. The Logistics Tactics Conference brought together leading logistics and maintenance professionals to analyze and address critical challenges within the sustainment enterprise. The primary objective is to ensure the continued generation of combat power, with a specific focus on the Indo-Pacific Command area of responsibility. Modeled after the USAF’s premier Weapons and Tactics Conference, the event is dedicated to the continual refinement of tactics, techniques, and procedures to meet modern operational demands. Although these two initiatives enhance overall force effectiveness, they do not address unit learning or adaptation to WRA, which is the loss or degradation of personnel, equipment, and logistical resupply. When resources are lost or degraded, it can lead to secondary effects, such as operational fatigue among the remaining resources, which harms the Air Force’s ability to continue producing lethal combat air power. This paper will primarily focus on the continued sustainment of air power in a high-end fight with a peer competitor. It is important to note that WRA can be applied to every aspect of the DoD. All military members’ daily operations help provide air power to Combatant Commanders. The end goal of any conflict we enter is to be victorious as quickly as possible; however, we must also strive to minimize the resources lost in that conflict.
Setting the Stage
A potential peer-to-peer conflict will create three prominent sustainment challenges: replacing lost aircraft and support assets, replacing lost personnel with trained replacements, and contested logistics. To fully understand the future fight, it is essential to examine how these challenges played out in previous conflicts. “The history of great power war, and observable trends in modern warfare, suggest that there will be high levels of attrition”.[ii] A conflict with a peer competitor will look vastly different from the wars we have fought in the Middle East over the last four decades. The likelihood of staging large amounts of resources or moving them with relative ease is low, and the skies will not be ours without a fight. A peer competitor is going to challenge us at every turn and make us work for every advancement. Those advancements will be paid for by WRA. “The United States has not faced contested lines of logistics since World War II.”[iii] With credible sources indicating that WRA will be near World War II levels, Table 1 shows historical personnel losses from previous conflicts,[iv] and Table 2 provides estimated personnel losses from a sudden Chinese attack on Taiwan.[v]
The number of expected personnel lost in Phase 1 of a conflict with China is staggering. As the conflict continues, it is estimated that the US will average 142 fatalities per day.[viii] Experience cannot be rapidly generated. Maintenance personnel require years to develop foundational aviation knowledge, aircraft systems expertise, troubleshooting proficiency, and component replacement skills. Shortfalls in experience inevitably lead to reduced productivity and increased safety risk. While personnel will always remain the foremost priority, the loss of aircraft and support equipment, combined with limited ability to replace them in a timely manner, will significantly degrade the force’s capacity to generate the air power required by Combatant Commanders. Table 3 shows the number of aircraft lost in combat and the number of aircraft delivered during World War II[ix] while Table 4 shows the current USAF aircraft inventory level with estimated aircraft deliveries in 2026.[x]
A 2023 US and China war simulation estimates the USAF will lose 206 aircraft, with 90 percent of those aircraft lost on the ground.[xiii] The loss of aircraft on the ground often entails the concurrent loss of maintainers, support equipment, and critical infrastructure. In the time since this simulation, risks have only grown in number. For example, in June 2025, Ukraine conducted large-scale drone strikes deep within Russian territory, resulting in the damage or destruction of more than 40 unsheltered Russian military aircraft. This event should compel the DoD to reassess the adequacy and resilience of existing protective aircraft sheltering. In the very least, these identified risks and vulnerabilities should reinforce the importance of continuing to execute and update Agile Combat Employment and Mission-Ready Airmen initiatives.
In addition to the direct threat to combat operations, sustainment operations required for prolonged conflict may become increasingly challenging due to contested logistics and current constraints within the US DIB. “The US DIB lacks surge capacity, compared to China’s three-decade military modernization and Russia’s wartime production ramp; the US DIB remains inflexible, fragmented, and too slow to respond.”[xiv] The last time the US mobilized for a full-scale combat operation, the DIB did not just flip a switch on and start producing the needed items. “The US DIB took nearly three years to reach full-time production that allowed the allies to turn the tide of World War II.”[xv]
SMSgt Washausen improvised a temporary solution by using gum to secure a nut plate, enabling the panel to be installed in time to support a resource constrained sortie during Exercise PURPLE REIGN. (Source: CMSgt Wayne Shaw)
As stated above, WRA will be significant and is hard to fathom. In a potential war with China, some of the doctrines we use, such as concentrating air power on one or a few bases, are difficult to implement due to the tyranny of distance and Chinese weapons capabilities. This will force us to send squadrons to multiple spoke locations. However, increasing the number of spoke locations disperses our resources, making it more challenging to effectively resupply each spoke with the necessary materials. It is important to have a visual of what this could look like. “Late-deploying units to Kadena AB on Okinawa will land at a base that has entire squadrons of wrecked US and Japanese aircraft bulldozed to the side of the runway, hundreds of wounded in the base hospital, and temporary cemeteries to handle the many dead. Missile attacks and air combat will have wiped out squadrons that arrived only a few days earlier.”[xvi] As the ‘Keystone of the Pacific,’ Kadena AB is a pivotal forward operating location, a role defined by its strategic geography. Its position allows aircraft to reach the coast of China or the airspace over Taiwan in less than an hour, providing rapid power projection and air operations within the first island chain. The loss of Kadena AB would likely force the displacement of aircraft and personnel to more distant bases along the first island chain, as well as to locations within the second island chain, significantly increasing operational distances and placing greater strain on remaining resources. Such a shift would exacerbate demands on logistics, sustainment, and force projection capabilities for Combatant Commanders.
In a future fight, resupply and replacements may not arrive in time, if at all. With a strained supply chain and a defense industry unable to rapidly replace losses, Warfighters must fight with what they have and remain lethal even as those resources degrade. That reality demands more than planning; it demands practice. To survive and win, operating in a degraded state must become routine, embedded not just in exercises but in daily operations. This is why I recommend incorporating a combat attrition event or exercise into the FHP. Such an event would provide the logistics and maintenance communities with meaningful, realistic experience in operating under conditions of loss, degradation, and sustainment stress, while preserving operator training objectives and aircrew qualification requirements. Deliberately shifting the training focus toward generation and sustainment would address critical readiness concerns within the logistics and maintenance community that cannot be effectively achieved when operator training and qualification requirements remain the primary objective.
Incorporating a combat attrition event or exercise into the FHP
USAF Wings conduct annual exercises to test their readiness. In these exercises, leaders design scenarios that challenge our airmen to continue generating aircraft despite resource degradation. Unfortunately, in most cases, these resources are returned, or the scenario does not sufficiently challenge logistics and maintenance capabilities, as the scheduled sorties are tied to the FHP. The FHP is more than just keeping our operators proficient and qualified. It also provides logistical support for maintaining and modifying our aircraft. In simple terms, it keeps all flying units and their resources operational and combat-ready for current worldwide taskings. The FHP is vital to successful flying operations and aircraft sustainment, but it denies the logistics and maintenance communities the opportunity to cope with WRA.
Officer Trainees participate in a Mission Command Experience, August 21, 2025, at Officer Training School, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. The new MCEs executed in the latter half of OTS focus on the future fight, Space Force integration, and evolving medical considerations. (U.S. Air Force photo by Mr. Brian Krause)
The future fight requires sustainment structures that can adapt in real-time, survive in degraded environments, and support forces operating far from traditional logistical hubs.[xvii] In many scenarios, the sustainment required to support operations may not be available. This will force personnel to exercise critical thinking and make timely decisions, often without direct guidance from leadership.
Our force must not only survive in WRA environments but also maintain lethality and continue the fight. A clear relationship exists between resource attrition and accepted risk: as resources are lost or consumed, the capacity to mitigate or manage risk diminishes, leading to higher levels of risk acceptance. Degraded or lost assets immediately influence how remaining resources are employed, directly affecting the capabilities available to Combatant Commanders. In a high-end conflict with a peer competitor, timely and difficult decisions will be required at all levels to adapt to WRA. Once these decisions are made, they must be communicated promptly to ensure leaders have the situational awareness necessary to inform planning, adjust strategies, and reallocate resources effectively.
Although the USAF and other service branches experienced WRA during the Global War on Terrorism and the Gulf War, the effects were not severe enough to necessitate changes in overall strategy or tactical employment. A potential conflict with a near-peer adversary, however, would present unprecedented conditions, with few personnel having prior experience in comparable high-intensity, resource-constrained operations.
Incorporating a combat attrition event or exercise requires the support of Wing leadership. At the start of the exercise, only a realistic quantity of resources, those currently ready and available, should be employed. As resources, including aircraft, personnel, and support equipment, are lost, they should be relocated or segregated from the exercise. Non-deployable personnel or those “lost” during the event can be tasked with working on these assets, enabling their immediate return to the FHP. Munitions and other consumables should not be artificially replenished; resupply must reflect realistic timelines and availability. The objective for the logistics and maintenance communities is to sustain sortie generation while adapting tactics and procedures as resources become unavailable. This approach could be applied across all squadrons in future iterations, providing a realistic assessment of the Wing’s readiness, potential shortfalls, and critical concerns. From an external perspective, the event may appear chaotic, but this is intentional, reflecting the operational challenges of conducting missions amid resource attrition.
Desired Learning Objectives (DLO)
DLOs provide specific, measurable actions that enable exercise objectives to be evaluated objectively. The results of these DLOs inform discussions and guide adjustments in future iterations, ensuring continuous improvement. The methodology used to formulate these DLOs integrates collaborative expertise with doctrinal analysis and empirical observation. It is founded upon insights gathered from working groups with multiple subject matter experts, combined with a review of doctrine and historical precedents. These have consistently revealed that injected degradation scenarios cause the generation of air power to degrade or cease entirely, a halt that persists until the scenario is artificially removed by exercise controllers. Therefore, the resulting DLOs were specifically selected because they represent the most probable and high-impact sustainment challenges anticipated in a peer conflict. By incorporating a combat attrition event or exercise, the logistics and maintenance communities can gain valuable insights through three targeted DLOs, enhancing readiness and highlighting areas for operational refinement.
DLO 1 – Pushing Decisions to the Lowest Competent Level
Once personnel start to attrit, the likelihood of having all the key decision-makers decreases. As the conflict continues, we are more likely to have our operators flying degraded aircraft into combat. In a combat attrition event or exercise, allowing decisions to be made at the lowest competent level will test our subject matter experts’ ability to make decisions with key member oversight while in a controlled environment. Some groups and squadrons within the maintenance community have begun pushing mission command, emphasizing the commander’s intent, enabling subordinate teams to understand the end goal and reach the finish line in their own way. Once a risk decision is made, it will be provided to the operators. It is important that the logistics and maintenance community understands and respects that operators are the final decision-makers.
DLO 2 – Communicate Change in Capability
As resources begin to attrit, the capabilities provided by the logistics and maintenance community can change rapidly. When deviations or operational adjustments are identified and accepted by operators, it is critical that these changes be communicated promptly up the chain of command whenever possible. Timely and accurate reporting enables Combatant Commanders to assess risk, adjust operational approaches, and reallocate resources to restore or sustain combat power.
However, when communication is degraded or unavailable, squadrons must clearly understand the mission-type orders under which they are operating. This understanding ensures that squadrons can continue to execute the commander’s intent and sustain operations despite changes in available capabilities until communication with the Combatant Commander can be reestablished. Maintaining situational awareness of evolving limitations allows leaders to mitigate the risks associated with outdated assumptions and ensures that mission objectives remain achievable even under degraded conditions.
DLO 3 – Identify Single Points of Failure in the Combat Attrition Event or Exercise
Prussian General Clausewitz[xviii] describes the fog of war as the inherent uncertainty and lack of situational awareness experienced by participants in military operations, while the friction of war refers to the countless unforeseen minor problems and accidents that accumulate, making even simple tasks difficult to execute during conflict. When combined with WRA, these concepts reveal that squadrons will inevitably uncover weaknesses in assumptions, current tactics, and strategies. This DLO enables us to document and debrief findings, allowing us to develop solutions and identify points of failure that may represent significant issues or even mission-critical obstacles. During a combat attrition event or exercise, if a squadron becomes degraded or unable to fly sorties, it is critical to let the scenario play out and observe how personnel attempt to overcome the challenges. Multiple solutions may exist, and even an unapproved airworthy repair can successfully return the aircraft to operational status.
Scenarios
Below are four scenarios related to WRA. It is important to recognize that there is no single correct answer. Each scenario presents multiple possible courses of action, and the optimal approach will depend on a range of dynamic factors, including weather, mission objectives, airfield conditions, remaining personnel capabilities, and operational priorities. These scenarios are designed to encourage critical thinking, decision-making, and adaptability at the lowest competent level and communicated up to senior leaders. Maintenance members are expected to evaluate each situation, weigh potential risks and benefits, and consider the short- and long-term impacts of their decisions. The purpose is not only to explore non-standard solutions but to also develop judgment, flexibility, and problem-solving skills that are essential in real-world operations.
Conclusion
Sun Tzu teaches in The Art of War that we should rely not on the likelihood of the enemy’s absence, but on our own readiness to face him.[xix] For this reason, I emphasized incorporating a combat attrition event or exercise into the FHP, allowing the logistics and maintenance communities to identify and address challenges they are likely to encounter in conflict with a peer competitor. The data presented above indicates that resource replacement will not occur in a timely manner, meaning we must continue the fight with the assets currently available. The three proposed DLOs provide measurable outcomes and reveal areas for improvement. Finally, this paper presents scenarios for airmen of all ranks to evaluate and discuss. Its purpose is to spark dialogue within the logistics and maintenance communities. Many professionals may share these concerns but hesitate to speak up, making it essential to openly discuss these issues across all levels of command.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Air Force, the Department of Defense, or the US Government.
Acknowledgements
Military members do not join the service to solve the hypothetical problems of tomorrow. We spend countless hours mastering our duties and executing today’s missions. However, with the guidance of key mentors and the influence of trusted peers, we begin to think critically, learning to look beyond daily operations and anticipate the challenges ahead. I would like to thank Lt Col Tim Aanerud, Lt Col Alex Pagano, CMSgt Tim Jordan, CMSgt Kevin Bupp, SMSgt Ben Hewitt, and SMSgt KJ Washausen for providing feedback and the countless conversations about work and family. My deepest gratitude goes to Col Joseph Stangl and Maj Kyle Briney for the immeasurable hours they dedicated to my development and for their invaluable guidance and meticulous edits on this paper. Their leadership has profoundly shaped me.
About the Author
CMSgt Wayne S. Shaw is a Tactical Aircraft Maintainer and the Senior Enlisted Leader for the 510th Fighter Generation Squadron, Aviano AB, Italy. He entered the United States Air Force in 2005 and has completed field-level, intermediate, and depot-level maintenance on A-10, F-15, F-16, F-22, and F-35 aircraft. He holds a Master of Science in Logistics and Supply Chain, a Bachelor of Science in Technical Management, and Airframe and Powerplant Licenses from the Federal Aviation Administration. Throughout his career, he has led and mentored airmen across operational and maintenance missions, ensuring aircraft readiness and mission success. He currently provides strategic leadership and guidance for the squadron, focusing on mission execution, and airmen development.
Works Cited
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