On the Brink: Ensuring Survival in Large-Scale NEO Amidst LSCO Threats

By: Maj Nate Lowman

Soldiers of the Minnesota National Guard’s 1st Battalion, 194th Armor Regiment, Task Force 1-194, fly on a U.S. Air Force C-17 Globemaster aircraft August 17, 2021, responding to the Noncombatant Evacuation Operation announced by the Department of State, supported by the Department of Defense. Members of Task Force 1-194 flew to Hamid Karzai International Airport when called upon for rapid deployment in support of Operation Allies Refuge in Kabul, Afghanistan.
Approximately 1,100 Soldiers from Task Force 1-194 deployed to the Middle East in early 2021 for a nine-month mission in support of Operation Spartan Shield. While deployed, the Soldiers assumed responsibilities within the CENTCOM area of operations assuming the Operation Spartan Shield response force mission.
“This task force will bring together Soldiers from several units across the state,” said Lt. Col. Jacob Helgestad, commander of Task Force 1-194. “Our Soldiers are well-trained and ready for this mission and I’m confident they will represent the State of Minnesota well.”
(Minnesota National Guard photo by Lt. Col. Jake Helgestad)

Abstract
Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEOs) are vital for protecting civilians during crises, yet Large-Scale Combat Operations (LSCO) expose critical vulnerabilities, as seen in the chaotic 2021 Kabul evacuation. This article analyzes Operation Allies Refuge, which airlifted 124,334 people, to uncover systemic flaws in interagency coordination, airlift capacity, and cyber security. Focusing on Indo-Pacific threats, including North Korea’s artillery endangering Seoul and a potential Taiwan evacuation of 500,000 non-combatants, it proposes actionable solutions: unified Department of Defense (DoD), Department of State (DoS), and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) frameworks, 50 additional C-17 aircraft, Space Force cyber systems, and Japan-South Korea partnerships. Addressing counterarguments on budget tradeoffs and allied reluctance, the study urges immediate reforms to prevent catastrophe and bolster US credibility in contested environments.

Introduction

U.S. citizens and their families process through the passenger terminal at Ramstein Air Base, Germany, to board a departure flight on their way to the United States as part of Operations Allies Refuge, Aug. 23, 2021. (U.S. Air Force photo by Airman Edgar Grimaldo)

In August 2021, Kabul’s chaotic evacuation gripped the world—thousands fled as the Taliban advanced, exposing stark failures in US Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO). Large-Scale Combat Operations (LSCO) amplify such challenges, from fractured interagency coordination to strained airlift and vulnerable cyber systems. Indo-Pacific flashpoints—North Korea’s 1,500 artillery pieces threatening Seoul and a potential Taiwan crisis requiring 500,000 evacuees—demand urgent preparedness. This article dissects Operation Allies Refuge (OAR), the largest US NEO, to reveal systemic gaps. It proposes robust solutions: unified interagency frameworks, expanded airlift capacity, and cyber resilience to secure lives in contested environments.

Section I: Why NEOs Matter Strategically

NEOs ensure the safety of US citizens, allies, and partners during conflicts or disasters. The DoD secures and transports evacuees, while the DoS manages diplomatic approvals. In LSCO, NEOs face contested airspace, cyber disruptions, and mass displacement. The 2022 National Defense Strategy prioritizes multi-domain readiness, tying NEOs to Indo-Pacific stability.[1] History underscores the stakes: Operation Frequent Wind (1975) evacuated 7,000 from Saigon but required 70 helicopters, revealing scalability limits. Today, with North Korea’s 1,500 artillery pieces threatening Seoul’s 10 million residents, NEOs demand robust solutions. These historical and emerging challenges set the stage for examining OAR’s lessons, which reveal both strengths and systemic flaws.

The Department of Defense is committed to supporting the U.S. State Department in the departure of U.S. and allied civilian personnel from Afghanistan, and to evacuate Afghan allies safely. (U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Brandon Cribelar)

Section II: Lessons from Afghanistan’s Operation Allies Refuge

OAR, the largest US-led NEO, evacuated 124,334 people from Kabul in 2021 amid Taliban advances.[2] Its successes and failures guide future planning.

Successes drove OAR’s historic scale. Nearly 800 military and civilian aircraft deployed, including C-17s, airlifting 120,000+ evacuees in 17 days.[3] Aeromedical teams delivered babies and treated wounded, showcasing adaptability. DoD housed 34,900 Afghans in Germany and 73,500 at US bases, leveraging global capabilities.

Yet, failures exposed systemic gaps and interagency coordination collapsed due to no Memoranda Of Agreement (MOA) between DoD, DoS, and DHS. The DoD Inspector General’s report notes bureaucratic silos; for example, DoS prioritized diplomacy while DoD focused on security, delayed vetting.[4] The Abbey Gate bombing, killing 13 US troops and 170 civilians, highlighted perimeter vulnerabilities. DoS’s Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) program, slowed by understaffing, stranded eligible Afghans.[5]

Why did these failures occur? No MOAs existed because pre-crisis planning assumed a stable Kabul government and severely underestimated the speed of the Taliban. Overwhelmed airfields reflected inadequate foresight for mass exodus scenarios. OAR underscores the need for pre-positioned assets, streamlined vetting, and agile combat employment. OAR’s chaos mirrors Indo-Pacific risks, where scale, adversaries, and geography demand tailored NEO strategies.

U.S. Airmen, including some assigned to McConnell Air Force Base, Kansas, assist refugees during Operation Allies Refuge in August of 2021 at Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar. Twenty-three McConnell Airmen received Air Medal-Combat Devices for their participation in the evacuation. (Courtesy Photo)

Section III: Indo-Pacific Challenges for NEOs

The Indo-Pacific tests NEOs with vast distances, hostile actors, and massive populations. North Korea’s 1,500 artillery pieces endanger Seoul’s 10 million residents, risking rapid escalation.[6] A Taiwan contingency could require evacuating 500,000 non-combatants, per RAND wargames, outstripping the capacity of the US’s 222 C-17s, which would need thousands of sorties.[7] China’s Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD) systems, which include missiles and electronic warfare, threaten air routes, threatening tanker aircraft and communications.[8]

Logistical gaps persist. Red Flag 23-3 exposed Navy-Air Force interoperability issues, highlighting needs for E-7 Wedgetail aircraft and 20 additional KC-46 tankers.[9] Cyber vulnerabilities, revealed in Cyber Flag 23-1, weaken command-control systems critical for NEO coordination.[10] Allies like Japan and South Korea are pivotal but lack clear NEO roles, risking delays similar to those seen in OAR.[11]

Could alternatives mitigate these challenges? Relying solely on commercial airlift could reduce military costs, with global fleets offering 4,000+ aircraft.[12] However, A2/AD systems render civilian planes vulnerable and China’s DF-21D missiles can target moving assets up to 1,800 km away. Pre-staging evacuees in allied ports might bypass airlift needs, but North Korea’s 600,000 troops could disrupt ground routes, and Japan’s policies limit military hosting.[13] These constraints reinforce the need for military-led, multi-domain integration for air, cyber, and allied support to protect millions. Addressing these challenges requires concrete steps, rooted in OAR’s lessons and Indo-Pacific realities.

U.S., Japanese, Australia, India, and South Korean forces conduct a multinational exercise in the Indo-Pacific, highlighting the need for allied integration to support large-scale NEOs in contested environments. (Australia, India, Japan, Korea, and the U.S. Complete Multinational Exercise Sea Dragon 20, n.d.) (U.S. Navy photo by Chief Mass Communication Specialist Matthew Cole).

Section IV: Recommendations for NEO Success

To secure NEOs in LSCO, four targeted strategies are proposed, each with actionable steps.

Interagency Frameworks
OAR’s vetting delays stem from misaligned priorities.[14] To unify efforts:
- Establish a DoD-DoS-DHS NEO taskforce by 2026 to draft MOAs.
- Conduct biannual joint exercises, simulating Taiwan or Seoul evacuations.
- Create a shared vetting database, reducing SIV-like backlogs.
Airlift Expansion
Taiwan’s 500,000-evacuee scenario exceeds current capacity.[15] To scale up:
- Procure 50 additional C-17s and 20 KC-46 tankers by 2030, despite $218M per C-17 costs.
- Lease commercial aircraft for uncontested routes, per Red Flag 23-3 lessons.
- Pre-position assets in Guam and Japan for rapid response.

Counterargument: Skeptics warn that boosting airlift capacity could siphon funds from critical INDOPACOM modernization efforts, such as advanced fighter programs, weakening deterrence against regional adversaries.[16] However, a hybrid airlift model with military C-17s for contested zones and leased commercial aircraft for safe routes optimizes budgets while ensuring Taiwan’s evacuation can occur within weeks, not months, preserving US responsiveness and credibility.

Cyber Resilience
Cyber Flag 23-1 exposed NEO communication risks.[17] To strengthen defenses:
- Deploy Space Force satellites for secure data links by 2027.
- Run annual USINDOPACOM cyber exercises, integrating allied systems.
- Develop redundant command networks to counter A2/AD jamming.

Counterargument: Some prioritize offensive cyber tools, like USCYBERCOM’s $2.1B budget, over defensive satellites costing $1Beach.[18] Over-reliance on the Space Force risks single-point failures if China’s Anti-Satellite (ASAT) weapons, tested in 2023, disrupt orbits.[19] However, redundant networks and allied integration ensure resilience as Taiwan’s evacuation demands uninterrupted coordination.

Allied Integration
Japan and South Korea’s roles are undefined, risking OAR-like missteps.[20] To align:
- Sign NEO agreements with both nations by 2026, clarifying evacuee hosting.
- Offer incentives, like trade benefits, to offset political resistance.
- Conduct trilateral NEO drills, building on US-Japan-South Korea summits.[21]

Counterargument: Allies may resist due to domestic pressures. Japan’s 2024 elections showed 60% public opposition to military expansion and South Korea fears North Korean retaliation.[22] Overcommitting US resources to trilateral drills, costing $500M yearly, could strain INDOPACOM budgets.[23] Still, agreements and incentives align interests, as Japan’s 1.5 million US citizens and South Korea’s bases are critical NEO hubs.[24]

Conclusion

The US stands at a critical juncture for NEO preparedness in the Indo-Pacific region. OAR evacuated 124,334 people but faltered due to disjointed coordination, inadequate airlift, and security lapses, flaws that could prove catastrophic in the Indo-Pacific. North Korea’s artillery threatens millions in Seoul, while a Taiwan crisis could demand evacuating 500,000 amidst China’s A2/AD systems. This article’s recommendations for interagency task forces, 50 new C-17s, Space Force cyber defenses, and Japan-South Korea agreements offer a roadmap to save lives. Delay risks repeating Kabul’s chaos on a larger scale. The time to act is now, before crisis strikes.

The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Air Force, the Department of Defense, or the US Government.

About the Author

Maj Nate Lowman is a USAF Aircraft Maintenance Officer with over 14 years of leadership in high-stakes operational environments. Commissioned through Officer Training School in 2010, he has served in diverse assignments, including five deployments, with his most recent as Wing Plans and Programs Officer at the 386th Air Expeditionary Wing, Ali Al Salem AB, Kuwait, during the 2021 Afghanistan NEO. After he completed Army Command and General Staff College, he is now the 482nd Aircraft Maintenance Squadron Commander.

Works Cited

[1] 2022-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY-NPR-MDR.pdf. (n.d.).

[2] Remembering the Largest Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation in US History | Air & Space Forces Magazine. (n.d.). Retrieved February 27, 2025, from https://www.airandspaceforces.com/remembering-the-largest-non-combatant-evacuation-operation-allies-refuge-in-u-s-history%ef%bf%bc/

[3] Remembering the Largest Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation in US History | Air & Space Forces Magazine. (n.d.). Retrieved February 27, 2025, from https://www.airandspaceforces.com/remembering-the-largest-non-combatant-evacuation-operation-allies-refuge-in-u-s-history%ef%bf%bc/

[4] Special Report: Lessons Learned From the Audit of DoD Support for the Relocation of Afghan. (n.d.). Department of Defense Office of Inspector General. Retrieved February 27, 2025, from https://www.dodig.mil/reports.html/Article/3120932/special-report-lessons-learned-from-the-audit-of-dod-support-for-the-relocation/https%3A%2F%2Fwww.dodig.mil%2Freports.html%2FArticle%2F3120932%2Fspecial-report-lessons-learned-from-the-audit-of-dod-support-for-the-relocation%2F

[5] Special Report: Lessons Learned From the Audit of DoD Support for the Relocation of Afghan. (n.d.). Department of Defense Office of Inspector General. Retrieved February 27, 2025, from https://www.dodig.mil/reports.html/Article/3120932/special-report-lessons-learned-from-the-audit-of-dod-support-for-the-relocation/https%3A%2F%2Fwww.dodig.mil%2Freports.html%2FArticle%2F3120932%2Fspecial-report-lessons-learned-from-the-audit-of-dod-support-for-the-relocation%2F

[6] Missiles of North Korea. (n.d.). Missile Threat. Retrieved April 14, 2025, from https://missilethreat.csis.org/country/dprk/

[7] Cancian, M. F., Cancian, M., & Heginbotham, E. (2023). The First Battle of the Next War: Wargaming a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan. https://www.csis.org/analysis/first-battle-next-war-wargaming-chinese-invasion-taiwan

[8] Cancian, M. F., Cancian, M., & Heginbotham, E. (2023). The First Battle of the Next War: Wargaming a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan. https://www.csis.org/analysis/first-battle-next-war-wargaming-chinese-invasion-taiwan

[9] Today’s D Brief: F-16s cleared for Ukraine; US-Japan-S.Korea summit; Spies target space firms; Deadly days in Tripoli; And a bit more. (2023, August 18). Defense One. https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2023/08/the-d-brief-august-18-2023/389538/

[10] m3seo. (2022, December 2). CYBERCOM concludes CYBER FLAG 23 exercise. Fort Eisenhower Cyber District. https://www.eisenhoweralliance.com/cybercom-concludes-cyber-flag-23-exercise/

[11] Harold, S. W., & Mori, S. (2021). A Taiwan Contingency and Japan’s Counterstrike Debate. https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2021/07/a-taiwan-contingency-and-japans-counterstrike-debate.html

[12] Mouton, C. A., Orletsky, D. T., Kennedy, M., & Timson, F. (2013). Reducing Long-Term Costs While Preserving a Robust Strategic Airlift Fleet: Options for the Current Fleet and Next-Generation Aircraft. RAND Corporation. https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG1238.html

[13] Missiles of North Korea. (n.d.). Missile Threat. Retrieved April 14, 2025, from https://missilethreat.csis.org/country/dprk/

[14] Special Report: Lessons Learned From the Audit of DoD Support for the Relocation of Afghan. (n.d.). Department of Defense Office of Inspector General. Retrieved February 27, 2025, from https://www.dodig.mil/reports.html/Article/3120932/special-report-lessons-learned-from-the-audit-of-dod-support-for-the-relocation/https%3A%2F%2Fwww.dodig.mil%2Freports.html%2FArticle%2F3120932%2Fspecial-report-lessons-learned-from-the-audit-of-dod-support-for-the-relocation%2F

[15] Cancian, M. F., Cancian, M., & Heginbotham, E. (2023). The First Battle of the Next War: Wargaming a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan. https://www.csis.org/analysis/first-battle-next-war-wargaming-chinese-invasion-taiwan

[16] Today’s D Brief: F-16s cleared for Ukraine; US-Japan-S.Korea summit; Spies target space firms; Deadly days in Tripoli; And a bit more. (2023, August 18). Defense One. https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2023/08/the-d-brief-august-18-2023/389538/

[17] m3seo. (2022, December 2). CYBERCOM concludes CYBER FLAG 23 exercise. Fort Eisenhower Cyber District. https://www.eisenhoweralliance.com/cybercom-concludes-cyber-flag-23-exercise/

[18] CYBERCOM_OP-5.pdf. (n.d.).

[19] Today’s D Brief: F-16s cleared for Ukraine; US-Japan-S.Korea summit; Spies target space firms; Deadly days in Tripoli; And a bit more. (2023, August 18). Defense One. https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2023/08/the-d-brief-august-18-2023/389538/

[20] Harold, S. W., & Mori, S. (2021). A Taiwan Contingency and Japan’s Counterstrike Debate. https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2021/07/a-taiwan-contingency-and-japans-counterstrike-debate.html

[21] Today’s D Brief: F-16s cleared for Ukraine; US-Japan-S.Korea summit; Spies target space firms; Deadly days in Tripoli; And a bit more. (2023, August 18). Defense One. https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2023/08/the-d-brief-august-18-2023/389538/

[22] Japanese Military Expansion: A Story of War Amnesia – Berkeley Political Review. (2024, April 15). https://bpr.studentorg.berkeley.edu/2024/04/15/japanese-military-expansion-a-story-of-war-amnesia/

[23] Joint Statement on the Philippines-United States Fourth 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue. (n.d.). U.S. Department of Defense. Retrieved April 14, 2025, from https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3854902/joint-statement-on-the-philippines-united-states-fourth-22-ministerial-dialogue/https%3A%2F%2Fwww.defense.gov%2FNews%2FReleases%2FRelease%2FArticle%2F3854902%2Fjoint-statement-on-the-philippines-united-states-fourth-22-ministerial-dialogue%2F

[24] Joint Statement on the Trilateral United States – Japan – Republic of Korea Meeting in Munich. (n.d.). United States Department of State. Retrieved April 14, 2025, from https://www.state.gov/joint-statement-on-the-trilateral-united-states-japan-republic-of-korea-meeting-in-munich/