By: Jondavid DuVall

Delta IV Heavy Launch
Three booster tanks filled with liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen propellants supplied by Defense Logistics Agency Energy Aerospace launched a United Launch Alliance Delta IV Heavy rocket from Vandenberg Space Force Base, California, Sept. 24. (Photo courtesy of United Launch Alliance. Photo by Connie Braesch)
Abstract
As space becomes an increasingly contested domain, the United States must adapt its strategies to sustain competitive advantage against peer adversaries such as China and Russia. This paper explores the operational, logistical, and strategic implications of a future conflict extending into space. It begins with an analysis of emerging counterspace threats, including kinetic and non-kinetic weapons, the risks of orbital debris, and the growing need for space traffic management.
The discussion then shifts to the unique logistics requirements of sustaining space operations, highlighting new paradigms such as on-orbit servicing, in-space refueling, and In-Space Assembly and Manufacturing (ISAM). The paper examines how these capabilities can increase the maneuverability, longevity, and resilience of US space assets. Central to this effort is the evolving partnership between the US Space Force (USSF) and the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), which is reshaping traditional defense supply chains to meet the demands of space operations.
Through case studies and policy analysis, the paper illustrates how this collaboration is leveraging commercial innovation, predictive analytics, and artificial intelligence to deliver agile, data-driven sustainment solutions. In addressing anticipated challenges—such as adapting legacy logistics frameworks, maintaining strategic deterrence, and building a robust in-space support infrastructure—the paper underscores the importance of integrated logistics as a decisive factor in future space warfare.
Introduction
The space domain is rapidly evolving into a contested arena where the United States’ adversaries are developing sophisticated means to challenge US assets on-orbit. As the US Space Force (USSF) grows into its role as a warfighting service, it must prepare for conflict extending to space – alongside the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) – to ensure US advantages are sustained. This paper examines key issues for the future fight in space: the implications of a contested space environment with peer competitors, the unique logistics required to support space operations, the evolving partnership between DLA and USSF to sustain space missions, and anticipated questions about balancing traditional logistics with space needs, the importance of data & Artificial Intelligence (AI) acumen, and what a future peer conflict in space might entail.

A US Space Force mission, carrying the first Weather System Follow-on—Microwave (WSF-M) satellite, launches aboard a SpaceX Falcon 9 rocket from Space Launch Complex 4-East at Vandenberg Space Force Base, Calif., April 11, 2024, at 7:24 a.m. PDT. (US Space Force photo by Airman 1st Class Olga Houtsma DVIDS)
Contested Space Environment in Peer Conflicts
In a conflict with a peer adversary like China or Russia, space will no longer serve as a sanctuary—it will be a fiercely contested warfighting domain .[1] These nations have actively weaponized space, fielding both kinetic and non-kinetic counterspace capabilities designed to disrupt, degrade, or destroy US satellites and the critical services they provide. Among the most visible kinetic threats are direct-ascent anti-satellite weapons (ASAT), which can be launched from the ground to intercept and destroy satellites in orbit. In 2007, China demonstrated this capability by intentionally destroying one of its own weather satellites, triggering a Kessler Event that produced thousands of hazardous debris fragments in Low Earth Orbit (LEO). Just two years later, in 2009, a defunct Russian satellite (Cosmos 2251) collided with an active US Iridium communications satellite, marking the first accidental satellite-to-satellite collision and creating more than 2,000 additional debris pieces. These incidents highlight the growing congestion and vulnerability of orbital space and underscore the urgent need for enhanced space traffic management and debris mitigation strategies to ensure freedom of action in the space domain.[2]
Since then, China has conducted several additional ASAT tests (at least seven) in a more controlled manner that did not produce long-lived debris, proving the capability to target LEO satellites while attempting to mitigate space debris. Russia has also tested such capabilities – notably the 2021 destruction of a defunct satellite (Cosmos 1408) by a direct-ascent missile – which produced a significant debris field and even forced astronauts to shelter due to the collision risk.[3] These kinetic attacks on satellites not only degrade space capabilities but also generate hazardous orbital debris that can threaten other satellites indiscriminately, complicating the space environment for all actors. Beyond direct missile strikes, co-orbital ASATs pose another kinetic threat.
Co-orbital systems involve a weapon satellite that is launched into orbit and later maneuvers to rendezvous with a target satellite to disable or destroy it. China has demonstrated the building blocks of co-orbital ASAT technology through on-orbit close proximity operations in both LEO and Geosynchronous Orbit (GEO). While China has not publicly proven a destructive co-orbital attack, the technology demonstrations (including a satellite physically moving another to a “graveyard” orbit) indicate they could rapidly convert these into operational weapons, even at the high altitudes where the most critical military satellites reside.[4]
Russia, inheriting a legacy of Soviet-era space weapon programs, has also pursued co-orbital ASAT systems and has conducted numerous on-orbit experiments that US Space Command categorizes as likely ASAT tests. These developments mean US satellites could face threats from hostile spacecraft approaching under guise of inspection or repair but intending harm. Non-kinetic threats are equally concerning in a peer confrontation. Adversaries are fielding advanced electronic warfare systems to jam or spoof satellite signals. Both China and Russia have deployed powerful jammers targeting US Global Positioning System (GPS) navigation signals, military communications satellites (SATCOM), and even space-based radars.[5] Such jamming can disrupt military operations that depend on precise timing, navigation, and communications, potentially degrading (though not entirely denying) services like GPS and SATCOM during conflict.[6]

US Space Force Spc. 4 Michael Masciave, a mobile maintainer assigned to 4th Space Operations Squadron, Mobile Operations Flight, conducts maintenance on the Family of Advanced Beyond Line of Site Terminals (FAB-T) at Schriever Space Force Base, Colorado, April 8, 2022. (US Space Force photo by Tiana Williams)
Directed energy weapons are another non-kinetic tool: ground-based lasers or high-powered microwave systems can be used to dazzle or damage satellite sensors and electronics without a physical interception. China is reportedly developing these directed-energy counterspace weapons (for example, lasers to blind imaging satellites), and while no known operational use has been reported yet, research suggests they could be deployed soon.[7]
Cyber attacks also loom as a silent threat – hacking into satellite control networks or ground stations could yield control of a satellite or corrupt the data it provides. Both China and Russia possess robust cyber warfare units, and although specific cyber attacks against satellites are not public, it is assessed that they have the capability and would incorporate cyber operations against space systems in wartime.[8] A peer adversary would likely use a combination of jamming, blinding, cyber intrusions, and physical attacks to cripple US space assets at the start of a conflict, aiming to “paralyze the enemy’s information systems” and blind US forces on the battlefield.[9]
[S]pace will no longer serve as a sanctuary—it will be a fiercely contested warfighting domain .[1]
Critically, these counterspace activities have implications for strategic deterrence. Space capabilities are integral to nuclear command-and-control, early warning of missile launches, and everyday military communications; thus, an attack on certain satellites could be highly escalatory. The US seeks to deter attacks in space by both demonstrating readiness to fight through such threats and by building resilience. General Stephen N. Whiting, Commander of United States Space Command, emphasized that the Department of Defense is preparing for conflict in space “to ensure deterrence. If that fails, the US military is ready to fight and win”.[10]

US Space Force SPC 3 Michelle Skeets, A Space Operator for the 4th Space Operations Squadron, Mobile Operations Flight (DOM) pulls security during a routine training exercise at Schriever Space Force Base, Colorado, April 8, 2022. (US Space Force Photo by Dennis Rogers DVIDS)
Deterrence in space follows the classic models of deterrence by denial (making it hard for the enemy to achieve a decisive advantage, for instance by deploying redundant satellites or quickly reconstituting lost capabilities) and deterrence by punishment (threatening to retaliate, potentially in other domains, if an adversary attacks US space assets).[11] For example, deploying large constellations of smaller satellites can ensure no single attack disables an entire capability, thereby denying the enemy’s objective and dissuading an attack. The US also signals that it can attribute and respond to hostile acts in space, to include leveraging its unparalleled network of commercial and allied space partnerships as a strength.[12]
Maintaining a robust, modernized space architecture – including hardened satellites, rapid-replacement launch options, and defensive countermeasures – all contributes to convincing a rival that attacking US space systems would yield little benefit and carry great risk. In a peer fight scenario, success will hinge on protecting our satellites and services while denying the adversary the space-enabled advantages they seek. Space is now undeniably a “warfighting domain,”[13] and the US must be prepared to “fight through” contested conditions in orbit just as we do in the air, land, and sea domains.
New Logistics Paradigms for Space Sustainment
Supporting and sustaining space forces require fundamentally different logistics thinking than traditional military supply chains on Earth. Satellites and other space systems cannot be refueled or repaired by a quick trip to a depot or the frontlines; once on-orbit, they are largely on their own. This has driven a historically one-and-done approach to space hardware – but future conflict and extended operations will demand more flexibility. Key concepts reshaping space logistics include on-orbit servicing, refueling, in-space assembly, and enhanced maneuverability, all of which are critical to prolonging the life and effectiveness of space assets.
Such on-orbit servicing and refueling capabilities could revolutionize sustainment by extending satellite lifespans and enabling more frequent orbital maneuvers. On-orbit servicing refers to using robotic spacecraft (“service vehicles” or “space tugs”) to inspect, repair, adjust, or upgrade satellites in orbit. This concept is already being tested in the commercial sector. For instance, Northrop Grumman’s Mission Extension Vehicle (MEV) demonstrated the ability to dock with an aging communications satellite and extend its life by supplying attitude control and propulsion – essentially acting as a replacement “engine” for the client satellite.[14] In military terms, such servicing craft could be used to fix malfunctioning strategic satellites or reposition them, reducing downtime and the need to launch costly replacements.
Supporting and sustaining space forces require fundamentally different logistics thinking than traditional military supply chains on Earth.
On-orbit refueling is a particularly game-changing service: by transferring propellant to satellites, we could dramatically extend their operational life and enable high-thrust maneuvers on demand. Next-generation military satellites are expected to be more maneuverable – able to evade threats or shift orbits as the tactical situation requires – but every maneuver consumes fuel. A satellite’s “life expectancy” is often limited by its fuel supply, so the ability to top off fuel in space would allow satellites to perform defensive maneuvers or orbital adjustments without prematurely burning through their reserves. The US Space Force recognizes this need: it has established a Space Mobility and Logistics program office and invested in prototype servicing technologies with companies like Astroscale,[15] Starfish Space,[16] Northrop Grumman, and Orbit Fab (a firm focused on orbital refueling). As one Space Force general noted, aerial refueling revolutionized air power by extending range and endurance, and similarly “developing similar logistics capabilities in space is crucial for future operations”.[17] In short, refueling and servicing in orbit could become the “tanker aircraft” and “maintenance depots” of the space domain, allowing US spacecraft to remain mission-capable far longer than would otherwise be possible.
ISAM is another paradigm shift in sustainment. Instead of launching a satellite fully assembled (and constrained by the size of a rocket fairing), ISAM envisions building structures in orbit or even fabricating parts on demand. NASA and commercial partners have demonstrated early steps, such as 3D printing small items on the International Space Station and experimenting with robotic assembly of large structures.[18]
For the military, ISAM could mean the ability to replace damaged components or construct large antennas and power systems in space, creating more resilient and scalable systems. In-space assembly also allows modularity – satellites could be built with plug-and-play modules that a servicing craft could swap out (for example, installing a new sensor or replacing a failed unit) without needing an entirely new spacecraft. Over the long term, ISAM might enable “space depots” or factories that produce spare parts or even fuel (through harvesting extraterrestrial resources like lunar ice for rocket propellant). These concepts remain in development,[19] [20] but they represent a forward-thinking approach where logistical support is projected into space itself rather than being confined to Earth.
China is also treating in-space logistics as a strategic priority. A recent study shows the People’s Liberation Army is preparing satellite operators for on-orbit refueling in both peacetime and wartime, even developing training simulators for satellite servicing missions. Chinese engineers have tested technologies for refueling and debris removal in orbit and are integrating these into military doctrine and exercises.[21]
China is also treating in-space logistics as a strategic priority.
This underscores that the US must not fall behind in the race to enable orbital sustainment capabilities. Because physical access to space assets is so limited and costly, propellant management and overall spacecraft design take on outsized importance in logistics planning. Satellites must carry all the fuel they will need from the moment of launch, which is akin to a soldier going into the field with a single tank of gas for a vehicle that must last years. This constraint forces tradeoffs: every kilogram of fuel is a kilogram less for payload (sensors, communications relays, etc.), and thus satellites traditionally carry only enough propellant for routine station-keeping and limited maneuvers over a planned lifespan. In the future fight, however, satellites may need to perform frequent maneuvers to dodge threats or reposition to cover degraded assets, which could quickly exhaust fuel. Here, logistics thinking means designing architectures that can accommodate losses and replacements.
One approach is proliferation and redundancy – deploying constellations of many smaller satellites (as opposed to a few large ones) so that losing one or expending another’s fuel does not cripple the mission. Another approach is pre-positioning spares and tankers in orbit. For example, small refueling pods could be placed in strategic orbits (much like caches of supplies), or rapid-launch vehicles kept on alert to deploy a replacement satellite or refueler at a moment’s notice. The USSF has been exploring “tactically responsive launch” concepts – essentially the ability to launch a satellite on short notice to replace one that was disabled.[22]
[T]he US must not fall behind in the race to enable orbital sustainment capabilities.
All of these require a different mindset than terrestrial logistics, which typically relies on large supply convoys, depots, and regular re-supply runs. In space, logistics must be much more predictive and preventive: we must anticipate needs and position support before a conflict or failure occurs. This includes practices like fueling satellites to maximum capacity pre-launch, building standardized docking adapters for future servicing, and establishing robust contracts with commercial providers to augment military space capabilities on demand. The bottom line is that sustaining space operations in wartime demands creativity and foresight – “logistics” in space may involve physics and orbits as much as trucks and warehouses.
The US Space Force’s planners acknowledge that legacy satellites were not built with this contested future in mind, and that must change. Next-generation systems are being designed for maneuverability and resilience, which in turn requires a “robust in-space support infrastructure” to keep them fueled and functioning.[23] Just as airpower evolved with aerial refueling and forward repair bases, spacepower will evolve with refuellable, serviceable satellites and on-orbit sustainment – all enabled by the emerging field of space logistics.
Evolving a Joint Sustainment Approach
Ensuring the US Space Force can fight and operate in space isn’t just about satellites and rockets – it also hinges on ground logistics and support systems here on Earth. The DLA, as the Pentagon’s combat logistics support arm, must evolve alongside the Space Force to provide timely, relevant sustainment. This means integrating space requirements into traditional defense supply chains, forging new partnerships (especially with the space industry), and leveraging data-driven tools to anticipate needs. Recent initiatives show DLA and USSF taking concrete steps to institutionalize their partnership and modernize logistics for space. A significant milestone was reached in September 2024, when DLA and the Space Force signed a new framework agreement establishing how they will collaborate to support Space Force missions. This agreement, the result of 12 months of joint work, set standards for aligning Space Force supply requirements with DLA’s worldwide logistics system. It focuses on readiness-based support – ensuring that the unique parts and materials needed for space systems are available when and where needed – and creates formal governance bodies (a Partnership Agreement Council and an Executive Steering Group) to synchronize efforts.[24]

US Air Force Master Sgt. Audrey Valdez, 21st Logistics Readiness Squadron materiel management superintendent, and US Space Force Spc. 4 Blake Settoon, 62nd Cyberspace Squadron defensive cyber operator, discuss the artificial intelligence optimized loading plan during the space logistics challenge at Peterson Space Force Base, Colorado, Jan. 15, 2025. (US Space Force photo by Staff Sgt. Jaime Sanchez)
In practice, this means Space Force now has equal priority within DLA, like the other military services. DLA is committed to “delivering responsive logistics support to the Space Force as it protects national security interests in space,” said DLA Director Lt Gen Mark T. Simerly. Importantly, the agencies are developing metrics to track performance in areas such as order response times and parts availability for Space Force systems. By measuring things like how fast a replacement component for a satellite ground station can be delivered, or how readily available a certain rocket fuel ingredient is, DLA can adjust its processes to better support the new service. These metrics are especially crucial for low-demand, niche items that the Space Force relies on – for example, a specialized semiconductor or sensor that isn’t used widely by other services.
Traditional DLA processes excel at high-volume commodities (food, fuel, common repair parts), but for space, DLA must forecast and stock items that may have no other buyers. Through focused national account managers and liaisons, DLA is learning Space Force’s needs and trying to “predict what’s going to be needed to keep the mission going”.[26]
Integration of space logistics with the broader defense supply chain is already yielding benefits. DLA Aviation, one of DLA’s major sub-organizations, has taken the lead on supporting Space Force’s materiel needs for spacecraft and launch operations. DLA Aviation manages an extensive inventory of aerospace parts and has ensured that critical parts for launch vehicles, satellites, and ground control systems are readily available, reducing downtime and boosting the Space Force’s mission readiness.[27] They even appointed a dedicated Weapon Systems Program Manager (WSPM) for Space Force systems. This WSPM works together with Space Force program offices to monitor the supply chain for space systems through their entire life cycle. For example, if a particular electronic component in a radar or satellite starts facing obsolescence (the manufacturer stops producing it), the WSPM can proactively coordinate with DLA procurement to find new sources or stockpile the part. The WSPM leads integrated process team meetings with Space Force personnel, conducts forecasting analyses, and flags any support issues early so they can be resolved without impacting operations.
This kind of embedded support is a shift from the traditional model – it ensures Space Force’s specialized needs don’t get lost in the shuffle. Likewise, DLA’s Nuclear & Space Enterprise Support Office has placed liaison officers at key Space Force locations (e.g. at Peterson SFB in Colorado) to facilitate daily coordination. When a problem does arise, this close integration pays off. A recent case saw a Space Force unit struggling to obtain a critical transistor for ground-based radar systems; a DLA liaison and program manager intervened, worked with the vendor to ramp up production, and cleared the backorders, restoring the stock of this vital part.
Such examples highlight how agility and communication between DLA and USSF can solve sustainment issues quickly – an essential capability given the rapid pace of technological advancement in space systems.
Another area of evolution is partnerships with commercial providers, which are indispensable in the space domain. The US commercial space sector – from launch companies to satellite manufacturers – is arguably the most advanced in the world, and the Space Force is leveraging this through contracts and collaborations. DLA’s role here is to integrate those commercial solutions into military logistics. For instance, the fuel and propellants used for rockets and satellites are often sourced commercially but managed by DLA Energy. DLA Energy’s Aerospace division works to ensure the Space Force has the fuels it needs, whether it’s traditional liquid rocket propellants (like RP-1 kerosene or liquid hydrogen), hypergolics for satellites, or even emerging propellants for electric propulsion.

Leaders from the Defense Logistics Agency, its Nuclear and Space Enterprise Support Office, and the Space Force met at DLA’s headquarters at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, on Oct. 24, 2023, to discuss working together on logistics. (Photo by Christopher Lynch DVIDS)
In one example, DLA helped coordinate delivery of hydrazine (a satellite fuel) for a new system, ensuring it was on hand at the launch site, properly stored and handled safely – tasks that draw on DLA’s long experience with fuel logistics, albeit applied to a new context. DLA also supports launch range operations through its disposition and distribution services. A February 2025 story noted that Space Launch Delta 45 (which runs Cape Canaveral) acquired needed ground support equipment (manlift machines) through DLA’s surplus program, saving money and time by reutilizing Defense Department assets. This shows the synergy of marrying traditional logistics practices (like excess property reutilization) with space mission needs.
On a larger scale, as the Space Force contracts commercial satellite servicing or data services, DLA may help craft the supply contracts or manage inventory for those services.[28] For example, if Space Force uses a commercial company to perform on-orbit refueling, DLA might handle the procurement and provision of the propellant that company uses, just as it does for military fuel contracts. Underpinning all these efforts is a drive to use data and AI tools to stay ahead of sustainment requirements.
Modern military logistics generates a vast amount of data – inventory levels, usage rates, transport times, etc. – and making sense of it is key to optimizing support. Both DLA and USSF are emphasizing “data acumen” as a core competency. The Space Force, as the first new military service of the digital age, has declared itself the world’s first “digital service,” aiming to harness data and AI for warfighting advantage. In March 2025 the Space Force released a Data & AI Strategic Action Plan that highlighted how “data and AI are critical for a warfighting service that is purpose-built for space superiority” and outlined efforts to foster data literacy in the workforce and adopt AI tools for decision-making.[29] For logistics, this could mean AI-driven forecasting models that predict when a satellite component will fail based on telemetry and arrange for a spare to be available, or algorithms that optimize the scheduling of launches and deliveries for resupply of a space station or orbital depot. DLA is likewise investing in AI for supply chain management; for instance, AI systems now help DLA track critical materials through the supply chain and flag risks or shortages.
By integrating Space Force into these systems, DLA can get early warnings if, say, a supplier of a satellite part is disrupted, and then work alternative sourcing before a crisis hits. Data integration also enables better asset visibility – both agencies want to know exactly what Space Force-related inventory is on hand, in production, in transit, or in need of disposal. DLA’s cataloging of Space Force parts (assigning National Stock Numbers and maintaining technical data) is an unglamorous but vital task to make Space Force sustainment part of the larger DoD logistics network. With proper data tagging and tracking, a Space Force unit can order a part through the standard system and trust that DLA will fulfill it, just as if it were an aircraft or tank part.
In short, DLA and USSF are learning from each other and from industry: combining DLA’s enterprise logistics experience with the Space Force’s cutting-edge requirements and leveraging commercial innovation and data tools. This joint evolution is essential to maintain and supply a force that operates in the most challenging environment known – the space domain. As one DLA official put it, “everything is tied to space, from communications to GPS” so ensuring the Space Force’s sustainment is on solid footing has become a DLA priority.
Through formal partnerships, agile support teams, commercial integration, and data-driven planning, DLA and USSF are laying the groundwork to support space operations with the same confidence as terrestrial operations, ensuring Guardians (Space Force personnel) get the “right stuff at the right time” whether their mission is on the ground or 22,000 miles up in orbit.
Conclusion
Sustaining US advantages in the space domain will require a fundamental shift in how we approach acquisition, logistics, and lifecycle management. As peer adversaries continue to challenge the freedom and security of operations in orbit, the DoD must build resilience not only into its space systems but into the end-to-end sustainment enterprise that supports them. This paper underscores the importance of integrating acquisition and logistics functions to enable capabilities such as on-orbit servicing, responsive launch, in-space refueling, and modular satellite architectures—capabilities that must be considered at program inception, not as afterthoughts.
Sustaining US advantages in the space domain will require a fundamental shift in how we approach acquisition, logistics, and lifecycle management.
The evolving collaboration between the US Space Force and the Defense Logistics Agency offers a model for future success: one grounded in enterprise integration, agile contracting, commercial partnerships, and data-informed sustainment planning. As the DoD continues to operationalize space as a warfighting domain, acquisition professionals and lifecycle logisticians will be essential to building the infrastructure, authorities, and governance models needed to support space operations over time. The future of space logistics is not only about the technology on-orbit—it’s about designing sustainment into the system from day one, ensuring readiness, flexibility, and resilience across the entire product support lifecycle. In Space Systems Command, Logistics is a forethought not an afterthought!
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Air Force, the Department of Defense, or the US Government.
About the Author
Jondavid DuVall is the Space Logistics Officer, Space Systems Command, United States Space Force, Peterson Space Force Base, Colorado. He serves as an advisor and trusted agent on various operational matters, communications, innovation, industry outreach, and policies related to Space Logistics.
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