By: Lt Col Zachery Hughes
Lt Col Zachery Hughes, USAF, wrote this essay while a student at the National War College. It won the 2024 Secretary of Defense National Security Essay Competition.
There is growing concern that the US military is unable to deter or win a conflict with China in the western Pacific. China’s sophisticated arsenal of long-range missiles is a lethal threat to America’s traditional way of deploying and employing expeditionary forces. With a rising sense of urgency, three US military services (the Marines, Army, and Air Force) have embraced new concepts of operations that favored dispersed operations. On the surface, these ideas appear to restore survivability within the Pacific’s first island chain by making American formations harder to find and target. Unfortunately, these concepts are also astonishingly logistics-intensive. Worse still, America’s military committed itself to these demanding concepts without full consideration of whether they were even logistically supportable at all. Now, evidence is emerging suggesting that each service’s individual concept is probably logistically unsustainable. Even worse, each service concept implicitly transfers risk from the service to the joint force, yet without a clear accounting of how all these risks aggregate together. This is all the more disturbing because a survey of historical great power wars—and a specific study of China’s likely military options—strongly suggests that logistics is likely to be the primary determinant of military success or failure. For dispersed operations to succeed in a contested logistics environment, the US military must address the problem coherently as a joint force. This requires facilitating a culture and organizations that integrate logistics jointly at every level of warfare, while giving logistics pride-of-place in both force design and campaign planning.[1]
Marines with 2nd Distribution Support Battalion, Combat Logistics Regiment 2, 2nd Marine Logistics Group, conduct
tactical vehicle onload at United Arab Emirates port after exercise Native Fury 24, May 28, 2024. (US Marine Corps/Meshaq Hylton)
To understand why logistics matters so much in the western Pacific, why the US military service concepts are so flawed, and how to begin addressing these challenges, this paper proceeds in three stages. First, it reviews existing literature to draw three observations on contested logistics: that in a war between great powers logistics matters most; that innovative militaries often fail due to flawed or undeveloped logistical concepts; and that the US military’s new concepts are logistically dubious. Second, the paper identifies three mistakes that the joint force is making, including belated or insufficient consideration of joint logistics, too many arbitrary “seams” in logistics organization, and a large gap between “combat” and “support” cultures. Finally, the author proposes three solutions: aligning combat and support cultures; strengthening the logistics command structure in the Pacific; and better integration of logistics in planning and design.
The First Observation: Logistics Matters Most
Although a hypothetical US-China conflict would be complex, in terms of military considerations, logistics is probably the dominant factor determining success or failure. Three pieces of evidence support this claim. First, for the “most dangerous” course of action—an armed attack by the PRC to subjugate Taiwan—China’s likely courses of action result in a contest that can be framed as competitive logistics. Second, the nature of the threat from the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) implies contested logistics, which has compounding inefficiencies that can drive militaries to self-defeating countermeasures. Third, historical great power conflicts normally protract, and in protracted war materiel factors dominate.
Competitive Logistics: Cues from Likely Conflict Scenarios with China
The likely forms of a US-China conflict suggests that logistics should have pride of place in the joint force. First, consider the highly dangerous—yet increasingly possible—amphibious invasion of Taiwan.[2] This would be China’s most difficult—yet decisive—option to resolve the PRC’s Taiwan issue. Most US military concepts focus on either defeating or disrupting the initial amphibious assault to deny China its campaign objectives. Yet, Forcible Entry Operations can be better framed as competitive logistics contests hinging largely on whether an invader can build logistics in a lodgment faster than the defender can shift combat power to contain it. Few historical amphibious assaults failed because the initial landing was defeated, while several prominent failures (e.g., Gallipoli in 1915, Anzio in 1944) occurred because a defender redeployed faster than an invader was able to generate momentum.[3] Such lessons are not lost on the PLA, who make a particular point of studying amphibious logistics in World War II and the Falklands War.[4] The PLA even developed a new Joint Logistics Support Force—modeled after US Transportation Command (TRANSCOM)—that enjoys enhanced capability to leverage “dual-use” industrial capabilities enabled by years of civil-military integration.[5]
Yet an invasion is not China’s only available option to subjugate Taiwan: open-source literature increasingly acknowledges the viability of a blockade as a tool for coercion, as a prelude to invasion, or as a face-saving fallback after an invasion failed.[6] Blockades are ultimately exercises in competitive logistics at national scale: can the blockaded nation materially hold out longer than the blockading force? Given that a likely US response to such a Chinese “close blockade” of Taiwan includes a US “distant blockade” of China (e.g., by disrupting maritime shipping through the South China Sea), such a campaign could unfold as a series of concentric rings, each representing a logistics contest on a different scale.[7]
Thus, if a US war with China is most likely to occur over the flashpoint of Taiwan, and if the PLA’s two most likely options for such a war (e.g., blockade and/or invasion) are both bloody contests in competitive logistics, then any US military approach to deter or defeat China must place logistical considerations foremost.
An MH-60S Seahawk, assigned to Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron (HSC) 5, picks up nets from the flight deck during a vertical replenishment aboard Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS George Washington (CVN 73) while underway in the Pacific Ocean, June 14, 2024. George Washington is deployed as part of Southern Seas 2024 which seeks to enhance capability, improve interoperability, and strengthen maritime partnerships with countries throughout the U.S. Southern Command area of responsibility through joint, multinational, and interagency exchanges and cooperation. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Nicholas Russell)
The Compounding Inefficiencies of Contested Logistics
Though several definitions of “contested logistics” exist, it can be summarized as an environment where an adversary seeks to disrupt friendly logistics efforts in all domains, in all points of the supply chain, and at all times.[8] Demonstrating this concept, China’s Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) system was designed to disrupt the lengthy build-up of forces the US used to win the first Gulf War.[9] Using long-range fires paired with proliferated intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, China can attack US bases, ships, and aircraft throughout the Pacific.[10] These systems are particularly optimized to hit targets in the first island chain.
This A2/AD system could impose operational inefficiencies at every possible step, and these inefficiencies do not add up linearly, but are compounding.[11] Some inefficiencies occur due to direct action: for instance, the PLA’s long-range missiles can destroy munitions or fuel depots at major hubs like Guam,[12] can wipe out entire ramps of parked aircraft with effective cluster weapons,[13] and can even hit moving supply ships at sea.[14] Each of these effects imposes obvious logistics costs, but the true cost is in the inefficient countermeasures the US must adopt to operate within such an A2/AD “umbrella.”
The primary mitigation the US military services are adopting is dispersal: spreading units out to complicate PLA targeting. Unfortunately, this also dramatically reduces efficiency.[15] Modern high-tech weapons require specialized maintenance equipment, and a small quantity of such equipment can service multiple units at a single location. However, once those units disperse, they must accept increased risk of critical equipment failure or must acquire, transport, and sustain equipment sufficient for each dispersed site—all of which imposes additional logistics costs.[16] For an example, consider modern fighter aircraft: sophisticated avionics require occasional software updates to keep pace with emerging threats. These updates require ground equipment kits that are often purchased in low numbers, but without which such software updates cannot occur. Simply buying more kits is possible, but wasteful: the vast majority of the time they sit unused, which is why the Air Force prefers a small number of such kits at a central location servicing many units.
Additionally, the complex terrain of the first island chain poses challenges for moving between dispersed sites. For instance, the Philippines is an archipelagic nation with complex seas, inland waterways, poor roads, and dense forests. Transiting between dispersed sites would require many modes of transportation, each vulnerable to different types of adversary interdiction (particularly at sites of transfer between modes).[17] Coordinating such an effort requires significant interservice communication—a detectable signal to cue PLA fires.
To support dispersed operations, multiple emerging concepts also envision minimizing highly targetable “iron mountains”—intermediate hubs with large stockpiles of materiel.[18] This poses serious challenges due to the vast distances in the Pacific. Each intermediate base is a chance to repack or reprioritize equipment in a way that is more efficient and responsive to the end-user. Seemingly mundane, this can be decisive: studies of the 1982 Falklands War have suggested that the intermediate node at Ascension Island was vital for logistics reorganization and restowing.[19] Without Ascension, the British task force could not have contested Argentina’s seizure of islands 8,000 miles away from the UK.[20]
Another way to mitigate the threat to logistics is by switching from a “pull” model to a “push” model. “Pull” logistics are similar to the most efficient modern delivery companies, using predictive analytics so that materiel is available “just-in-time” to meet a request from the final user.[21] In contrast, “push” logistics relies on scheduled logistics packets that are forecasted based on expected consumption rates. Push logistics are inefficient since they fail to respond to actual needs, often wasting crucial transportation capacity with unneeded supplies.[22] However, a “push” model is far more resilient to disruptions than the hyper-lean “pull” model.[23] Unfortunately, “push” logistics often ends in significant excess material, which is usually stowed at an intermediate node.[24] Given that most contested logistics seek to minimize the use of intermediate nodes, this merely exacerbates the downsides of “push” logistics.
A final mitigation that poses significant inefficiencies is the drive to preposition stockpiles of materiel at likely dispersal sites. This would greatly reduce the demand placed on a long-range supply chain. The disadvantages are significant: in historical cases where dispersed units relied on caches, much or most cached materiel was abandoned as units were forced to conduct hasty “survivability moves” between sites.[25] Additionally, there is a significant opportunity cost to cached sites, requiring significant investments in materiel that can no longer be used for training or to meet an unexpected contingency.[26] Materiel hidden at an austere location is materiel that requires several forms of maintenance: maintenance of the materiel itself, maintaining physical security, and maintaining a relationship with the host nation.[27] Finally, caching creates a signature that could be detected and targeted; at the very least, it signals an intended scheme of maneuver, which could be a disadvantage during conflict (although perhaps an advantage as a deterrent).[28]
Considering the contested logistics situation in the western Pacific holistically, the combination of high threat, reduced capacity, compounding inefficiencies, and massive distance add up to the greatest logistical challenge since World War II. Given the erosion of America’s manufacturing and shipbuilding advantages in the past seventy years,[29] a dispersed campaign against China within the first island chain would be the greatest logistic challenge ever attempted.
Protracted Logistics: Lessons from Historical Great Power Conflict
The history of great power conflict shows how logistical factors have largely dominated military success or failure. There are two main reasons for this. First, logistics is often the most important component of broad military strategy, because sound logistics—more than any other factor—creates the broadest possible number of strategic options for a nation.[30] Thus, logistics is unique in not only being a means of strategy, but occasionally is a strategic end in itself.[31] During competition prior to conflict, great powers may even use logistics as a form of military maneuver.[32] As logistical theorist Henry Eccles observed: “throughout the whole spectrum of conflict, we should recognize how logistics factors tend to dominate.”[33]
The second reason logistics factors dominate is that great power conflict is usually protracted. Though quick great power victories have occurred—e.g., the collapse of France in 1940—history has far more examples of protracted conflicts.[34] If logistics is, as Eccles says: “the bridge between the national economy and the tactical operations of the combat forces,” then logistics is particularly significant in protracted wars where national economic and industrial strength are so crucial to eventual triumph.[35] Concerningly, both the US and China appear to be designing their forces to fight and win a short war over Taiwan: new US service concepts appear oriented at quickly defeating an initial amphibious assault, while Chinese thought fixates on “scientifically” determinative short wars.[36] Despite these optimistic concepts, in a protracted war China’s geographic proximity, interior lines of communication, and strong manufacturing base would provide a better logistical foundation.
This emphasis on materiel attrition is unfashionable in the US military, which prefers decisive action and maneuver. However, scholarship of the air and sea campaigns of World War II suggests that materiel attrition—rather than individual battles—were the primary means by which the Allies won.[37]
Given all these factors, one would expect that logistical considerations dominate the thinking of military reformers. Sadly, the next two observations suggest otherwise.
Staff Sgt. Evan Minca, 517th Airlift Squadron loadmaster and Capt. Andrew Miller-Bissell both from Joint Base Elmendorf AK., prepares to off load M777 howitzers from a C-17 Globemaster III in Eastern Europe, May 2, 2022. The security assistance the U.S. is providing to Ukraine is enabling critical success on the battlefield against the Russian invading force. (U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Shawn White)
The Second Observation: Innovation Often Fails Because of Logistical Oversights
The importance of logistics was dramatically highlighted by Russia’s botched invasion of Ukraine in 2022.[38] Despite overmatch in technology, numbers and firepower, Russia’s offensive ground to a halt well short of its objectives, largely due to insufficient fuel. [39] Russia’s failure is attributable to the classic problems of an authoritarian system—e.g., unchallenged assumptions and poor leadership.[40] Though Russia’s example is a useful reminder, there are more instructive historical examples: cases where highly competent, well-led troops embarked on bold new operational concepts that ended in national catastrophe due to foreseeable logistics failures.
One example is Imperial Germany’s 1918 offensive on the Western Front. To enable offensive maneuver in the face of entrenched firepower, the German Army innovated new concepts of leadership, organization, and combined arms integration. Popularized as “stormtroop tactics,” the German concepts relied on elite units relying on surprise to disrupt a robust enemy defense, seize the initiative, and generate momentum.[41] Tactically, this was extraordinarily effective. Unfortunately for the Germans, they lacked sufficient transportation, sufficient stockpiles of munitions, and sufficient lines of communication to sustain their momentum. The Entente defenders gained strength as they withdrew closer to their sources of supply, while the German supply system neared collapse.[42] The German offensive culminated early after only 40 miles of advance.[43] The last gasps of German military, moral, and materiel strength were spent for negligible strategic gain, and ultimately the innovative tactics merely served to accelerate the collapse of the German war effort.
A second example of catastrophic innovation is the French disaster at Dien Bien Phu. Seeking to force their Viet Minh opponents into a decisive battle, the French planned a bold airdrop astride the Viet Minh’s strategic lines of communication.[44] Relying on aerial resupply, French paratroopers established a fortified camp at Dien Bien Phu.[45] However, the effort was doomed from the outset: the French had chosen a logistically intensive operational concept with no recourse for altering their plan once committed. In contrast, their chief opponent—General Vo Nguyen Giap—wielded one of the most sophisticated logistics organizations in history despite relying largely on human porters.[46] Thus, the French irreversibly committed themselves to a battle of mass, firepower, and attrition against an opponent who could use his superior, flexible logistics to bring far more mass and firepower to bear at the vital place.[47] The battle ended with the annihilation of the French garrison and France’s withdrawal from Southeast Asia.
It would be comforting to dismiss these failures as mere incompetence, but these were some of the most professional militaries of their times. Furthermore, these campaigns were led by experienced, battle-tested generals. One could blame these catastrophes on a failure to innovate, but in fact these were truly bold operations that initially caught their adversaries off guard. Each concept was also grounded in historical precedent: “stormtroop tactics” derived from extensive small-scale experimentation,[48] while in World War II’s Burma Theater the British used fortified airheads to force Japanese attackers into battles of annihilation.[49] Instead, the fundamental flaw was more mundane: insufficient attention to logistics in planning.
Taking a cue from these case studies, the US military should ask itself the following: First, are the joint force’s new operational concepts for the first island chain logistically sustainable at all, or are they self-defeating (as with the German 1918 concept)? Second, learning from Dien Bien Phu: Are the joint force’s operational concepts effective in terms of competitive logistics against an adversary? Answers to these questions are troubling.
The Third Observation: The US Military’s New Concepts are Logistically Dubious
The Department of Defense has increased its focus on contested logistics at every level. At the strategic level, it has examined vulnerabilities in America’s industrial base and inter-theater sea and airlift.[50] At the theater level, it has examined aerial refueling, intra-theater sealift, and even emerging concepts for space-based supply.[51] However, the most daunting challenge is closer to the fight: the service concepts for dispersed operations in the first island chain. The Marines, Army, and Air Force all have notable similarities in their new operating concepts: all focus on land-based operations from dispersed sites; all aim to operate within the first island chain (i.e., in the heart of China’s A2/AD system); and, all suffer from serious logistical challenges, being so difficult to sustain as to risk either outright self-defeat or imposing more cost than benefit upon the wider joint effort.
The Marine Corps’ Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO)
Marine Commandant David Berger laid out a bold vision for reform in Force Design 2030, resulting in the divestment of legacy systems including armor, artillery, and infantry.[52] Force Design 2030 aims to reorient the Corps towards supporting a campaign of naval maneuver, projecting power from the littorals by denying maneuver to an adversary while creating options for friendly naval maneuver.[53] Fundamental to this effort are two related concepts. First, EABO establishes littoral bases that provide fires, sensing, or logistical support to the maritime component.[54] Second, the Stand-In Force is envisioned as a low-signature littoral force that can survive, maneuver, and generate effects within an adversary’s weapons engagement zone.[55]
To sustain a network of dispersed operations in a littoral environment against a lethal adversary, the Marines have updated their logistics doctrine.[56] The Corps clearly recognizes the need to be lighter, more mobile, and able to operate coherently despite strict signature management.[57] However, these updates bring more questions than answers, and not all of the answers may be favorable to EABO. Three major flaws in logistics still plague the Marines’ new concepts. First, the concepts themselves were developed by officers from an operational and maneuver background with undue consideration for logistics, a fact later acknowledged by General Berger.[58] Marine observers have quietly begun to acknowledge that the operational concepts may themselves be logistically infeasible.[59]
Second, of all the services, the Marines have chosen the most logistically challenging concept (i.e., closest to the threat and farthest from friendly supply) despite owning the fewest organic logistic assets.[60] By design, the Marines are reliant on joint force logistics for sustained campaigns, lacking the intra-theater logistics of other services.[61] Though expert at expeditionary tactical logistics, the Marines have identified a shortfall in understanding operational logistics—in other words, inherently joint, theater-scale logistics.[62]
The Marines have thus assessed that their new concepts require greater leveraging of joint logistics, yet this reveals a third problem: the solutions to EABO’s logistics challenges could obviate the need for EABO altogether. If substantial tactical airlift is one solution, why not simply generate fires and effects from airpower instead of a littoral base?[63] If low-signature, high-speed watercraft are needed to sustain a Stand-In Forces, why not simply employ fires and effects from the watercraft?[64] Littoral fires and effects would doubtless challenge a Chinese adversary, yet if deploying them at meaningful scale requires joint logistics support that consequently constrains the joint force’s other options, then EABO may be more trouble than it is worth. As it is, the sustainability of the concept is in question despite the Marines planning for a mere three Marine Littoral Regiments—begging a question of utility.[65] If unresolved, these problems could echo the situation of the Japanese on Guadalcanal in 1942. The isolated Japanese lodgment was intended to improve Japan’s operational air and naval reach, yet it proved so costly for the Imperial Japanese Navy to support that it ultimately did more harm than good.[66]
The Army’s Multi-Domain Task Forces (MDTFs)
Whereas the Marine concept optimizes for the Pacific, the Army has pursued a more generalized concept: Multi-Domain Operations. In the context of a fight with China, the Army’s new MDTFs are a particularly important piece of this new concept. Designed as modular, inherently joint, brigade-sized formations leveraging space, cyber, information, and electronic warfare systems, MDTFs would benefit from the Army’s organic air defenses, force protection, and long-range fires.[67]
However, like the Marines’ Stand-In Forces, the MDTFs have several fundamental problems. First, the concept of their employment is unclear: based on the ranges of their weapons systems, the MDTFs would need to be positioned within the first island chain. [68] Thus, they will have the same sustainment challenges as the Marines.[69] Second, although envisioned as light and mobile, the weapons systems assigned to MDTFs are decidedly heavy: HIMARS and PATRIOT batteries are logistics-intensive, while new capabilities like the Typhon missile battery are massive, road-bound, and not optimized for austere operations.[70] Third, the Army’s concept is so similar to the Marines that it is unclear what unique capability it brings, and vice versa. Though this is not inherently damning, if neither concept is logistically sustainable then it may be “too much of a good thing.” Similar to the Marines, the Army only has three MDTFs templated, which may not provide much power for the logistical costs incurred.[71]
The Air Force’s Agile Combat Employment (ACE)
Not coincidentally, China’s A2/AD systems pose the greatest threat to the Air Force’s operating methods. Studying the overwhelming success of US airpower in Operation DESERT STORM, the PLA concluded that America’s dependence on large, logistically efficient bases was a targetable vulnerability.[72] The PLA designed a bespoke system of long-range weapons to disrupt these bases, even creating an independent PLA Rocket Force.[73] Facing an imminent threat to its large bases, the Air Force adopted Agile Combat Employment: a doctrine of distributing airpower amongst smaller dispersed sites.[74]
Operating from austere airfields is historically well-established. During World War II and the Korean War, the US Air Force deployed fighter units to dirt or steel mesh strips.[75] However, as jet aircraft advanced, they required increasingly robust airfields and support facilities. Over time, this incentivized large, efficient, well-stocked bases with large runways. Thus, the Air Force is in the position of reverting to a much more austere model with aircraft and support systems optimized for major installations. Though low-level innovation and force restructuring have helped adjust command relationships and culture to the challenge, four daunting logistics problems remain.[76]
First, studies have suggested that dispersed air operations require a massive increase in support personnel—particularly in certain maintenance specialties.[77] The Air Force’s efforts to certify “multi-capable airmen” can only partly mitigate this need.[78]
Second, while dispersing reduces the risks from long-range fires, it can dramatically increase the risk from ground attacks. Even a small ground force can cause catastrophic damage to parked aircraft.[79] For example, during the Falklands War a single British Special Air Service team—on foot—destroyed more enemy aircraft in an hour than most fighter squadrons destroyed throughout the entire campaign.[80] They achieved this by surprising a small, austere airfield with poor perimeter security—a lesson not lost on the PLA, who studied the Falklands conflict in depth.[81] To prevent such attacks, small airfields demand the same degree of perimeter security as large ones—thus, dispersal amongst multiple sites increases the security force size multiplicatively.[82] Outsourcing this defense is no panacea: host nation security may not always be available, and relying on the Army assumes the availability of large numbers of untasked infantry. Even if available, these forces have their own hefty sustainment requirements.
A third problem is that—from the perspective of sortie generation—ACE may be inherently self-defeating. Historically, achieving air superiority requires a high sustained sortie generation rate.[83] Given the USAF’s relatively diminished fighter fleet, generating sufficient mass to contest the PLA requires unusually high sortie rates for each aircraft. Unfortunately, the inherent inefficiencies of dispersed, austere operations constrain the rates of sortie generation. Thus, dispersed operations merely trade “risk-to-force” for “risk-to-mission.”[84] This was what the Polish Air Force discovered in 1939: facing an overwhelming Luftwaffe assault, some Polish fighter units managed to stay in the fight throughout the entire six-week campaign by dispersing to “secret” airfields well-stocked with materiel.[85] However, due to the dramatic losses of materiel left behind each time they were forced to displace, the Polish aviators never generated enough sorties to pose a serious threat.
A final problem for ACE is its conceptual overreliance on organic airlift (at least as applied in the Pacific theater). Multiple conferences, exercises, and wargames examining ACE have focused on how the Air Force can self-deploy and self-sustain using its own airlift.[86] This is a flawed concept: in most modern conflicts, only 1-2% of the necessary materiel traveled by airlift—nearly 95% traveled by sealift.[87] Additionally, this assumes the availability of such airlift, whereas in a major conflict, other stakeholders’ demands for airlift would be staggering. This is symptomatic of insufficient consideration of ACE’s implications for joint logistics.
Three Emergent Problems in Joint Force Logistics
#1. An insufficient consideration of joint force-wide logistics.
The Chinese pacing threat is the scenario driving US military modernization,[88] yet paradoxically the entity responsible for such a scenario (Indo-Pacific Command, or INDOPACOM) has little direct say in acquisitions or modernization.[89] Instead, each military service’s modernization reflects individual service conceptions of such a conflict. This is not to suggest that the services are disingenuous or do not coordinate with INDOPACOM. Rather, bureaucratic pressures matter tremendously, and service-driven acquisitions incline to service-focused solutions. Services gravitate toward concepts that allow them to play a more decisive role, reinforcing the bias towards roles like operations or fires over supporting roles like transportation or sustainment.[90] This has enabled services to commit themselves to extraordinarily logistics-intensive operational concepts with belated consideration for the supportability of those concepts—or an implied assumption that other services will assume more risk in support. It is probable that the joint force has enough logistical capability to support a single service’s stand-in, dispersed operational concept—but not all simultaneously at the end of a contested, thousands-mile-long supply chain.[91]
#2. Too many “seams.”
The service concepts discussed above create extraneous “lateral seams” between services due to belated or insufficient consideration of how their logistics fit together holistically.[92] This exacerbates the lateral seams imposed by the complex terrain of the western Pacific. A unit deployed in this terrain will be fighting under threat of PLA bombardment while thousands of miles from the US industrial base. Should a unit run into logistics difficulties, its best option may be to reach laterally to adjacent units (whatever their service) instead of requesting resupply from a distant rear area base that is vulnerable to comms jamming or interdiction.[93] Indeed, embattled Ukrainian brigades do just that: by pulling critical parts from adjacent units rather than reaching backward to depots, they reduce Russia’s ability to intercept their lines of communication.[94]
There are also doctrinal “longitudinal seams” that are no longer helpful.[95] It was previously useful to conceptualize transport as either inter-theater, intra-theater, and tactical. Each of these categories operated on different timescales and was vulnerable to different threats. Each category had an organization to facilitate it: TRANSCOM directed inter-theater movements, after which a lead logistics service appointed by the Combatant Commander facilitated intra-theater movement, and finally individual services handled tactical distribution.[96] However, the need to minimize the number of highly targetable intermediate hubs means that the boundaries between these categories of transportation are blurring, and existing doctrine is ill-suited to address it. It is increasingly likely that intermediate handoffs in materiel may be replaced by continuous movement towards the end user,[97] by placing intermediate nodes farther from the threat,[98] or replacing intermediate nodes with an “intermediate zone” wherein low-signature logistics handoff will occur.[99] Such solutions require increasing the amount of intra-theater transport with a greater degree communication between components, and probably the ability to conceptually flex between the traditional roles of tactical, intra-theater, and inter-theater logistics. Normally a problem of this magnitude would have a clear lead service appointed to champion and advocate for resources, but at present none has been identified.
#3. A large cultural gap between combat and logistics communities.
There is a significant cultural difference between military career fields traditionally considered as either “combat” or “support.” Multiple factors contribute to this difference: different bureaucratic incentives, different prospects for promotion, and different outlooks on risk acceptance. Also, the post-Cold War emphasis on a “Revolution in Military Affairs” deliberately sought to de-emphasize logistics,[101] while multiple rounds of budget cuts often disproportionately cut logistics staff.[102] Whatever the reason, officers from “combat” communities have a different outlook and often dominate conversations with their “support” peers.[103]
This cultural gap is poorly suited to a conflict inside the first island chain. Not only will support personnel be vulnerable to PLA targeting, but China prefers to target logistics assets.[104] Furthermore, in a dispersed, contested operation, many units traditionally considered “combat arms” (e.g., Marine Littoral Regiments) may function less like units of maneuver and more akin to firing positions for long-range missiles. In fact, it may be the logisticians doing most of the “maneuvering”: e.g., maneuvering supplies from distant stockpiles to concealed end-users, all while maintaining a coherent scheme of maneuver under fire. This implies that logistics should be driving many concepts of operations, yet officers from combat arms backgrounds still to dominate planning. This imbalance partly explains how concepts like ACE are so popular with operations personnel and so unpopular with support personnel.[105] Succeeding in a conflict with China requires that logisticians gain an increasingly dominant voice in planning and design.
U.S. Marines with 3rd Landing Support Battalion (LSB), ground guide a medium tactical vehicle replacement at Pohang, South Korea, June 12, 2023. 3rd LSB, 3rd Marine Logistics Group is conducting Combined Distribution Exercise (CDEX) 23 in South Korea alongside the Republic of Korea (ROK) Navy, the ROK Army, the U.S. Army, the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Navy. 3rd LSB is providing fuel, water, ground and air transportation to enable the sustainment and distribution of the CDEX force. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Staff Sgt. Danny Gonzalez)
Three Recommendations to Enable Contested, Dispersed Logistics
Recommendation #1. Revitalize a joint “combat logistics” culture.
To focus the logistics community on combat operations, give it a stronger voice, and raise its joint-mindedness, the most important place to start is culture—especially how that community attracts and educates talent. There are already multiple programs for advanced logistics education and multiple elite units that focus on expeditionary combat logistics.[106] However, at present there is no institute that focuses on producing logistics leaders who are joint-minded, experts on dispersed operations, oriented on combat in the western Pacific, and capable of leading the conversation in campaign planning. In other words, there is no joint institution dedicated to developing the skillsets young logistics leaders need for the US to succeed in a dispersed, contested logistics environment in the first island chain.
The need for such young leaders is obvious: each service’s literature on dispersed operations states a need to organize multifunctional logistics teams at a lower level than previously attempted; that these organizations need to be closely integrated with combat units; and, that these units will be led by a junior officers invested with significant training, authority, and trust.[107] Such officers will need to understand how they both support and leverage the wider joint logistics enterprise and will need to be skilled at leveraging resources both locally (from their host nation) and laterally (from adjacent joint units). The US military has a unique opportunity to cross-level these skills across its services. It can do so by building a training program that is challenging, motivating, and professionally enhancing for its graduates while also drawing ambitious, talented young leaders. Such a program should be competitively selective, should allow students to immerse themselves in emerging logistics problems (and solutions), to drive the pace of combat in both planning and execution, and—crucially—to do so while developing an understanding of the problems the entire joint force faces. To conceptualize such a program at scale, consider an analogy: the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Weapons Schools.[108] Each school sharpens some of the best young leaders in its service by ruthlessly focusing them on tough, realistic, inherently joint problem sets. The result is a cadre of graduates with joint perspective and instant credibility. Additionally, the schools regularly engage in exercises and exchanges with one another—a crossflow so successful that F-35 pilots from every service now operate off the same tactical standards, enabling real-time joint integration.[109]
For an example of the power of an expeditionary, joint-minded, combat-oriented logistics cadre, no better example exists than the Royal Marines Commando Logistics Regiment during the Falklands War. The Regiment was unique in that it recruited competitively from every branch of the British military.[110] Once recruited, its members had to pass the infamously grueling Commando training program. Its command structure was joint by design, rotating billets between Army and Marine officers.[111] Curiously, it was also a joint organization subordinated to a service organization, something unseen in US practice. The result was an elite, inherently joint organization that punched well above its weight. Designed to support three Commando battalions while enjoying air superiority robust transportation infrastructure, the Regiment instead found itself supporting a multi-service division, under constant air attack, with only twenty percent of its templated ground transport, without a useable port, and 8,000 miles away from home.[112] That they succeeded had little to do with any specialized training and almost everything to do with the esprit, culture, and joint mindedness of the organization. The success of the entire British task force often hinged on quick-thinking decisions made by a junior officer or non-commissioned officer in the Regiment: the fact that they not only consistently made the best choices, but had the confidence to do so under fire, exemplifies the kind of culture the US military needs for its logisticians.[113]
Recommendation #2. Empower a stronger joint logistics structure in the Pacific.
Setting the conditions to deter or defeat China in the Pacific requires lengthy, expensive preparation, particularly in logistics. Although TRANSCOM is the permanent functional joint logistics integrator, its focus is on strategic, inter-theater logistics. INDOPACOM has Directive Authority for Logistics yet may lack sufficient “fingertip feel” in the first island chain.[114] There are several indications that the present command structure is insufficient, and that an organization that is simultaneously stronger, more focused, and inherently joint is needed. First, the present structure maintains too many lateral and longitudinal “seams” as discussed above. Second, though several recent Pacific exercises emphasized joint logistics,[115] these efforts must be accelerated and expanded in order to develop new methods of command, control, and operations. A more powerful advocate for such exercises could increase their scope and fidelity. Third, the lack of an overarching, persistent, theater-specific joint logistics “watchdog” allows the military services to inadvertently make overoptimistic assumptions about their operational concepts and logistics preparations. In the absence of such a watchdog, services tend to make their own logistics preparations in host nations, often with a poor understanding of the internal politics of those nations—and how scarce resources are actually allocated in those nations.[116] Similarly, a joint watchdog can identify dangerous risks that might look reasonable from a single-service perspective—e.g., if too many services rely on throughput of a major hub like Guam, making it an even more vulnerable target.
In addition to shoring up the problems with the current command structure, there are two additional benefits to a stronger joint logistics organization in the Pacific. The first is in helping the US triumph in competition. Recent scholarship has suggested that in great power competition logistics is maneuver.[117] In tactical combat, forces maneuver to positions of advantage; similarly, in strategic competition, logistics maneuvers to creates opportunities that can deter or win conflict. In practice, this implies building infrastructure, caches, and maintaining host-nation relationships, all serving as a deterrent to aggression.[118] A joint logistics structure—permanently standing and oriented on the Pacific—could bolster this maneuver during strategic competition.
The second benefit of such a joint structure is its ability to hasten a better kind of logistics operation. Logistics personnel dispersed in complex terrain will need to reach laterally for resources, adapt to battlefield changes at the speed of missile warfare, and do all this despite intermittent communications with distant headquarters.[119] This kind of operation is impossible to command through centralization, and instead favors the development of the kind of “Team of Teams” popularized by General Stan McChrystal.[120] McChrystal’s construct advocated the importance of consistent, broad, and flat communications. However, against China such detectable and targetable communications can be deadly. Instead, developing a consistent, broad culture may be a closer fit. However, such a culture must be developed before a conflict begins—i.e., by an existing joint organization focused on logistics in the Pacific.
Several solutions might serve to create this semi-permanent, joint, and combat-oriented Pacific focused logistics structure. The least disruptive would be to simply assign more personnel to INDOPACOM’s staff—although this would continue the disadvantage of being too far removed from the first island chain. A better solution might be to take an existing logistics organization with strong Pacific ties and strengthen it into a joint headquarters. The best candidate for this is the Army’s 8th Theater Sustainment Command.[121] With a strong understanding of theater military and commercial logistics—and the relationships that go with them—this would likely be the lead agency for coordinating wartime intra-theater logistics anyway.[122] Empowering it as a joint organization during competition would give it far more ability to set the tempo for logistics developments in the theater. Admittedly, empowering a new headquarters would require careful wargaming to find where this organization’s authority overlapped with existing service infrastructure (e.g., services are responsible for logistics on their own bases). Where this organization might be most valuable is in providing a framework for the logistics web connecting various service sites—and in particular, ensuring such a web is well-coordinated, well-integrated, and resilient prior to the beginning of hostilities.
In fact, an Army War College thinktank suggested this as the primary role the Army should play in a fight with China.[123] In a refreshing departure from service parochialism, these scholars argued that the Army (and the 8th Theater Sustainment Command) was uniquely positioned to construct and empower a logistics “grid” which could then be occupied by joint combat units.[124] Such a grid would consist of a distributed network of local joint headquarters, with few arbitrary seams and greater ability to shift resources laterally than any structure currently extant in doctrine. If realized and resourced, such a structure might be exactly the thing to rescue the logistically frail service concepts—however, creating this grid will take significant preparation, and therefore merits joint-level advocacy and attention prior to conflict.
Recommendation #3. Experiment with a New, Logistics-Led Framework for Planning.
Logistics scholars agree that military planning should—in theory—involve operations and logistics personnel working in tandem.[125] In practice, this barely occurs: more commonly, lead planners from an operational, maneuver, or fires background create an initial concept, then use rough rules of thumb to check logistical viability.[126] Periodically, logisticians are asked for a check on feasibility, and generally expected to “make it happen” if it is remotely possible. This creates a significant bias towards operational considerations over logistics ones, which was appropriate in an era of assured logistics. However, in a campaign of dispersed operations in the first island chain, logistics will be of paramount importance. Thus, at any level of planning or design (e.g., designing a campaign to defeat a PLA invasion of Taiwan), commanders should experiment with planning guidance by directing logisticians to lead the planning of operations, and having operational personnel verify that it satisfies certain criteria. For example, a logistician leading planning for a Taiwan scenario might use simple templates to estimate locations where firing units will need to be, when they will need to be there, and for how long—in other words, using rough rules of thumb for operations. That same lead planner can then consider detailed logistics-driven courses of action that achieve these objectives. A conflict to defeat a Chinese attack on Taiwan is well-suited to such an approach because US success would not be decided by offensive maneuver but instead by its denial of Chinese objectives. This denial would be achieved primarily via long-range fires from templated firing sites—in other words, an operation well-suited to planning via rough templates, allowing planners to refine logistical details.[127]
This may seem an arbitrary change, but every planning methodology seeks to optimize a certain “objective function.” This is poorly described in most military literature, yet well-documented in literature for computer science or operations research.[128] In effect, this planning approach seeks to optimize logistics feasibility, while “satisficing” operational needs—the inverse of most current approaches. One might expect that operations-driven and logistics-driven approaches would converge on the same solutions. However, in practice such convergence rarely happens due to the “anchoring effect” of the initial design and the bias of its designer. Plans created by teams using a logistics-driven methodology could broaden a commander’s understanding of a problem, particularly when compared side-by-side with plans created using a more traditional methodology. Most importantly, this alternate approach can elevate logistics in the commander’s mind while reducing the cultural gap between combat and support personnel by stimulating healthy debate. This approach can work beyond campaign planning: for example, some authors have argued on the need to bring logistics advocacy into research and development much earlier than currently practiced.
U.S. Army Soldiers from 1st Battalion, 7th Air Defense Artillery Regiment, 108th Air Defense Artillery Brigade, conduct convoy operations to a Patriot air defense artillery site in an undisclosed location in the CENTCOM area of operations, Nov. 30, 2023. The primary mission of Air Defense Artillery is to safeguard both military forces and strategically vital geopolitical assets from potential threats posed by aerial attacks, missile launches, and intrusive surveillance activities. The Patriot system is an important component of the integrated air and missile defense network that defends critical assets in the U.S Central Command area of responsibility amidst needs for increased force protection. (U.S. Army photo by Sgt. Christopher Neu)
Considering the Counterarguments
The Joint Warfighting Concept (JWC) and the Joint Concept for Contested Logistics (JCCL) address these problems. Since these documents are classified, a full discussion is impossible. However, publicly available information shows them as necessary but insufficient. The JWC has been described as a “north star” to guide services’ force design;[130] the JCCL is a supporting effort to this.[131] Force design affects procurements that are five to fifteen years away—thus, these concepts will not solve near-term problems of culture, planning, and preparation in the Pacific. Furthermore, none of the services lost significant equities in the development of the JWC. Given ferocious competition for scarce resources, a sufficiently bold concept should have had winners and losers.
Local contracting (e.g., “21st Century Foraging”) will minimize supply-chain demands. While it will do little to help with certain classes of supply (e.g., munitions),[132] improving Operational Contract Support can reduce other demands on long-distance supply chains.[133] However, service literature is guilty of cognitive dissonance, a symptom of the cultural gap between combat and logistics communities. While military authors espouse the importance of enabling tactical units to self-support via local contracting,[134] they also cite Ukraine as an example of the need for strict signals discipline (e.g., controlling cell phones).[135] In an era of proliferated smartphones, disciplined emissions control and large numbers of local civilian contractors are a poor combination.
Furthermore, multiple services are reinvigorating host nation relationships and local contracting skillsets, but these are doing so in a way that is occasionally ignorant of host nation realities. Truly leveraging a host nation requires understanding its capacity for support—and deconflicting competing demands from the joint force. It also requires a range of skillsets beyond contracting, such as Security Force Assistance Battalions, Civil Affairs, Foreign Area Officers, and Special Forces.[136] This level of detailed “fingertip feel” at theater scale requires better integration of logistics in planning and requires a stronger hand in theater coordination.
Dispersed operations will be a temporary measure only. In some theaters it may be possible to disperse to survive an initial missile bombardment, then reconcentrate for efficiency. However, the PLA’s capacity for bombardment might be practically unlimited. In a conflict over Taiwan, the Chinese are likely to hold the initiative: having a “time limit” on how long the US military can disperse allows the PLA to keep that initiative by retaining a sufficient arsenal in reserve. Furthermore, given the PLA’s interior lines and proximity to its industrial base, these stockpiles might replenish quickly. Unless the US intends its forces to act as sacrificial “tripwires,” then short-duration dispersal remains a valid tactic, but a poor strategy.[137]
New, autonomous, low-signature transport will solve contested logistics. Multiple authors developed clever concepts of transportation, including submarine fuel bladders,[138] semi-submersible transports,[139] backpack-sized cargo drones,[140] self-propelled shipping containers,[141] space-based or rocket-launched resupply,[142] and wavetop skimming seaplanes.[143] Additionally, the Army and Navy are reinvigorating traditional sealift efforts.[144] However, it takes roughly a decade to field such platforms at scale, possibly too late to deter China. Furthermore, the development of these systems is still too service-centric. For instance, if the Marines fielded a fleet of semi-submersible transports, would the Air Force not demand their support to sustain remote island airfields? Thus, any breakthrough requires joint integration anyway.
Additive manufacturing and alternative energy sources will boost efficiency. Technologies to generate parts and power in the field could greatly improve logistics efficiency.[145] However, such systems are only of limited utility if the complex weapons systems they support are not engineered with their use in mind. For instance, most high-performance jet aircraft or missiles cannot accept parts that do not meet certain rigid criteria—sub-standard parts can result in catastrophic failures in flight. Similarly, much of the joint force’s logistics challenge is oriented on munitions, which are another high-risk class of supply requiring strict tolerances. None of this is to say these technical efforts are ill-advised: many types of equipment probably can use 3D printed parts or run tolerably well on alternative fuels. However, the US is preparing for a high technology fight and will thus be constrained by its reliance on sensitive high-performance weapons. Until a new generation of weapons is designed with additive manufacturing in mind, its impact may be real, albeit marginal.
Cheap, easy-to-sustain drones will replace hard-to-sustain weapons. While evidence from wars in Ukraine and Nagorno-Karabakh suggests great potential for relatively cheap drones, these technologies are unlikely to solve logistical challenges in the Pacific.[146] For one thing, many autonomous or unmanned systems require comparable—if not more—materiel to sustain than manned systems.[147] Furthermore, the cheap, short-range drones prevalent in Eurasian conflicts may be irrelevant to the vast distances of the Pacific, where drones may need to be larger, heavier, and more sophisticated.
Joint-All Domain Command and Control (JADC2) and artificial intelligence (AI) will dramatically boost efficiency. JADC2 is the US military’s effort to leverage proliferated sensors networks and artificial intelligence to enable better, faster decisions.[148] Logistics is a data-intensive art, and therefore integral to JADC2.[149] However, JADC2 has been difficult and slow to implement, given networks never designed to work together. Furthermore, AI’s promise has probably been overstated.[150] One can train an algorithm to aid a specific tactical decision, such as how to redirect a critical part when the plane carrying it breaks down.[151] However, there is no dataset to train an algorithm on a theater-wide logistics effort for a 21st century great power conflict, when such a conflict has never occurred.[152] Training an algorithm on simulations is also dangerous, as flawed assumptions can dramatically skew results.[153] Thus, AI will incrementally improve logistics processes, but is unlikely to usher in radical change.[154]
PHILIPPINE SEA (Dec. 28, 2022) U.S. Navy Sailors receive pallets from the Military Sealift Command fleet replenishment oiler USNS Guadalupe (T-AO 200) during a replenishment-at-sea (RAS) aboard the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Decatur (DDG 73). Decatur, part of the Nimitz Carrier Strike Group, is currently underway in U.S. 7th Fleet conducting routine operations. U.S. 7th Fleet is the U.S. Navy’s largest forward-deployed numbered fleet, and routinely interacts and operates with 35 maritime nations in preserving a free and open Indo-Pacific region. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class David Negron)
Concluding with Cautious Optimism
It is important not to overstate the above critique of these innovative technical efforts to enable contested logistics. Just as dispersed, contested logistics creates compounding inefficiencies, positive technical innovations create compounding efficiencies. Over time, these innovations might overcome the inefficiencies, resulting in a breakthrough: where a new type of operation suddenly becomes feasible. Such has happened many times in military history. However, no such breakthrough ever occurred without an honest accounting of the challenges faced. Ergo, the US military faces the greatest logistical challenge of its history, in a conflict where logistics is likely to be determinative, and while wielding new operating concepts that thought of logistics too little or too late. To overcome these challenges, America must invigorate the culture, organization, and mindset of its logistics communities. A strong combat logistics community—joint by design, oriented on the Pacific, and trained to overcome hardships—can set the stage for the many technical improvements currently in development. Failure to make these changes risks making the joint force a “paper tiger” possessed of bold concepts with little staying power. China’s ambitious leaders are unlikely to be intimidated by such a force. However, it is not too late to build a logistics enterprise that makes these concepts truly formidable—and to give this “tiger” some real teeth.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Air Force, the Department of Defense, or the US Government.
About the Author:
Lt Col Zachery Hughes is a student at National War College, having previously completed a tour as Commander of the 25th Fighter Squadron at Osan AB, ROK. He graduated from the United States Air Force Academy in 2007, receiving a Bachelor of Science in History. He served in the 74th Fighter Squadron, deploying twice to Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. He served as the Weapons Officer in the 75th Fighter Squadron, deploying in support of Operation INHERENT RESOLVE. Later, he served as the Director of Operations and Instructor in the 66th Weapons Squadron at Nellis AFB. Lt Col Hughes holds master’s degrees in Military Studies from American Military University, in Policy Management from Georgetown University, in Applied Physics from Johns Hopkins University, and in Operational Studies from the School of Advanced Warfighting. He is a Senior Pilot with over 2,500 flying hours, including 1,100 combat hours in Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan. His next assignment is with the “Red Team” under the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
Endnotes
[1] There are multiple definitions of logistics. For this paper, consider the following: “A discipline that encompasses the resources needed to keep the means of a military operation going in order to achieve its desired objectives. It includes planning, managing, treating, operating, and controlling these resources.” Moshe Kress, Operational Logistics: The Art and Science of Sustaining Military Operations, 2nd ed. (Heidelberg: Springer, 2016), 7.
[2] Mathieu Duchatel, “Chapter 3: An Assessment of China’s Options for Military Coercion of Taiwan,” in Crossing the Strait: China’s Military Prepares for War with Taiwan, ed. Joel Wuthnow et al. (Washington: National Defense University Press, 2022), 87–112; Joel Wuthnow et al., eds., “Chapter 4: Firepower Strike, Blockade, Landing: PLA Campaigns for a Cross-Strait Conflict,” in Crossing the Strait: China’s Military Prepares for War with Taiwan (Washington: National Defense University Press, 2022), 113–38.
[3] Ministry for Cultural Heritage, “Gallipoli in Brief,” New Zealand History, accessed April 5, 2024, https://nzhistory.govt.nz/war/the-gallipoli-campaign/gallipoli-in-brief; Clayton D. Laurie, Anzio 1944, The US Army Campaigns of World War II 72–19 (Washington: US Army Center for Military History, 1972).
[4] Conor M. Kennedy, “Chapter 8: Getting There: Chinese Military and Civilian Sealift in a Cross-Strait Invasion,” in Crossing the Strait: China’s Military Prepares for War with Taiwan, ed. Joel Wuthnow et al. (Washington: National Defense University Press, 2022), 223–50; Christopher D. Yung, “Sinica Rules the Waves? The People’s Liberation Army Navy’s Power Projection and Anti-Access/Area Denial Lessons from the Falklands/Malvinas Conflict,” in China’s Lessons from Other Peoples’ Wars, ed. Andrew Scobell, David Lai, and Roy Kamphausen (Carlisle Barracks: US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 2011), 75–114, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA553490.pdf.
[5] Minnie Chan, “Chinese Media Unveils Details of US-Inspired Military Logistics System,” South China Morning Post, May 11, 2022, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3177222/chinese-media-unveils-details-us-inspired-military-logistics; Joel Wuthnow, “A New Era for Chinese Military Logistics,” Asian Security 17, no. 3 (September 2, 2021): 279–93, https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2021.1880391; Kevin McCauley, “Modernization of PLA Logistics: Joint Logistics Support Force” (Testimony before the US China Economic and Security Review Commission, February 15, 2018), https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/McCauley_Written%20Testimony.pdf.
[6] Lonnie D. Henley, “CMSI China Maritime Report #26: ‘Beyond the First Battle: Overcoming a Protracted Blockade of Taiwan’ | Andrew S. Erickson” (Newport: US Naval War College: China Maritime Studies Institute, March 2023), https://www.andrewerickson.com/2023/03/cmsi-china-maritime-report-26-beyond-the-first-battle-overcoming-a-protracted-blockade-of-taiwan/; Wuthnow et al., “Chapter 4: Firepower Strike, Blockade, Landing: PLA Campaigns for a Cross-Strait Conflict”; Duchatel, “Chapter 3: An Assessment of China’s Options for Military Coercion of Taiwan.”
[7] Henley, “CMSI China Maritime Report #26.”
[8] Amos C. Fox, “Contested Logistics: A Primer,” AUSA: Landpower Essay 24-1, February 2, 2024, https://www.ausa.org/publications/contested-logistics-primer; Jon Michael King, “Contested Logistics Environment Defined,” Army Sustainment, February 1, 2024, https://www.army.mil/article/272922/contested_logistics_environment_defined.
[9] Roger Cliff et al., “Entering the Dragon’s Lair: Chinese Antiaccess Strategies and Their Implications for the United States” (RAND Corporation, March 21, 2007), 45–48, https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG524.html.
[10] Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes, Red Star Over the Pacific: China’s Rise and the Challenge to U.S. Maritime Strategy, 2nd ed. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2018), 200–220.
[11] Maximilian Bremer and Kelly Grieco, “The Pentagon Needs Fresh Ideas for Evading Taiwan Logistics Pitfalls,” Defense News, December 4, 2023, https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/2023/12/04/the-pentagon-needs-fresh-ideas-for-evading-taiwan-logistics-pitfalls/; Miranda Priebe et al., “Distributed Operations in a Contested Environment: Implications for USAF Force Presentation” (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, July 17, 2019), chap. Summary, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2959.html.
[12] Yoshihara and Holmes, Red Star Over the Pacific: China’s Rise and the Challenge to U.S. Maritime Strategy, 205.
[13] Alan J. Vick and Mark Ashby, Winning the Battle of the Airfields: Seventy Years of RAND Analysis on Air Base Defense and Attack (Santa Monica: RAND, 2021), 68–79.
[14] Robert Haddick, Fire on the Water: China, America, and the Future of the Pacific (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2022), 130–40; Defense Intelligence Agency, China Military Power: Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win (Washington: US Defense Intelligence Agency, 2019), 90–95, www.dia.mil/military-power-publications; Christian Brose, The Kill Chain: Defending America in the Future of High-Tech Warfare (New York: Hachette Books, 2020), chap. 1.
[15] Priebe et al., “Distributed Operations in a Contested Environment,” ix–xii.
[16] Priebe et al., ix–xii.
[17] John Sattely and Jason A. Paredes, “Sustainment of the Stand-In Force,” War on the Rocks, September 12, 2022, https://warontherocks.com/2022/09/sustainment-of-the-stand-in-force/.
[18] Sattely and Paredes; Brandon L. Erwin, “Sustainment within the Weapons Engagement Zone,” Marine Corps Gazette 108, no. 3 (March 2024): 91–95.
[19] Kenneth L. Privatsky, Logistics in the Falklands War: A Case Study in Expeditionary Warfare (Yorkshire: Pen and Sword Books, 2014), 64.
[20] Peter Hore, “‘Logistics Miracle,’” Naval History Magazine 36, no. 2 (March 1, 2022), https://www.usni.org/magazines/naval-history-magazine/2022/april/logistics-miracle.
[21] Headquarters US Marine Corps, Marine Corps Doctrine Publication 4 – Logistics (Washington: US Marine Corps, 2023), chap. 2.
[22] Kress, Operational Logistics: The Art and Science of Sustaining Military Operations, 68–70; Headquarters US Marine Corps, Marine Corps Doctrine Publication 4 – Logistics, chap. 2.
[23] For a discussion of incentives and metrics in civilian versus military supply chains, see: B. A. Friedman, On Operations: Operational Art and Military Disciplines (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2021), 100–107.
[24] Kress refers to this as “no free disposal”: Kress, Operational Logistics: The Art and Science of Sustaining Military Operations, 68–70.
[25] Michael Alfred Peszke, “Poland’s Military Aviation, September 1939: It Never Had a Chance,” in Why Air Forces Fail: The Anatomy of Defeat, ed. Robin Higham and Stephen J. Harris (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2006).
[26] Ashley Roque, “Army to Use Operation Pathways to Test Assumptions about ‘contested Logistics,’ Prepositioned Stocks,” Breaking Defense (blog), March 31, 2023, https://breakingdefense.sites.breakingmedia.com/2023/03/army-to-use-pacific-pathways-to-test-assumptions-about-contested-logistics-prepositioned-stocks/.
[27] Haddick, Fire on the Water: China, America, and the Future of the Pacific, 130–32.
[28] Haddick, 130–32.
[29] Salvatore R. Mercogliano, “Logistics Wins (and Loses) Wars,” USNI Proceedings 150, no. 2 (February 1, 2024), https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2024/february/logistics-wins-and-loses-wars.
[30] Thomas M. Kane, Military Logistics and Strategic Performance (London: Routledge, 2001), 1–12.
[31] Kane, 1–12.
[32] Aaron Angell, “Logistics as Maneuver: Strategic Messaging across the Competition Spectrum,” Marine Corps Gazette, March 2022.
[33] Henry Eccles, “Logistics and Strategy,” Naval War College Review 11, no. 1 (January 1958): 17–39.
[34] Iskander Rehman, Planning for Protraction: A Historically Informed Approach to Great-Power War and Sino-US Competition (New York: Routledge, 2023).
[35] Eccles, “Logistics and Strategy.”
[36] Rehman, Planning for Protraction: A Historically Informed Approach to Great-Power War and Sino-US Competition; Andrew Scobell, “Chapter 2: China’s Calculus on the Use of Force: Futures, Costs, Benefits, Risks, and Goals,” in Crossing the Strait: China’s Military Prepares for War with Taiwan, ed. Joel Wuthnow et al. (Washington: National Defense University Press, 2022), 65–81.
[37] Phillips Payson O’Brien, How the War Was Won: Air-Sea Power and Allied Victory in World War II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).
[38] Economist, “Why Logistics Are Too Important to Be Left to the Generals,” The Economist, July 3, 2023, https://www.economist.com/special-report/2023/07/03/why-logistics-are-too-important-to-be-left-to-the-generals; Marta Kepe, “Logistics and Sustainment in the Russian Armed Forces” (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, November 15, 2023), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA2523-1.html.
[39] T. X. Hammes, “Game-Changers: Implications of the Russo-Ukraine War for the Future of Ground Warfare,” Issue Brief (Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security: Atlantic Council, April 2023); Katie Crombe and John Nagl, “A Call to Action: Lessons from Ukraine for the Future Force,” The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters 53, no. 3 (August 25, 2023), https://doi.org/10.55540/0031-1723.3240.
[40] Kepe, “Logistics and Sustainment in the Russian Armed Forces.”
[41] Bruce I. Gudmundsson, Stormtroop Tactics: Innovation in the German Army, 1914-1918 (Westport: Praeger, 1989).
[42] Julian Thompson, The Lifeblood of War: Logistics in Armed Conflict, 1st ed. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1991), 44–47; Jeremy Black, Logistics: The Key to Victory (Philadelphia: Pen and Sword Books, 2021), 126–27.
[43] Thompson, The Lifeblood of War: Logistics in Armed Conflict, 44–47.
[44] Thompson, 164–85; Philip B. Davidson, Vietnam at War: The History 1946-1975 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 161–91.
[45] Thompson, The Lifeblood of War: Logistics in Armed Conflict, 164–85; Davidson, Vietnam at War: The History 1946-1975, 161–91.
[46] Thompson, The Lifeblood of War: Logistics in Armed Conflict, 144–45, 171–73.
[47] Thompson, 184–85.
[48] Gudmundsson, Stormtroop Tactics: Innovation in the German Army, 1914-1918.
[49] Kane, Military Logistics and Strategic Performance, 28–32; Field Marshal Viscount Slim, Defeat Into Victory: Battling Japan in Burma and India, 1942-1945 (New York: Cooper Square Press, 2000), 296–346; Thompson, The Lifeblood of War: Logistics in Armed Conflict, 88–99; Shane Williams et al., “Echoes of the Past: The Burma Campaign and Future Operational Design in the Indo-Pacific R,” National Defense University Press, no. 109 (April 2023), https://ndupress.ndu.edu/JFQ/Joint-Force-Quarterly-109/Article/Article/3385559/echoes-of-the-past-the-burma-campaign-and-future-operational-design-in-the-indo/https%3A%2F%2Fndupress.ndu.edu%2FMedia%2FNews%2FNews-Article-View%2FArticle%2F3385559%2Fechoes-of-the-past-the-burma-campaign-and-future-operational-design-in-the-indo%2F.
[50] Assistant Secretary of Defense for Industrial Base Policy, National Defense Industrial Strategy (Washington: US Department of Defense, 2024).
[51] William T. Eliason, “An Interview with Jacqueline D. Van Ovost,” Joint Force Quarterly, no. 107 (October 2022), https://ndupress.ndu.edu/JFQ/Joint-Force-Quarterly-107/Article/Article/3197231/an-interview-with-jacqueline-d-van-ovost/; Bruce Busler, “Strategic Mobility in the Context of U.S. National Defense Strategies,” Joint Force Quarterly, no. 107 (October 2022), https://ndupress.ndu.edu/JFQ/Joint-Force-Quarterly-107/Article/Article/3197251/strategic-mobility-in-the-context-of-us-national-defense-strategies/https%3A%2F%2Fndupress.ndu.edu%2FMedia%2FNews%2FNews-Article-View%2FArticle%2F3197251%2Fstrategic-mobility-in-the-context-of-us-national-defense-strategies%2F.
[52] Headquarters US Marine Corps, Force Design 2030 (Washington: US Marine Corps, 2020).
[53] Brian Kerg, “A Summary of Changes in the New EABO Manual,” USNI Proceedings 149, no. 7 (July 19, 2023), https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2023/july/summary-changes-new-eabo-manual; David Berger, “Marines Will Help Fight Submarines,” USNI Proceedings 146, no. 11 (November 1, 2020), https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2020/november/marines-will-help-fight-submarines; Dustin League and Dan Justice, “Sink ‘Em All: Envisioning Marine Corps Maritime Interdiction | Center for International Maritime Security,” CIMSEC, June 8, 2020, https://cimsec.org/sink-em-all-envisioning-marine-corps-maritime-interdiction/; Timothy Warren, “FARPs Keep Aviation in the Fight,” USNI Proceedings 150, no. 1 (January 1, 2024), https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2024/january/farps-keep-aviation-fight.
[54] US Marine Corps, Tentative Manual for Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO), 2nd ed. (Washington: US Marine Corps, 2021), https://www.marines.mil/News/News-Display/Article/2708120/expeditionary-advanced-base-operations-eabo/https%3A%2F%2Fwww.marines.mil%2FNews%2FNews-Display%2FArticle%2F2708120%2Fexpeditionary-advanced-base-operations-eabo%2F.
[55] Headquarters US Marine Corps, A Concept for Stand in Forces (Washington: US Marine Corps, 2021).
[56] “MCDP 4, Logistics 2.0 – MCA,” Marine Corps Gazette 107, no. 2 (February 15, 2023), https://www.mca-marines.org/gazette/mcdp-4-logistics-2-0/.
[57] Headquarters US Marine Corps, Marine Corps Doctrine Publication 4 – Logistics; Headquarters US Marine Corps, Sustaining the Force in the 21st Century: A Functional Concept for Future Installations and Logistics Development (Washington: US Marine Corps, 2019).
[58] Erwin, “Sustainment within the Weapons Engagement Zone.”
[59] Erwin; Sattely and Paredes, “Sustainment of the Stand-In Force”; Brian Donlon, “Logistics 2030: Foraging Is Not Going to Cut It,” USNI Proceedings 149, no. 11 (November 1, 2023), https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2023/november/logistics-2030-foraging-not-going-cut-it; Walker D. Mills and Erik Limpaecher, “Sustainment Will Be Contested,” USNI Proceedings 146, no. 11 (November 1, 2020), https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2020/november/sustainment-will-be-contested.
[60] Sattely and Paredes, “Sustainment of the Stand-In Force”; Headquarters US Marine Corps, Marine Corps Doctrine Publication 4 – Logistics, chaps. 4–5.
[61] Headquarters US Marine Corps, Marine Corps Doctrine Publication 4 – Logistics, chaps. 4–5.
[62] Aaron Angell and Mark Schouten, “Leveraging Logistics above the MAGTF,” Marine Corps Gazette 108, no. 3 (March 2024): 12–15; Jake Sharry, “The Marine Corps’ Failure to Connect,” USNI Proceedings 146, no. 10 (October 1, 2020), https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2020/october/marine-corps-failure-connect.
[63] Walker D. Mills, Dylan Phillips-Levine, and Joshua Taylor, “Modern Sea Monsters,” USNI Proceedings 146, no. 9 (September 1, 2020), https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2020/september/modern-sea-monsters.
[64] Paul R. Watson, “The Stand-In Force Needs Sea Legs,” USNI Proceedings 149, no. 5 (May 18, 2023), https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2023/may/stand-force-needs-sea-legs.
[65] Andrew Feickert, “The U.S. Marine Corps Marine Littoral Regiment (MLR)” (Washington: Congressional Research Service, August 25, 2022).
[66] Mills and Limpaecher, “Sustainment Will Be Contested.”
[67] Andrew Feickert, “The Army’s Multi-Domain Task Force (MDTF)” (Washington: Congressional Research Service, March 16, 2023); Charles McEnany, “Multi-Domain Task Forces: A Glimpse at the Army of 2035,” Association of the US Army, March 2, 2022, https://www.ausa.org/publications/multi-domain-task-forces-glimpse-army-2035.
[68] Lockheed Martin, “Precision Strike Missile (PrSM),” Lockheed Martin, 2024, https://www.lockheedmartin.com/en-us/products/precision-strike-missile.html; Andrew Feickert, “The U.S. Army’s Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW): Dark Eagle” (Washington: Congressional Research Service, March 13, 2024), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11991.
[69] Collin Fox et al., “Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations for the Army,” War Room – U.S. Army War College (blog), January 13, 2022, https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/articles/exp-ops/.
[70] Aaron-Matthew Lariosa, “Army Activates Latest Land-Based SM-6, Tomahawk Battery Based on Navy Tech,” USNI News (blog), January 18, 2024, https://news.usni.org/2024/01/18/army-activates-latest-land-based-sm-6-tomahawk-battery-based-on-navy-tech.
[71] Feickert, “The Army’s Multi-Domain Task Force (MDTF).”
[72] Dean Cheng, “Chinese Lessons from the Gulf Wars,” in China’s Lessons from Other Peoples’ Wars, ed. Andrew Scobell, David Lai, and Roy Kamphausen (Carlisle Barracks: US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 2011), 153–200, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA553490.pdf; Vick and Ashby, Winning the Battle of the Airfields: Seventy Years of RAND Analysis on Air Base Defense and Attack, 68–79; Cliff et al., “Entering the Dragon’s Lair,” 45–48.
[73] Defense Intelligence Agency, China Military Power: Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win.
[74] LeMay Center, Air Force Doctrine Note 1-21: Agile Combat Employment (Maxwell AFB: Curtis E. LeMay Center, 2022).
[75] Justin R. Davis, “The Air Force’s True Expeditionary Roots: Historical Context and Lessons for the Agile Combat Employment (ACE) Concept” (Fort Leavenworth, School of Advanced Military Studies, 2021); Douglas A. Birkey, “Air War Over Korea: Lessons for Today’s Airmen” (Washington: The Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, August 12, 2022), https://www.airandspaceforces.com/article/air-war-over-korea-lessons-for-todays-airmen/.
[76] Shawn Cochran et al., “The Forces We Need: Building Multi-Capable Airmen to Enable Agile Combat Employment” (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, December 20, 2023), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA1746-1.html.
[77] John Stillion and David T. Orletsky, “Airbase Vulnerability to Conventional Cruise-Missile and Ballistic-Missile Attacks: Technology, Scenarios, and U.S. Air Force Responses” (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, January 1, 1999), https://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1028.html.
[78] Cochran et al., “The Forces We Need”; James A. Leftwich et al., “Advancing Combat Support to Sustain Agile Combat Employment Concepts: Integrating Global, Theater, and Unit Capabilities to Improve Support to a High-End Fight” (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, May 23, 2023), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA1001-1.html.
[79] Alan J. Vick, “Snakes in the Eagle’s Nest: A History of Ground Attacks on Air Bases” (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, January 1, 1995), https://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR553.html; David A. Shlapak and Alan J. Vick, “‘“Check Six Begins on the Ground”’: Responding to the Evolving Ground Threat to U.S. Air Force Bases” (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, January 1, 1995), https://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR606.html.
[80] Cedric Delves, Across an Angry Sea: The SAS in the Falklands War (London: Hurst and Company, 2018), 131–74.
[81] Yung, “Sinica Rules the Waves? The People’s Liberation Army Navy’s Power Projection and Anti-Access/Area Denial Lessons from the Falklands/Malvinas Conflict.”
[82] Stillion and Orletsky, “Airbase Vulnerability to Conventional Cruise-Missile and Ballistic-Missile Attacks,” 39–42.
[83] O’Brien, How the War Was Won: Air-Sea Power and Allied Victory in World War II.
[84] Patrick Mills et al., “Building Agile Combat Support Competencies to Enable Evolving Adaptive Basing Concepts” (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, April 16, 2020), 7–8, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR4200.html.
[85] Peszke, “Poland’s Military Aviation, September 1939: It Never Had a Chance”; Bartlomiej Belcarz and Robert Peczkowski, White Eagles: The Aircraft, Men and Operations of the Polish Air Force 1918-1939 (Ottringham: Hikoki Publications Ltd, 2001), 182–200.
[86] Charles Choate, “Failure Is Not an Option: Changing the Paradigm on Air Force Logistics,” Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies (blog), September 10, 2020, https://mitchellaerospacepower.org/failure-is-not-an-option-changing-the-paradigm-on-air-force-logistics/; Troy Pierce and MSgt Johannes, KING FISH ACE – Logistics Board Game (Maxwell AFB: Air University, 2023).
[87] Joseph Sinclair, Arteries of War: Military Transportation from Alexander the Great to the Falklands–and Beyond (Shrewsbury: Airlife Publishing, 1992), 36.
[88] Haddick, Fire on the Water: China, America, and the Future of the Pacific, 1–10; U.S. Department of Defense, 2022 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America (Pentagon: U.S. Department of Defense, 2022).
[89] Bradley Martin and Christopher G. Pernin, “So Many Questions, So Little Time for Pacific Logistics” (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, June 23, 2023), https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2023/06/so-many-questions-so-little-time-for-pacific-logistics.html.
[90] Martin and Pernin.
[91] Sattely and Paredes, “Sustainment of the Stand-In Force.”
[92] For a definition of lateral seams, see: Kress, Operational Logistics: The Art and Science of Sustaining Military Operations, 68–69.
[93] Patrick Griffin, “The Marine Corps Needs a Local Supply-Web Logistics System,” USNI Proceedings 149, no. 10 (October 12, 2023), https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2023/october/marine-corps-needs-local-supply-web-logistics-system; Gabe E. Mata, “A Marine Corps Supply Chain in the Indo-Pacific,” Marine Corps Gazette 108, no. 3 (March 2024): 28–31; Jeffrey M. Hubbard and W. Tyler Horton, “The Formation of Littoral Logistics Concepts,” Marine Corps Gazette 108, no. 3 (March 2024): 73–78.
[94] Economist, “Why Logistics Are Too Important to Be Left to the Generals.”
[95] For a definition of longitudinal seams, see: Kress, Operational Logistics: The Art and Science of Sustaining Military Operations, 68–69.
[96] Kress, 1–25; John E. Wissler, “Logistics: The Lifeblood of Military Power,” Heritage Foundation – Military Strength Topical Essays, October 4, 2018, https://www.heritage.org/military-strength-topical-essays/2019-essays/logistics-the-lifeblood-military-power.
[97] Wissler, “Logistics.”
[98] Mills et al., “Building Agile Combat Support Competencies to Enable Evolving Adaptive Basing Concepts.”
[99] Headquarters US Marine Corps, Marine Corps Doctrine Publication 4 – Logistics, chaps. 2, 4.
[100] Martin and Pernin, “So Many Questions, So Little Time for Pacific Logistics.”
[101] Kane, Military Logistics and Strategic Performance, chap. Conclusion.
[102] David Goldfein, “Public Remarks by Chief of Staff of the Air Force General Goldfein” (Nellis AFB, 2017).
[103] For some discussion on this point: Priebe et al., “Distributed Operations in a Contested Environment,” ix–xi; James A. Leftwich, Bradley DeBlois, and David T. Orletsky, “Supporting Combat Power Projection Away from Fixed Infrastructure” (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, January 26, 2022), ix–xi, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA596-1.html; Choate, “Failure Is Not an Option,” 7–8.
[104] Peter Suciu, “The Really Boring Way China Would Try to Win a War Against America,” Text, The National Interest (The Center for the National Interest, June 9, 2020), https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/really-boring-way-china-would-try-win-war-against-america-162036.
[105] Choate, “Failure Is Not an Option.”
[106] Multiple examples can be found on their public domain websites. Some examples include: The Air Force Contingency Response Wing, Air Force Advanced Logistics Readiness Officer Course, Advanced Maintenance and Munitions Officer School, Army Sustainment University, and multiple others.
[107] For some examples: Jeffrey Horning, “Compressing the Spring: How III Armored Corps Sustains Large-Scale Combat Operations,” Army Sustainment, Winter 2024, 12–16; Sean T. Conderman and William J. Culp IV, “Littoral Sustainment Teams,” Marine Corps Gazette 108, no. 3 (March 2024): 46–53; Nicholas R. Boivin, “Logistics in the Littorals: Designing the Future Tactical-Level LCE,” Marine Corps Gazette, March 2022; Priebe et al., “Distributed Operations in a Contested Environment,” ix–xi.
[108] “Weapons School” is an oversimplification, but the broad point remains. The Marines have Weapons and Tactics Instructor Course, the Air Force has the Air Force Weapons School (formerly Fighter Weapons School), and the Navy has its Fighter Weapons School among others. Source: the author’s firsthand experience.
[109] Author’s firsthand experience.
[110] Privatsky, Logistics in the Falklands War: A Case Study in Expeditionary Warfare.
[111] Privatsky.
[112] Privatsky; Michael J. Gunther, “Getting Ashore: Joint Logistics at the Battle of San Carlos,” in The Long Haul: Historical Case Studies of Sustainment in Large-Scale Combat Operations, ed. Keith R. Beurskens (Fort Leavenworth: Army University Press, 2018), 120, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/September-October-2018/The-Long-Haul/; Thompson, The Lifeblood of War: Logistics in Armed Conflict; Julian Thompson, 3 Commando Brigade In The Falklands: No Picnic (Yorkshire: Pen and Sword Books, 2009); Michael Clapp and Ewen Southby-Tailyour, Amphibious Assault Falklands: The Battle of San Carlos Water (Yorkshire: Pen and Sword Books, 2007).
[113] Gunther, “Getting Ashore: Joint Logistics at the Battle of San Carlos,” 123–24.
[114] For a definition of Directive Logistics Authority, see: The Joint Staff, Joint Publication 4-0: Logistics (Pentagon: US Department of Defense, 2023).
[115] Roque, “Army to Use Operation Pathways to Test Assumptions about ‘contested Logistics,’ Prepositioned Stocks.”
[116] US Joint Staff, Interview with US Joint Staff Experts on Japan, 2024.
[117] Angell, “Logistics as Maneuver: Strategic Messaging across the Competition Spectrum.”
[118] Marcus Gillett, “The Role of Logistics in Deterrence – MCA,” Marine Corps Gazette 108, no. 3 (March 2024): 16–19.
[119] Griffin, “The Marine Corps Needs a Local Supply-Web Logistics System.”
[120] Stanley McChrystal et al., Team of Teams: New Rules of Engagement for a Complex World (New York: Portfolio, 2015).
[121] David Wilson, “Army Sustainment Capabilities: Instrumental to the Joint Force in the Indo-Pacific Region,” National Defense University Press, no. 108 (January 2023), https://ndupress.ndu.edu/JFQ/Joint-Force-Quarterly-108/Article/Article/3264632/army-sustainment-capabilities-instrumental-to-the-joint-force-in-the-indo-pacif/https%3A%2F%2Fndupress.ndu.edu%2FMedia%2FNews%2FNews-Article-View%2FArticle%2F3264632%2Farmy-sustainment-capabilities-instrumental-to-the-joint-force-in-the-indo-pacif%2F.
[122] Gabriel W. Pryor, “Logistics in the Indo-Pacific: Setting the Theater for a Conflict Over Taiwan,” Army Sustainment, Winter 2024, 12–16; Wilson, “Army Sustainment Capabilities.”
[123] Nathan Freier, John Schaus, and William Braun, “The US Is Out of Position in the Indo-Pacific Region,” Defense One, July 19, 2020, https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2020/07/us-out-position-indo-pacific-region/166964/.
[124] Nathan Freier, John Schaus, and William Braun, “An Army Transformed: USINDOPACOM Hypercompetition and US Army Theater Design,” US Army War College Monographs, Collaborative Studies, & IRPs, July 17, 2020, 62–64, https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/912.
[125] Eccles, “Logistics and Strategy”; Henry E. Eccles, Logistics in the National Defense (Harrisburg: The Stackpole Company, 1959); Choate, “Failure Is Not an Option,” 7–8; Henry E. Eccles, Operational Naval Logistics (Honolulu: University Press of the Pacific, 1950), 35–41.
[126] Kress, Operational Logistics: The Art and Science of Sustaining Military Operations, 61–84.
[127] Eldridge A. Colby, The Strategy of Denial: American Defense in an Age of Great Power Conflict (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2021).
[128] Vincent A. W. J. Marchau et al., eds., Decision Making under Deep Uncertainty (Heidelberg: Springer, 2019), https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-030-05252-2.
[129] Leftwich, DeBlois, and Orletsky, “Supporting Combat Power Projection Away from Fixed Infrastructure.”
[130] Thomas Walsh and Alexandra Huber, “A Symphony of Capabilities: How the Joint Warfighting Concept Guides Service Force Design,” Joint Force Quarterly 111 (October 2023), https://ndupress.ndu.edu/JFQ/Joint-Force-Quarterly-111/Article/Article/3568312/a-symphony-of-capabilities-how-the-joint-warfighting-concept-guides-service-for/https%3A%2F%2Fndupress.ndu.edu%2FMedia%2FNews%2FNews-Article-View%2FArticle%2F3568312%2Fa-symphony-of-capabilities-how-the-joint-warfighting-concept-guides-service-for%2F.
[131] Frank Wolfe, “Joint Warfighting Concept Assumes ‘Contested Logistics,’” Defense Daily, October 6, 2020, https://www.defensedaily.com/joint-warfighting-concept-assumes-contested-logistics/pentagon/.
[132] US Marine Corps Logistician, Interview with US Marine Corps Logistician, April 2024.
[133] Wilson, “Army Sustainment Capabilities.”
[134] For example, see: Nathan J. Gervaise, “Self-Sustainment in an EAB,” Marine Corps Gazette 108, no. 3 (March 2024): 54–55.
[135] Hammes, “Game-Changers: Implications of the Russo-Ukraine War for the Future of Ground Warfare”; Sean Ford, “Making Tactical-Level Logistics More Survivable: Employing an Infiltration Mindset,” Marine Corps Gazette, March 2021.
[136] Wilson, “Army Sustainment Capabilities”; Charles Flynn and Tim Devine, “To Upgun Seapower in the Indo-Pacific, You Need an Army,” USNI Proceedings 150, no. 2 (February 1, 2024), https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2024/february/upgun-seapower-indo-pacific-you-need-army.
[137] Haddick, Fire on the Water: China, America, and the Future of the Pacific, 206–7.
[138] Lyla Englehorn, “Logistics in Contested Environments – Warfare Innovation Continuum (WIC) Workshop September 2019 After Action Report,” Consortium for Robotics and Unmanned Systems Education and Research (CRUSER) (Monterrey: Naval Postgraduate School, November 14, 2019).
[139] Patrick Griffin, “Contested Logistics: Adapting Cartel Submarines to Support Taiwan,” USNI Proceedings 150, no. 1 (January 25, 2024), https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2024/january/contested-logistics-adapting-cartel-submarines-support-taiwan; Walker D. Mills, “Contested Logistics: Look to the Illicit Drug Trade,” USNI Proceedings 147, no. 8 (August 3, 2021), https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2021/august/contested-logistics-look-illicit-drug-trade; Brent Stricker, “EABO Degraded Logistics in the WEZ: Self Propelled Semi-Submersible Solutions | Center for International Maritime Security,” CIMSEC (blog), October 11, 2022, https://cimsec.org/eabo-degraded-logistics-in-the-wez-self-propelled-semi-submersible-solutions/; Alec Blivas, “6 Platforms for Marine Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations Logistics,” The Diplomat, November 11, 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/11/6-platforms-for-marine-expeditionary-advanced-base-operations-logistics/.
[140] Ross Ochs, “Big Fight, Small Logistics Apparatus,” Marine Corps Gazette 108, no. 3 (March 2024): 62–65.
[141] Englehorn, “Logistics in Contested Environments – Warfare Innovation Continuum (WIC) Workshop September 2019 After Action Report.”
[142] Brian E. Hamel, “Supporting Warfare in the Indo-Pacific Through Space-Based Sustainment,” Army Sustainment, February 1, 2024, https://www.army.mil/article/272928/supporting_warfare_in_the_indo_pacific_through_space_based_sustainment; Von P. H. Fernandes et al., “The World in 90 Minutes or Less: Rocket Logistics and Future Military Operations,” Campaigning: The Journal of the Joint Forces Staff College, October 13, 2022.
[143] Aviation Week, “Regent To Demo Seaglider For U.S. Marines’ Warfighting Lab in 2025 | Aviation Week Network,” Aviation Week: Advanced Air Mobility Report, October 18, 2023, https://aviationweek.com/aerospace/emerging-technologies/regent-demo-seaglider-us-marines-warfighting-lab-2025; Mills, Phillips-Levine, and Taylor, “Modern Sea Monsters.”
[144] Chris Bernotavicius et al., “You Go to War with the Watercraft You Have,” War on the Rocks, July 26, 2022, https://warontherocks.com/2022/07/you-go-to-war-with-the-watercraft-you-have/; Rae Higgins, “New Vessel Class Enters Army Watercraft Fleet with Prototype Launch,” US Army, October 12, 2022, https://www.army.mil/article/260993/new_vessel_class_enters_army_watercraft_fleet_with_prototype_launch; Jennifer Hlad, “Army Takes on a Naval Tinge as It Adapts to the Pacific,” Defense One, October 17, 2023, https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2023/10/army-takes-naval-tinge-it-adapts-pacific/391251/; Bloomberg, “U.S. Navy Secretary Looks to Asia to Revive Shipbuilding at Home,” gCaptain, February 26, 2024, https://gcaptain.com/u-s-navy-secretary-looks-to-asia-to-revive-shipbuilding-at-home/; Pete Pagano, “Use the Gator Navy for Combat Logistics,” USNI Proceedings 148, no. 7 (July 28, 2022), https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2022/july/use-gator-navy-combat-logistics; Joe Greco, “Unpacking Merchant Shipping,” USNI Proceedings 150, no. 2 (February 1, 2024), https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2024/february/unpacking-merchant-shipping.
[145] For detailed examples of advanced manufacturing and fuels, see: Andrew P. Armstrong, “3-D Printing: From Cutesy to Credible,” USNI Proceedings 150, no. 2 (February 1, 2024), https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2024/february/3-d-printing-cutesy-credible; Patrick Tucker, “The Air Force Is Quietly Revolutionizing Parts Replacement – Defense One,” Defense One, April 2, 2024, https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2024/04/air-force-help-startup-quietly-revolutionizing-parts-replacement/395430/; Walker D. Mills and Erik Limpaecher, “Need Fuel? Marines Should Make Moonshine Hydrogen,” USNI Proceedings 147, no. 11 (November 30, 2021), https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2021/november/need-fuel-marines-should-make-moonshine-hydrogen; Chase Smeeks, “Harvest Hydrogen for Distributed Logistics,” USNI Proceedings 149, no. 1 (January 1, 2023), https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2023/january/harvest-hydrogen-distributed-logistics.
[146] Hammes, “Game-Changers: Implications of the Russo-Ukraine War for the Future of Ground Warfare”; John F. Antal, 7 Seconds to Die: A Military Analysis of the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War and the Future of Warfighting (Philadelphia: Casemate Publishing, 2022).
[147] Leftwich, DeBlois, and Orletsky, “Supporting Combat Power Projection Away from Fixed Infrastructure,” ix–xi; Jack Watling, “Automation Does Not Lead to Leaner Land Forces – War on the Rocks,” War on the Rocks, February 7, 2024, https://warontherocks.com/2024/02/automation-does-not-lead-to-leaner-land-forces/.
[148] CRS, “Joint All-Domain Command and Control: Background and Issues for Congress” (Washington: Congressional Research Service, March 18, 2021).
[149] Art Sellers, “Four Ways DOD Can Leverage AI for Contested Logistics,” DefenseScoop (blog), June 20, 2023, https://defensescoop.com/2023/06/20/four-ways-dod-can-leverage-ai-for-contested-logistics/.
[150] For thoughtful articles that discuss AI’s promise in contested logistics (at the risk of overstating their case):
Bart De Muynck, “Council Post: The True Role Of AI In Logistics,” Forbes, August 17, 2023, https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2023/08/17/the-true-role-of-ai-in-logistics/; Rome Ruiz, “Redefining Contested Logistics: How AI Can Optimize the Navy’s Refueling Operations,” SparkCognition Government Systems, March 17, 2023, https://sparkgov.ai/redefining-contested-logistics-how-ai-can-optimize-the-navys-refueling-operations/; Robert Wolfe and Matthew Barnes, “Artificial Intelligence in the Marine Corps Logistics Enterprise: Parts 1, 2, and 3,” Marine Corps Gazette, November 15, 2023, https://www.mca-marines.org/gazette/ai-in-the-marine-corps-logistics-enterprise-part-1/; Everett Bud Lacroix, “Future of Army Logistics | Exploiting AI, Overcoming Challenges, and Charting the Course Ahead,” Army Sustainment, August 1, 2023, https://www.army.mil/article/267692/future_of_army_logistics_exploiting_ai_overcoming_challenges_and_charting_the_course_ahead; Aerospace and Defense Review, “Transforming Army Logistics: The AI Revolution,” Aerospace & Defence Review, October 4, 2023, https://www.aerospacedefensereview.com/news/transforming-army-logistics-the-ai-revolution-nwid-1385.html; Regan Copple, “Prepare for AI-Enabled Future Logistics,” U.S. Naval Institute, November 8, 2021, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2021/november/prepare-ai-enabled-future-logistics.
[151] Audrey Decker, “Can AI Reduce Air Force Logistics Planning from Days to Minutes?,” Defense One, February 1, 2024, https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2024/02/can-ai-reduce-air-force-logistics-planning-days-minutes/393850/.
[152] William T. Smith, “Contested Logistics | AI, Optimization, and Rational Thought (A Mathematician’s Lament),” Army Sustainment, February 1, 2024, https://www.army.mil/article/272917/contested_logistics_ai_optimization_and_rational_thought_a_mathematicians_lament.
[153] For a discussion of training algorithms, see William T. Smith, for a discussion of training an algorithm on simulations (as with DeepMind’s AlphaGo) see Lee: Smith; Kai-Fu Lee, AI Superpowers: China, Silicon Valley, and the New World Order (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2018).
[154] Smith, “Contested Logistics | AI, Optimization, and Rational Thought (A Mathematician’s Lament).”
Bibliography
Aerospace and Defense Review. “Transforming Army Logistics: The AI Revolution.” Aerospace & Defence Review, October 4, 2023. https://www.aerospacedefensereview.com/news/transforming-army-logistics-the-ai-revolution-nwid-1385.html.
AIR. “USAF Vice Chief Challenges Workforce to ‘Operationalise’ Agile Combat Employment.” Defense Connect, February 24, 2023. http://www.defenceconnect.com.au/strike-air-combat/11475-usaf-vice-chief-challenges-workforce-to-operationalise-agile-combat-employment.
Andrew Feickert. “The U.S. Marine Corps Marine Littoral Regiment (MLR).” Washington: Congressional Research Service, August 25, 2022.
Angell, Aaron. “Logistics as Maneuver: Strategic Messaging across the Competition Spectrum.” Marine Corps Gazette, March 2022.
Angell, Aaron, and Mark Schouten. “Leveraging Logistics above the MAGTF.” Marine Corps Gazette 108, no. 3 (March 2024): 12–15.
Antal, John F. 7 Seconds to Die: A Military Analysis of the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War and the Future of Warfighting. Philadelphia: Casemate Publishing, 2022.
Armstrong, Andrew P. “3-D Printing: From Cutesy to Credible.” USNI Proceedings 150, no. 2 (February 1, 2024). https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2024/february/3-d-printing-cutesy-credible.
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Industrial Base Policy. National Defense Industrial Strategy. Washington: US Department of Defense, 2024.
Australian Army. Land Warfare Doctrine 4-0 Logistics. Sydney: Australian Army, 2018. https://australianarmycadets.files.wordpress.com/2018/03/lwd_4-0_logistics_full.pdf.
Aviation Week. “Regent To Demo Seaglider For U.S. Marines’ Warfighting Lab in 2025 | Aviation Week Network.” Aviation Week: Advanced Air Mobility Report, October 18, 2023. https://aviationweek.com/aerospace/emerging-technologies/regent-demo-seaglider-us-marines-warfighting-lab-2025.
Bassett, David, and James Regan. “Military Sealift Command: Joint Maritime Mobility.” Joint Force Quarterly, no. 107 (October 2022). https://ndupress.ndu.edu/JFQ/Joint-Force-Quarterly-107/Article/Article/3197242/military-sealift-command-joint-maritime-mobility/.
Belcarz, Bartlomiej, and Robert Peczkowski. White Eagles: The Aircraft, Men and Operations of the Polish Air Force 1918-1939. Ottringham: Hikoki Publications Ltd, 2001.
Bergengruen, Vera. “How Tech Giants Turned Ukraine Into an AI War Lab.” TIME, February 8, 2024. https://time.com/6691662/ai-ukraine-war-palantir/.
Berger, David. “Marines Will Help Fight Submarines.” USNI Proceedings 146, no. 11 (November 1, 2020). https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2020/november/marines-will-help-fight-submarines.
Bernotavicius, Chris, Michelle Macander, Danielle Ngo, and John Schaus. “You Go to War with the Watercraft You Have.” War on the Rocks, July 26, 2022. https://warontherocks.com/2022/07/you-go-to-war-with-the-watercraft-you-have/.
Berry, Warren. “Air Force Persistent Logistics Sustaining Combat Power during 21st Century Competition and Conflict.” In The Mitchell Forum, Vol. 37. The Mitchell Forum. Washington: Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, 2020.
Beurskens, Keith R., ed. “Introduction.” In The Long Haul: Historical Case Studies of Sustainment in Large-Scale Combat Operations. Fort Leavenworth: Army University Press, 2018. https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/September-October-2018/The-Long-Haul/.
———. The Long Haul: Historical Case Studies of Sustainment in Large-Scale Combat Operations. Edited by Keith R. Beurskens. Fort Leavenworth: Army University Press, 2018. https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/September-October-2018/The-Long-Haul/.
Birkey, Douglas A. “Air War Over Korea: Lessons for Today’s Airmen.” Washington: The Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, August 12, 2022. https://www.airandspaceforces.com/article/air-war-over-korea-lessons-for-todays-airmen/.
Black, Jeremy. Logistics: The Key to Victory. Philadelphia: Pen and Sword Books, 2021.
Blasko, Dennis J. “China’s Merchant Marine.” Arlington: Center for Naval Analysis, 2015. https://www.cna.org/cna_files/pdf/china-merchant-marine.pdf.
Blivas, Alec. “6 Platforms for Marine Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations Logistics.” The Diplomat, November 11, 2020. https://thediplomat.com/2020/11/6-platforms-for-marine-expeditionary-advanced-base-operations-logistics/.
Bloomberg. “U.S. Navy Secretary Looks to Asia to Revive Shipbuilding at Home.” gCaptain, February 26, 2024. https://gcaptain.com/u-s-navy-secretary-looks-to-asia-to-revive-shipbuilding-at-home/.
Boivin, Nicholas R. “Logistics in the Littorals: Designing the Future Tactical-Level LCE.” Marine Corps Gazette, March 2022.
Bremer, Maximilian, and Kelly Grieco. “The Air Littoral: Another Look.” The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters 51, no. 4 (November 17, 2021): 67–80. https://doi.org/10.55540/0031-1723.3092.
———. “The Pentagon Needs Fresh Ideas for Evading Taiwan Logistics Pitfalls.” Defense News, December 4, 2023. https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/2023/12/04/the-pentagon-needs-fresh-ideas-for-evading-taiwan-logistics-pitfalls/.
Bristol, Douglas. “The ‘Tooth-to-Tail’ Ratio and Modern Army Logistics.” Reflections on War & Society (blog), November 3, 2021. https://dalecentersouthernmiss.wordpress.com/2021/11/03/the-tooth-to-tail-ratio-and-modern-army-logistics/.
Brose, Christian. The Kill Chain: Defending America in the Future of High-Tech Warfare. New York: Hachette Books, 2020.
Bureau of Transportation Statistics. “Number and Size of the U.S. Flag Merchant Fleet and Its Share of the World Fleet.” US Department of Transportation Bureau of Transportation Statistics, 2023. https://www.bts.gov/content/number-and-size-us-flag-merchant-fleet-and-its-share-world-fleet.
Busler, Bruce. “Strategic Mobility in the Context of U.S. National Defense Strategies.” Joint Force Quarterly, no. 107 (October 2022). https://ndupress.ndu.edu/JFQ/Joint-Force-Quarterly-107/Article/Article/3197251/strategic-mobility-in-the-context-of-us-national-defense-strategies/https%3A%2F%2Fndupress.ndu.edu%2FMedia%2FNews%2FNews-Article-View%2FArticle%2F3197251%2Fstrategic-mobility-in-the-context-of-us-national-defense-strategies%2F.
Carberry, Sean. “Forget Hardened Bases, Pacific Conflict Requires Agile Combat Employment, Commander Says.” National Defense, March 8, 2023. https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2023/3/8/forget-hardened-bases-pacific-conflict-requires-agile-combat-employment-commander.
Chan, Minnie. “Chinese Media Unveils Details of US-Inspired Military Logistics System.” South China Morning Post, May 11, 2022. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3177222/chinese-media-unveils-details-us-inspired-military-logistics.
Cheng, Dean. “Chinese Lessons from the Gulf Wars.” In China’s Lessons from Other Peoples’ Wars, edited by Andrew Scobell, David Lai, and Roy Kamphausen, 153–200. Carlisle Barracks: US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 2011. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA553490.pdf.
Choate, Charles. “Failure Is Not an Option: Changing the Paradigm on Air Force Logistics.” Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies (blog), September 10, 2020. https://mitchellaerospacepower.org/failure-is-not-an-option-changing-the-paradigm-on-air-force-logistics/.
Clapp, Michael, and Ewen Southby-Tailyour. Amphibious Assault Falklands: The Battle of San Carlos Water. Yorkshire: Pen and Sword Books, 2007.
Clayton D. Laurie. Anzio 1944. The US Army Campaigns of World War II 72–19. Washington: US Army Center for Military History, 1972.
Cliff, Roger, Mark Burles, Michael S. Chase, Derek Eaton, and Kevin L. Pollpeter. “Entering the Dragon’s Lair: Chinese Antiaccess Strategies and Their Implications for the United States.” RAND Corporation, March 21, 2007. https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG524.html.
Cobb, Justin. “The Navy Is Not Prepared for the Joint Fight in IndoPaCom.” Proceedings, March 2024.
Cochran, Shawn, Kirsten M. Keller, Mark Toukan, Maria C. Lytell, Matthew Walsh, Andrea M. Abler, Isabelle Winston, Ryan L. Stallsworth, and Ryan C. Thulin. “The Forces We Need: Building Multi-Capable Airmen to Enable Agile Combat Employment.” Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, December 20, 2023. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA1746-1.html.
Colby, Eldridge A. The Strategy of Denial: American Defense in an Age of Great Power Conflict. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2021.
Conderman, Sean T., and William J. Culp IV. “Littoral Sustainment Teams.” Marine Corps Gazette 108, no. 3 (March 2024): 46–53.
Copple, Regan. “Prepare for AI-Enabled Future Logistics.” U.S. Naval Institute, November 8, 2021. https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2021/november/prepare-ai-enabled-future-logistics.
Costello, Donald. “Dynamic Maneuver Requires Agile Logistics.” USNI Proceedings 146, no. 1 (January 1, 2020). https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2020/january/dynamic-maneuver-requires-agile-logistics.
Crombe, Katie, and John Nagl. “A Call to Action: Lessons from Ukraine for the Future Force.” The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters 53, no. 3 (August 25, 2023). https://doi.org/10.55540/0031-1723.3240.
CRS. “Joint All-Domain Command and Control: Background and Issues for Congress.” Washington: Congressional Research Service, March 18, 2021.
———. “The Army’s Multi-Domain Task Force (MDTF).” Washington: Congressional Research Service, March 16, 2023.
Cunningham, Alan. “Automated Systems: The Complexity of the Supply and Logistics System of the U.S. Army and the Need for Automation.” Military Review Online, September 2023. https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/Online-Exclusive/2023-OLE/Automated-Systems/.
David Goldfein. “Public Remarks by Chief of Staff of the Air Force General Goldfein.” Nellis AFB, 2017.
Davidhizar, M. Hunter. “Don’t Make It Complicated: A Commensense Solution to the Landing Ship Medium.” Marine Corps Gazette 108, no. 3 (March 2024): 84–87.
Davidson, Philip B. Vietnam at War: The History 1946-1975. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991.
Davis, Justin R. “The Air Force’s True Expeditionary Roots: Historical Context and Lessons for the Agile Combat Employment (ACE) Concept.” School of Advanced Military Studies, 2021.
Decker, Audrey. “Can AI Reduce Air Force Logistics Planning from Days to Minutes?” Defense One, February 1, 2024. https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2024/02/can-ai-reduce-air-force-logistics-planning-days-minutes/393850/.
Defense Intelligence Agency. China Military Power: Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win. Washington: US Defense Intelligence Agency, 2019. www.dia.mil/military-power-publications.
Delves, Cedric. Across an Angry Sea: The SAS in the Falklands War. London: Hurst and Company, 2018.
Diamond, Mary E. “Air Force Logistics Mission Command for Great Power Competition.” Air Force Strategic Policy Fellowship, 2020. https://aul.primo.exlibrisgroup.com/discovery/delivery/01AUL_INST:AUL/1281131440006836?lang=en&viewerServiceCode=DigitalViewer.
DoD Defense Science Board. “Task Force on Survivable Logistics Executive Summary.” The Pentagon: Department of Defense, November 2018.
Donlon, Brian. “Logistics 2030: Foraging Is Not Going to Cut It.” USNI Proceedings 149, no. 11 (November 1, 2023). https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2023/november/logistics-2030-foraging-not-going-cut-it.
Duchatel, Mathieu. “Chapter 3: An Assessment of China’s Options for Military Coercion of Taiwan.” In Crossing the Strait: China’s Military Prepares for War with Taiwan, edited by Joel Wuthnow, Derek Grossman, Phillip C. Sanders, Andrew Scobell, and Andrew N.D. Yang, 87–112. Washington: National Defense University Press, 2022.
Duvall, Jondavid. “ER: Understanding ACE.” Logistics Officer Association (blog), January 5, 2021. https://atloa.org/er-understanding-ace/.
Eccles, Henry. “Logistics and Strategy.” Naval War College Review 11, no. 1 (January 1958): 17–39.
Eccles, Henry E. Operational Naval Logistics. Honolulu: University Press of the Pacific, 1950.
Echevarria, Antulio J. “It’s Time to Recognize Sustainment as a Strategic Imperative.” War on the Rocks, February 15, 2023. https://warontherocks.com/2023/02/its-time-to-recognize-sustainment-as-a-strategic-imperative/.
Eckstein, Megan. “‘It’s All about Logistics’: US Marines Test Force Design in Pacific.” Defense News, July 24, 2023. https://www.defensenews.com/training-sim/2023/07/24/its-all-about-logistics-us-marines-test-force-design-in-pacific/.
Economist. “Why Logistics Are Too Important to Be Left to the Generals.” The Economist, July 3, 2023. https://www.economist.com/special-report/2023/07/03/why-logistics-are-too-important-to-be-left-to-the-generals.
Ekman, Elle. “Attention Logisticians: EABO Is Logistics.” AMCL, September 1, 2019. https://www.marinecorpslogistics.org/post/attention-logisticians-eabo-is-logistics.
Eliason, William T. “An Interview with Jacqueline D. Van Ovost.” Joint Force Quarterly, no. 107 (October 2022). https://ndupress.ndu.edu/JFQ/Joint-Force-Quarterly-107/Article/Article/3197231/an-interview-with-jacqueline-d-van-ovost/.
Ellison, Kyle B. “Marine Corps Adaptation: The Future Is Now.” USNI Proceedings 149, no. 4 (April 1, 2023). https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2023/april/marine-corps-adaptation-future-now.
Englehorn, Lyla. “Logistics in Contested Environments – Warfare Innovation Continuum (WIC) Workshop September 2019 After Action Report.” Consortium for Robotics and Unmanned Systems Education and Research (CRUSER). Monterrey: Naval Postgraduate School, November 14, 2019.
Erickson, Andrew S. “Numbers Matter: China’s Three ‘Navies’ Each Have the World’s Most Ships.” Text. The National Interest. The Center for the National Interest, February 26, 2018. https://nationalinterest.org/feature/numbers-matter-chinas-three-navies-each-have-the-worlds-most-24653.
Erwin, Brandon L. “Sustainment within the Weapons Engagement Zone.” Marine Corps Gazette 108, no. 3 (March 2024): 91–95.
Feickert, Andrew. “The Army’s Multi-Domain Task Force (MDTF).” Washington: Congressional Research Service, March 16, 2023.
———. “The U.S. Army’s Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW): Dark Eagle.” Washington: Congressional Research Service, March 13, 2024. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11991.
Fernandes, Von P. H., Ashley Gunn, Lucas Hoffman, and Nita McQuitery. “The World in 90 Minutes or Less: Rocket Logistics and Future Military Operations.” Campaigning: The Journal of the Joint Forces Staff College, October 13, 2022.
Fetter, Jeremy. “Contested Logistics – Army’s Role in the Joint Force.” The Cove, March 17, 2023. https://cove.army.gov.au/article/contested-logistics-armys-role-joint-force.
Flynn, Charles, and Tim Devine. “To Upgun Seapower in the Indo-Pacific, You Need an Army.” USNI Proceedings 150, no. 2 (February 1, 2024). https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2024/february/upgun-seapower-indo-pacific-you-need-army.
Flynn, Karl. “Unmanned Vessels for EABO.” USNI Proceedings 147, no. 11 (November 1, 2021). https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2021/november/unmanned-vessels-eabo.
Ford, Sean. “Making Tactical-Level Logistics More Survivable: Employing an Infiltration Mindset.” Marine Corps Gazette, March 2021.
Fox, Amos C. “Contested Logistics: A Primer.” AUSA: Landpower Essay 24-1, February 2, 2024. https://www.ausa.org/publications/contested-logistics-primer.
Fox, Collin, Walker Mills, Dylan Phillips-Levine, and Trevor Phillips-Levine. “Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations for the Army.” War Room – U.S. Army War College (blog), January 13, 2022. https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/articles/exp-ops/.
Freier, Nathan, John Schaus, and William Braun. “An Army Transformed: USINDOPACOM Hypercompetition and US Army Theater Design.” US Army War College Monographs, Collaborative Studies, & IRPs, July 17, 2020. https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/912.
———. “The US Is Out of Position in the Indo-Pacific Region.” Defense One, July 19, 2020. https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2020/07/us-out-position-indo-pacific-region/166964/.
Friedman, B. A. On Operations: Operational Art and Military Disciplines. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2021.
German, 1Lt. “Contested Logistics in the EABO Environment – MCA.” Marine Corps Association (blog), April 15, 2023. https://www.mca-marines.org/gazette/contested-logistics-in-the-eabo-environment/.
Gervaise, Nathan J. “Self-Sustainment in an EAB.” Marine Corps Gazette 108, no. 3 (March 2024): 54–55.
Gillett, Marcus. “The Role of Logistics in Deterrence – MCA.” Marine Corps Gazette 108, no. 3 (March 2024): 16–19.
Gough, Terrence J. U.S. Army Mobilization and Logistics in the Korean War: A Research Approach. Washington: US Army Center of Military History, 1987.
Graves, Christian. “Emergency Logistics Stochastic Network Optimization with Prepositioning and Distribution Center Support.” Air Force Institute of Technology, 2022. https://scholar.afit.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=6376&context=etd.
Greco, Joe. “Unpacking Merchant Shipping.” USNI Proceedings 150, no. 2 (February 1, 2024). https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2024/february/unpacking-merchant-shipping.
Griffin, Patrick. “Contested Logistics: Adapting Cartel Submarines to Support Taiwan.” USNI Proceedings 150, no. 1 (January 25, 2024). https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2024/january/contested-logistics-adapting-cartel-submarines-support-taiwan.
———. “The Marine Corps Needs a Local Supply-Web Logistics System.” USNI Proceedings 149, no. 10 (October 12, 2023). https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2023/october/marine-corps-needs-local-supply-web-logistics-system.
Gudmundsson, Bruce I. Stormtroop Tactics: Innovation in the German Army, 1914-1918. Westport: Praeger, 1989.
Gully, Megan. “Army Focuses on Contested Logistics – a Threat to Enemy.” US Army, April 3, 2023. https://www.army.mil/article/265428/army_focuses_on_contested_logistics_a_threat_to_enemy.
Gunther, Michael J. “Getting Ashore: Joint Logistics at the Battle of San Carlos.” In The Long Haul: Historical Case Studies of Sustainment in Large-Scale Combat Operations, edited by Keith R. Beurskens, 113–30. Fort Leavenworth: Army University Press, 2018. https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/September-October-2018/The-Long-Haul/.
Haddick, Robert. Fire on the Water: China, America, and the Future of the Pacific. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2022.
Hall, Michael J. “Operating Distributed Command & Control and Logistics Networks with Agile Combat Employment (ACE).” Air University, 2021. https://aul.primo.exlibrisgroup.com.
Hamel, Brian E. “Supporting Warfare in the Indo-Pacific Through Space-Based Sustainment.” Army Sustainment, February 1, 2024. https://www.army.mil/article/272928/supporting_warfare_in_the_indo_pacific_through_space_based_sustainment.
Handley, Kara. “Navy Expeditionary Combat Forces Enable Distributed Maritime Operations during LSE 2023.” United States Navy, August 23, 2023. https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/News-Stories/Article/3503957/navy-expeditionary-combat-forces-enable-distributed-maritime-operations-during/https%3A%2F%2Fwww.navy.mil%2FPress-Office%2FNews-Stories%2FArticle%2F3503957%2Fnavy-expeditionary-combat-forces-enable-distributed-maritime-operations-during%2F.
Headquarters US Marine Corps. A Concept for Stand in Forces. Washington: US Marine Corps, 2021.
———. Force Design 2030. Washington: US Marine Corps, 2020.
———. Marine Corps Doctrine Publication 4 – Logistics. Washington: US Marine Corps, 2023.
———. Sustaining the Force in the 21st Century: A Functional Concept for Future Installations and Logistics Development. Washington: US Marine Corps, 2019.
Henley, Lonnie D. “CMSI China Maritime Report #26: ‘Beyond the First Battle: Overcoming a Protracted Blockade of Taiwan’ | Andrew S. Erickson.” Newport: US Naval War College: China Maritime Studies Institute, March 2023. https://www.andrewerickson.com/2023/03/cmsi-china-maritime-report-26-beyond-the-first-battle-overcoming-a-protracted-blockade-of-taiwan/.
Higgins, Rae. “New Vessel Class Enters Army Watercraft Fleet with Prototype Launch.” US Army, October 12, 2022. https://www.army.mil/article/260993/new_vessel_class_enters_army_watercraft_fleet_with_prototype_launch.
Higham, Robin, and Stephen J. Harris, eds. Why Air Forces Fail: The Anatomy of Defeat. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2006.
Hill, Kathleen E. “Multinational Resource Sharing.” Marine Corps Gazette 108, no. 3 (March 2024): 41–42.
Hillestad, Richard, and Louis R. Moore. “The Theater-Level Campaign Model: A Research Prototype for a New Generation of Combat Analysis Model.” Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, January 1, 1996. https://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR388.html.
Historical Division, War Department. Salerno: American Operations From the Beaches to the Volturno 9 September – 6 October 1943. 50th Anniversary Edition. Washington: US Army Center of Military History, 1990.
Hlad, Jennifer. “Army Takes on a Naval Tinge as It Adapts to the Pacific.” Defense One, October 17, 2023. https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2023/10/army-takes-naval-tinge-it-adapts-pacific/391251/.
Hore, Peter. “‘Logistics Miracle.’” Naval History Magazine 36, no. 2 (March 1, 2022). https://www.usni.org/magazines/naval-history-magazine/2022/april/logistics-miracle.
Horning, Jeffrey. “Compressing the Spring: How III Armored Corps Sustains Large-Scale Combat Operations.” Army Sustainment, Winter 2024, 12–16.
Hoyle, Heidi. “Preparing to Win: Ensuring Our Army’s Success in a Contested Environment.” Army Sustainment, Winter 2024. https://www.army.mil/article/272931/preparing_to_win_ensuring_our_armys_success_in_a_contested_environment.
Hubbard, Jeffrey M., and W. Tyler Horton. “The Formation of Littoral Logistics Concepts.” Marine Corps Gazette 108, no. 3 (March 2024): 73–78.
Irion, Alexander, Elle Ekman, and Mitchell Ryan. “Logistics Is a Shaping Factor.” USNI Proceedings 146, no. 11 (November 1, 2020). https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2020/november/logistics-shaping-factor.
Kane, Thomas M. Military Logistics and Strategic Performance. London: Routledge, 2001.
Katz, Justin. “What We Now Know about the Marine Corps’ Plans for Medium Landing Ship.” Breaking Defense (blog), March 13, 2024. https://breakingdefense.sites.breakingmedia.com/2024/03/what-we-now-know-about-the-marine-corps-plans-for-medium-landing-ship/.
Kennedy, Conor M. “Chapter 8: Getting There: Chinese Military and Civilian Sealift in a Cross-Strait Invasion.” In Crossing the Strait: China’s Military Prepares for War with Taiwan, edited by Joel Wuthnow, Derek Grossman, Phillip C. Sanders, Andrew Scobell, and Andrew N.D. Yang, 223–50. Washington: National Defense University Press, 2022.
Kepe, Marta. “Logistics and Sustainment in the Russian Armed Forces.” Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, November 15, 2023. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA2523-1.html.
Kerg, Brian. “A Summary of Changes in the New EABO Manual.” USNI Proceedings 149, no. 7 (July 19, 2023). https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2023/july/summary-changes-new-eabo-manual.
Kern, Joshua R. “The Future of Unmanned Logistics Aircraft.” USNI Proceedings 145, no. 9 (September 1, 2019). https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2019/september/future-unmanned-logistics-aircraft.
Kettner, Andrew P. “Admiral Eccles’ Logistics Framework.” Marine Corps Gazette 108, no. 3 (March 2024): 59–61.
King, Jon Michael. “Contested Logistics Environment Defined.” Army Sustainment, February 1, 2024. https://www.army.mil/article/272922/contested_logistics_environment_defined.
Kress, Moshe. Operational Logistics: The Art and Science of Sustaining Military Operations. 2nd ed. Heidelberg: Springer, 2016.
Kumar, P. N. Ram, and T. T. Narendran. “Convoy Movement Problem – An Optimization Perspective.” In Innovations in Defence Support Systems – 1, edited by Anthony Finn and Lakhmi C. Jain, 79–93. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer, 2010. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-14084-6_4.
Lacroix, Everett Bud. “Future of Army Logistics | Exploiting AI, Overcoming Challenges, and Charting the Course Ahead.” Army Sustainment, August 1, 2023. https://www.army.mil/article/267692/future_of_army_logistics_exploiting_ai_overcoming_challenges_and_charting_the_course_ahead.
Lariosa, Aaron-Matthew. “Army Activates Latest Land-Based SM-6, Tomahawk Battery Based on Navy Tech.” USNI News (blog), January 18, 2024. https://news.usni.org/2024/01/18/army-activates-latest-land-based-sm-6-tomahawk-battery-based-on-navy-tech.
Layer, Brian R. “Some Principles of Convoy Operations in Operations Other Than War.” US Army CGSC School of Advanced Military Studies, 1993.
League, Dustin, and Dan Justice. “Sink ‘Em All: Envisioning Marine Corps Maritime Interdiction | Center for International Maritime Security.” CIMSEC, June 8, 2020. https://cimsec.org/sink-em-all-envisioning-marine-corps-maritime-interdiction/.
Leatherman, J. “Key Logistical and Infrastructure Challenges in Support of the Defense of Taiwan – White Paper on Key Logistical and Infrastructure Challenges in Support of the Defense of Taiwan.” Air University, 2021. https://aul.primo.exlibrisgroup.com.
Lee, Kai-Fu. AI Superpowers: China, Silicon Valley, and the New World Order. New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2018.
Leftwich, James A., Bradley DeBlois, and David T. Orletsky. “Supporting Combat Power Projection Away from Fixed Infrastructure.” Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, January 26, 2022. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA596-1.html.
Leftwich, James A., Katherine C. Hastings, Vikram Kilambi, Kristin F. Lynch, Shannon Prier, and Ronald G. McGarvey. “Advancing Combat Support to Sustain Agile Combat Employment Concepts: Integrating Global, Theater, and Unit Capabilities to Improve Support to a High-End Fight.” Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, May 23, 2023. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA1001-1.html.
LeMay Center. Air Force Doctrine Note 1-21: Agile Combat Employment. Maxwell AFB: Curtis E. LeMay Center, 2022.
Leonard, Tanya. “Keys to Contested Logistics in the Indo-Pacific: Access, Presence, Posture, and Interoperability.” Army Sustainment, February 1, 2024. https://www.army.mil/article/272924/keys_to_contested_logistics_in_the_indo_pacific_access_presence_posture_and_interoperability.
LMI. “Logistics Decision Dominance | LMI.” LMI. Accessed March 12, 2024. https://www.lmi.org/blog/logistics-decision-dominance-maintaining-operational-superiority-contested-environment.
Lockheed Martin. “Precision Strike Missile (PrSM).” Lockheed Martin, 2024. https://www.lockheedmartin.com/en-us/products/precision-strike-missile.html.
Luce, LeighAnn, and Erin Richter. “Handling Logistics in a Reformed PLA: The Long March Toward Joint Logistics.” In Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA, edited by Philip C. Saunders, Arthur S. Ding, Andrew Scobell, Andrew N.D. Yang, and Joel Wuthnow. Washington: National Defense University Press, 2019. https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/1748004/handling-logistics-in-a-reformed-pla-the-long-march-toward-joint-logistics/https%3A%2F%2Fndupress.ndu.edu%2FMedia%2FNews%2FNews-Article-View%2FArticle%2F1748004%2Fhandling-logistics-in-a-reformed-pla-the-long-march-toward-joint-logistics%2F.
Lynch, Christopher, Rachel Costello, Jacob L. Heim, Andrew Karode, Patrick Mills, Robert S. Tripp, and Alan J. Vick. “Operational Imperative: Investing Wisely to Bolster U.S. Air Bases Against Chinese and Russian Attacks.” Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, January 17, 2023. https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PEA1996-1.html.
Lynch, Kristin F., Anthony DeCicco, Bart E. Bennett, John G. Drew, Amanda Kadlec, Vikram Kilambi, Kurt Klein, et al. “Analysis of Global Management of Air Force War Reserve Materiel to Support Operations in Contested and Degraded Environments.” Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, January 14, 2021. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR3081.html.
Lytton, Travis. The Evolution of Adaptive Basing as a Future Warfighting Tactic. Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air Command and Staff College, 2019.
Marchau, Vincent A. W. J., Warren E. Walker, Pieter J. T. M. Bloemen, and Steven W. Popper, eds. Decision Making under Deep Uncertainty. Heidelberg: Springer, 2019. https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-030-05252-2.
Martin, Bradley, and Christopher G. Pernin. “So Many Questions, So Little Time for Pacific Logistics.” Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, June 23, 2023. https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2023/06/so-many-questions-so-little-time-for-pacific-logistics.html.
Mata, Gabe E. “A Marine Corps Supply Chain in the Indo-Pacific.” Marine Corps Gazette 108, no. 3 (March 2024): 28–31.
———. “Engineering Logistics Success.” Marine Corps Gazette 108, no. 3 (March 2024): 32–35.
McCaffree, Justin. “Improve Combat Logistics.” USNI Proceedings 147, no. 10 (October 1, 2021). https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2021/october/improve-combat-logistics.
McCauley, Kevin. “China Maritime Report No. 22: Logistics Support for a Cross-Strait Invasion: The View from Beijing.” Newport: US Naval War College: China Maritime Studies Institute, July 2022. https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1021&context=cmsi-maritime-reports.
———. “Modernization of PLA Logistics: Joint Logistics Support Force.” Testimony before the US China Economic and Security Review Commission, February 15, 2018. https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/McCauley_Written%20Testimony.pdf.
McChrystal, Stanley, Tantum Collins, David Silverman, and Chris Fussell. Team of Teams: New Rules of Engagement for a Complex World. New York: Portfolio, 2015.
“MCDP 4, Logistics 2.0 – MCA.” Marine Corps Gazette 107, no. 2 (February 15, 2023). https://www.mca-marines.org/gazette/mcdp-4-logistics-2-0/.
McEnany, Charles. “Multi-Domain Task Forces: A Glimpse at the Army of 2035.” Association of the US Army, March 2, 2022. https://www.ausa.org/publications/multi-domain-task-forces-glimpse-army-2035.
Mejean, Bradley. “Opinion: Joint Sustainment Support to Agile Combat Employment.” Army Sustainment, June 1, 2022. https://www.army.mil/article/255090/opinion_joint_sustainment_support_to_agile_combat_employment.
Mercogliano, Salvatore R. “Logistics Wins (and Loses) Wars.” USNI Proceedings 150, no. 2 (February 1, 2024). https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2024/february/logistics-wins-and-loses-wars.
Military Sealift Command. “Expeditionary Fast Transport (PM8).” US Navy Military Sealift Command, 2024. https://www.msc.usff.navy.mil/Ships/Expeditionary-Fast-Transport-PM8/.
Mills, Patrick, James A. Leftwich, John G. Drew, Daniel P. Felten, Josh Girardini, John P. Godges, Michael J. Lostumbo, et al. “Building Agile Combat Support Competencies to Enable Evolving Adaptive Basing Concepts.” Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, April 16, 2020. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR4200.html.
Mills, Walker D. “Contested Logistics: Look to the Illicit Drug Trade.” USNI Proceedings 147, no. 8 (August 3, 2021). https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2021/august/contested-logistics-look-illicit-drug-trade.
Mills, Walker D., and Erik Limpaecher. “Need Fuel? Marines Should Make Moonshine Hydrogen.” USNI Proceedings 147, no. 11 (November 30, 2021). https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2021/november/need-fuel-marines-should-make-moonshine-hydrogen.
———. “Sustainment Will Be Contested.” USNI Proceedings 146, no. 11 (November 1, 2020). https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2020/november/sustainment-will-be-contested.
Mills, Walker D., Dylan Phillips-Levine, and Joshua Taylor. “Modern Sea Monsters.” USNI Proceedings 146, no. 9 (September 1, 2020). https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2020/september/modern-sea-monsters.
Minihan, Michael A. “Air Mobility Command: The Meaningful Maneuver for Joint Force Victory.” Joint Force Quarterly, no. 107 (October 2022). https://ndupress.ndu.edu/JFQ/Joint-Force-Quarterly-107/Article/Article/3197235/air-mobility-command-the-meaningful-maneuver-for-joint-force-victory/.
Ministry for Cultural Heritage. “Gallipoli in Brief.” New Zealand History. Accessed April 5, 2024. https://nzhistory.govt.nz/war/the-gallipoli-campaign/gallipoli-in-brief.
Moer, Zachary T., Christopher M. Chini, Peter P. Feng, and Steven J. Schuldt. “Contested Agile Combat Employment: A Site-Selection Methodology.” Air and Space Operations Review 1, no. 3 (September 2022): 62–77.
Mulgund, Sandeep. “Command and Control for Agile Combat Employment > Air University (AU) > Wild Blue Yonder.” Wild Blue Yonder, August 30, 2021. https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Wild-Blue-Yonder/Article-Display/Article/2753756/command-and-control-for-agile-combat-employment/.
Muynck, Bart De. “Council Post: The True Role Of AI In Logistics.” Forbes, August 17, 2023. https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2023/08/17/the-true-role-of-ai-in-logistics/.
Nicholson, Dustin. “Marines Need Regenerative Logistics.” USNI Proceedings 148, no. 11 (November 1, 2022). https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2022/november/marines-need-regenerative-logistics.
O’Brien, Phillips Payson. How the War Was Won: Air-Sea Power and Allied Victory in World War II. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015.
Ochs, Ross. “Big Fight, Small Logistics Apparatus.” Marine Corps Gazette 108, no. 3 (March 2024): 62–65.
Orletsky, David T., Jeffrey S. Brown, Bradley DeBlois, Patrick Mills, Daniel M. Norton, Julia Brackup, Christian Curriden, Adam R. Grissom, and Robert A. Guffey. “How Can the Mobility Air Forces Better Support Adaptive Basing?: Summary Analysis, Findings, and Recommendations.” Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, January 24, 2023. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA1125-1.html.
O’Rourke, Brian. “Prepare for Contested Logistics.” USNI Proceedings 148, no. 4 (April 1, 2022). https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2022/april/prepare-contested-logistics.
Owen, Joshua E. “EABO Needs Special Forces Logistics.” USNI Proceedings 149, no. 7 (July 1, 2023). https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2023/july/eabo-needs-special-forces-logistics.
Pagano, Pete. “Organize Combat Logistics for the High-End Fight.” USNI Proceedings 145, no. 5 (May 1, 2019). https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2019/may/organize-combat-logistics-high-end-fight.
———. “Use the Gator Navy for Combat Logistics.” USNI Proceedings 148, no. 7 (July 28, 2022). https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2022/july/use-gator-navy-combat-logistics.
Paparone, Christopher R., and George L. Topic Jr. “The ‘Clausewitz’ of Logistics: Henry E. Eccles.” Army Sustainment, February 2014, 9.
Peck, Michael. “The US Air Force’s Big Plan to Spread out and Take on China May Actually Make Things Easier for Beijing.” Business Insider, March 1, 2023. https://www.businessinsider.com/us-air-force-ace-concept-creates-logistics-base-defense-needs-2023-3.
Peszke, Michael Alfred. “Poland’s Military Aviation, September 1939: It Never Had a Chance.” In Why Air Forces Fail: The Anatomy of Defeat, edited by Robin Higham and Stephen J. Harris. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2006.
Pierce, Troy, and MSgt Johannes. KING FISH ACE – Logistics Board Game. Maxwell AFB: Air University, 2023.
Placek, Martin. “Merchant Ships Worldwide by Owning Country.” Statista, December 6, 2022. https://www.statista.com/statistics/1284460/share-of-merchant-ships-worldwide-owning-country/.
Priebe, Miranda, Alan J. Vick, Jacob L. Heim, and Meagan L. Smith. “Distributed Operations in a Contested Environment: Implications for USAF Force Presentation.” Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, July 17, 2019. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2959.html.
Privatsky, Kenneth L. Logistics in the Falklands War: A Case Study in Expeditionary Warfare. Yorkshire: Pen and Sword Books, 2014.
Pryor, Gabriel W. “Logistics in the Indo-Pacific: Setting the Theater for a Conflict over Taiwan.” Army Sustainment, February 1, 2024. https://www.army.mil/article/272919/logistics_in_the_indo_pacific_setting_the_theater_for_a_conflict_over_taiwan.
Reardon, Patrick. “Watch, Read: ‘Agile Combat Employment: Are We Ready?’” Air & Space Forces Magazine, March 7, 2023. https://www.airandspaceforces.com/watch-read-agile-combat-employment-are-we-ready/.
Reece, Beth. “Innovation Will Help Shape Future of Military Logistics.” U.S. Department of Defense, September 14, 2023. https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3526511/innovation-will-help-shape-future-of-military-logistics/https%3A%2F%2Fwww.defense.gov%2FNews%2FNews-Stories%2FArticle%2FArticle%2F3526511%2Finnovation-will-help-shape-future-of-military-logistics%2F.
———. “Managing Logistics in Contested Areas Is Key to Military Success.” U.S. Department of Defense, September 1, 2023. https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3513936/managing-logistics-in-contested-areas-is-key-to-military-success/https%3A%2F%2Fwww.defense.gov%2FNews%2FNews-Stories%2FArticle%2FArticle%2F3513936%2Fmanaging-logistics-in-contested-areas-is-key-to-military-success%2F.
Rehman, Iskander. Planning for Protraction: A Historically Informed Approach to Great-Power War and Sino-US Competition. New York: Routledge, 2023.
Roque, Ashley. “Army to Use Operation Pathways to Test Assumptions about ‘contested Logistics,’ Prepositioned Stocks.” Breaking Defense (blog), March 31, 2023. https://breakingdefense.sites.breakingmedia.com/2023/03/army-to-use-pacific-pathways-to-test-assumptions-about-contested-logistics-prepositioned-stocks/.
———. “Army’s Contested Logistics Team Close to ‘fully’ Operational: General Rainey.” Breaking Defense (blog), October 9, 2023. https://breakingdefense.sites.breakingmedia.com/2023/10/armys-contested-logistics-team-close-to-fully-operational-general/.
Rowley, Jack. “Naval Logistics: Still a Compelling Need.” Naval News (blog), April 19, 2022. https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2022/04/naval-logistics-still-a-compelling-need/.
Ruiz, Rome. “Redefining Contested Logistics: How AI Can Optimize the Navy’s Refueling Operations.” SparkCognition Government Systems, March 17, 2023. https://sparkgov.ai/redefining-contested-logistics-how-ai-can-optimize-the-navys-refueling-operations/.
Sattely, John, and Jesse Johnson. “Sustaining Distributed Forces in a Conflict with China.” War on the Rocks, April 21, 2023. https://warontherocks.com/2023/04/sustaining-distributed-forces-in-a-conflict-with-china/.
Sattely, John, and Jason A. Paredes. “Sustainment of the Stand-In Force.” War on the Rocks, September 12, 2022. https://warontherocks.com/2022/09/sustainment-of-the-stand-in-force/.
Schuck, Eric. “Shoestring Logistics Lessons from Guadalcanal.” USNI Proceedings 145, no. 11 (November 1, 2019). https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2019/november/shoestring-logistics-lessons-guadalcanal.
Scobell, Andrew. “Chapter 2: China’s Calculus on the Use of Force: Futures, Costs, Benefits, Risks, and Goals.” In Crossing the Strait: China’s Military Prepares for War with Taiwan, edited by Joel Wuthnow, Derek Grossman, Phillip C. Sanders, Andrew Scobell, and Andrew N.D. Yang, 65–81. Washington: National Defense University Press, 2022.
Scobell, Andrew, David Lai, and Roy Kamphausen, eds. China’s Lessons from Other Peoples’ Wars. Carlisle Barracks: US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 2011. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA553490.pdf.
Secretary of the Air Force Public Affairs. “Air Force Senior Leaders Hold Contested Logistics Table-Top Exercise.” US Air Force, June 22, 2023. https://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/3436101/air-force-senior-leaders-hold-contested-logistics-table-top-exercise/https%3A%2F%2Fwww.af.mil%2FNews%2FArticle-Display%2FArticle%2F3436101%2Fair-force-senior-leaders-hold-contested-logistics-table-top-exercise%2F.
Sellers, Art. “Four Ways DOD Can Leverage AI for Contested Logistics.” DefenseScoop (blog), June 20, 2023. https://defensescoop.com/2023/06/20/four-ways-dod-can-leverage-ai-for-contested-logistics/.
Sharry, Jake. “The Marine Corps’ Failure to Connect.” USNI Proceedings 146, no. 10 (October 1, 2020). https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2020/october/marine-corps-failure-connect.
Shatzer, George R., and Roger D. Cliff, eds. “PLA Logistics and Sustainment: PLA Conference 2022.” New Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 2023.
Shlapak, David A., and Alan J. Vick. “‘“Check Six Begins on the Ground”’: Responding to the Evolving Ground Threat to U.S. Air Force Bases.” Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, January 1, 1995. https://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR606.html.
Sidoti, Sal. Airbase Operability: A Study in Airbase Survivability and Post-Attack Recovery. 2nd ed. RAAF Base Fairbairn: Aerospace Centre, 2001.
Simerly, Mark T., Marchant Callis, and Ryan J. Legault. “Transforming Army Sustainment to Contend with a Contested Logistics Environment.” Army Sustainment, February 1, 2024. https://www.army.mil/article/272932/transforming_army_sustainment_to_contend_with_a_contested_logistics_environment.
Sinclair, Joseph. Arteries of War: Military Transportation from Alexander the Great to the Falklands–and Beyond. Shrewsbury: Airlife Publishing, 1992.
Slim, Field Marshal Viscount. Defeat Into Victory: Battling Japan in Burma and India, 1942-1945. New York: Cooper Square Press, 2000.
Smeeks, Chase. “Harvest Hydrogen for Distributed Logistics.” USNI Proceedings 149, no. 1 (January 1, 2023). https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2023/january/harvest-hydrogen-distributed-logistics.
Smith, William T. “Contested Logistics | AI, Optimization, and Rational Thought (A Mathematician’s Lament).” Army Sustainment, February 1, 2024. https://www.army.mil/article/272917/contested_logistics_ai_optimization_and_rational_thought_a_mathematicians_lament.
Smoak, Lillian. “Chinese Flag Is the Flag Most Used by Bulk Carriers.” DatamarNews, July 28, 2023. https://www.datamarnews.com/noticias/chinese-flag-is-the-flag-most-used-by-bulk-carriers/.
Snyder, Don, Kristin F. Lynch, Alexis A. Blanc, Jonathan L. Brosmer, John G. Drew, Kyle D. Haak, Myron Hura, Daniel Ish, Kelly Klima, and Fabian Villalobos. “Assessing the Effectiveness of Future Concepts in the U.S. Air Force: Application to Future Logistics Concepts.” RAND Corporation, March 7, 2022. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA534-1.html.
Snyder, Don, Kristin F. Lynch, Colby P. Steiner, John G. Drew, Myron Hura, Miriam E. Marlier, and Theo Milonopoulos. “Command and Control of U.S. Air Force Combat Support in a High-End Fight.” Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, March 16, 2021. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA316-1.html.
Sorenson, Christian A. “Logistics in a Contested Environment: Network Analysis and Flow Optimization.” Naval Post Graduate School, 2020. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/trecms/pdf/AD1114716.pdf.
South, Todd. “Cost Drain and Weapon Stockpile Drawdowns Worry Marine General.” Military Times, February 16, 2024. https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-marine-corps/2024/02/16/cost-drain-and-weapon-stockpile-drawdowns-worry-marine-general/.
———. “Future Soldier Resupply Could Rely on AI-Powered Logistics, Robo-Boats.” Army Times, February 7, 2024. https://www.armytimes.com/news/your-army/2024/02/07/future-soldier-resupply-could-rely-on-ai-powered-logistics-robo-boats/.
Stearman, William. “An Expeditionary Support Ship for a Navy-Marine Team.” USNI Proceedings 146, no. 6 (June 16, 2020). https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2020/june/expeditionary-support-ship-navy-marine-team.
Stillion, John, and David T. Orletsky. “Airbase Vulnerability to Conventional Cruise-Missile and Ballistic-Missile Attacks: Technology, Scenarios, and U.S. Air Force Responses.” Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, January 1, 1999. https://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1028.html.
Stricker, Brent. “EABO Degraded Logistics in the WEZ: Self Propelled Semi-Submersible Solutions | Center for International Maritime Security.” CIMSEC (blog), October 11, 2022. https://cimsec.org/eabo-degraded-logistics-in-the-wez-self-propelled-semi-submersible-solutions/.
———. “Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations Deception | RealClearDefense.” Real Clear Defense, April 1, 2022. https://www.realcleardefense.com/2022/04/01/expeditionary_advanced_base_operations_deception_824971.html.
Suciu, Peter. “The Really Boring Way China Would Try to Win a War Against America.” Text. The National Interest. The Center for the National Interest, June 9, 2020. https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/really-boring-way-china-would-try-win-war-against-america-162036.
Sugai, Courtney M., and Mark A. Yore. “Exercising the Pacific Theater AFSB.” Army Sustainment, February 1, 2024. https://www.army.mil/article/272923/exercising_the_pacific_theater_afsb.
Sweeney, Abraham T. “US Army Logistics in Large-Scale Combat Operations: Distribution of CL III Bulk.” US Army CGSC School of Advanced Military Studies, 2019.
Systecon Knowledge Center. “Software for Contested Logistics | Systecon Group,” 2024. https://www.systecongroup.com/gl/modeling-and-simulation-logistics-contested-environments.
Taylor, Daniel B. “Integration at Echelon: Maximizing Functional Component Relationships to Enable the Marine Corps Scheme of Maneuver.” Marine Corps Gazette 108, no. 3 (March 2024): 66–70.
Taylor, John. Bullet Background Paper on Rapid Aerial Delivery of Ground Based Air Defense. Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Squadron Officer School, 2023.
Tereniak, Joseph W. “Pier to Peer: Using JLOTS to Deploy Forces During LSCO.” Army Sustainment, February 1, 2024. https://www.army.mil/article/272918/pier_to_peer_using_jlots_to_deploy_forces_during_lsco.
The Economist. “Invading Taiwan Would Be a Logistical Minefield for China.” The Economist, November 6, 2023. https://www.economist.com/special-report/2023/11/06/invading-taiwan-would-be-a-logistical-minefield-for-china.
The Joint Staff. Joint Publication 4-0: Logistics. Pentagon: US Department of Defense, 2023.
Thompson, Julian. 3 Commando Brigade In The Falklands: No Picnic. Yorkshire: Pen and Sword Books, 2009.
———. The Lifeblood of War: Logistics in Armed Conflict. 1st ed. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1991.
Topshe, Jason. “Could Jet Skis Be the Next Amphibious Craft?” USNI Proceedings 145, no. 11 (November 1, 2019). https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2019/november/could-jet-skis-be-next-amphibious-craft.
Tucker, Patrick. “The Air Force Is Quietly Revolutionizing Parts Replacement – Defense One.” Defense One, April 2, 2024. https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2024/04/air-force-help-startup-quietly-revolutionizing-parts-replacement/395430/.
U.S. Department of Defense. 2022 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America. Pentagon: U.S. Department of Defense, 2022.
US DOT Maritime Administration. “The Ready Reserve Force (RRF) | MARAD.” US Department of Transportation Maritime Administration, August 2, 2023. https://www.maritime.dot.gov/national-defense-reserve-fleet/ndrf/maritime-administration%E2%80%99s-ready-reserve-force.
US Joint Staff. Interview with US Joint Staff Experts on Japan, 2024.
US Marine Corps. Tentative Manual for Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO). 2nd ed. Washington: US Marine Corps, 2021. https://www.marines.mil/News/News-Display/Article/2708120/expeditionary-advanced-base-operations-eabo/https%3A%2F%2Fwww.marines.mil%2FNews%2FNews-Display%2FArticle%2F2708120%2Fexpeditionary-advanced-base-operations-eabo%2F.
US Marine Corps Logistician. Interview with US Marine Corps Logistician, April 2024.
US Navy Expeditionary Combat Command. “NAVELSG.” Navy Expeditionary Logistics Support Group, 2024. https://www.necc.usff.navy.mil/navelsg/.
USAID Deliver Project. “Logistics System Assessment Tool (LSAT).” Washington: US Agency for International Development, January 2009.
Vick, Alan J. “Air Base Attacks and Defensive Counters: Historical Lessons and Future Challenges.” Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, June 12, 2015. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR968.html.
———. “Snakes in the Eagle’s Nest: A History of Ground Attacks on Air Bases.” Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, January 1, 1995. https://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR553.html.
Vick, Alan J., and Mark Ashby. “Winning the Battle of the Airfields: Seventy Years of RAND Analysis on Air Base Defense and Attack.” Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, February 24, 2021. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA793-1.html.
Walsh, Thomas, and Alexandra Huber. “A Symphony of Capabilities: How the Joint Warfighting Concept Guides Service Force Design.” Joint Force Quarterly 111 (October 2023). https://ndupress.ndu.edu/JFQ/Joint-Force-Quarterly-111/Article/Article/3568312/a-symphony-of-capabilities-how-the-joint-warfighting-concept-guides-service-for/https%3A%2F%2Fndupress.ndu.edu%2FMedia%2FNews%2FNews-Article-View%2FArticle%2F3568312%2Fa-symphony-of-capabilities-how-the-joint-warfighting-concept-guides-service-for%2F.
Walton, Timothy A., Harrison Schramm, and Ryan Boone. “Sustaining the Fight: Resilient Maritime Logistics for a New Era.” CSBA: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, April 23, 2019. https://csbaonline.org/research/publications/sustaining-the-fight-resilient-maritime-logistics-for-a-new-era.
Warren, Timothy. “FARPs Keep Aviation in the Fight.” USNI Proceedings 150, no. 1 (January 1, 2024). https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2024/january/farps-keep-aviation-fight.
Watkins, Michael J. “Employment of Joint Maritime Logistics Capability During the Korean War.” US Army CGSC School of Advanced Military Studies, 2019. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/AD1083694.pdf.
Watling, Jack. “Automation Does Not Lead to Leaner Land Forces – War on the Rocks.” War on the Rocks, February 7, 2024. https://warontherocks.com/2024/02/automation-does-not-lead-to-leaner-land-forces/.
Watson, Paul R. “The Stand-In Force Needs Sea Legs.” USNI Proceedings 149, no. 5 (May 18, 2023). https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2023/may/stand-force-needs-sea-legs.
Williams, Shane, John Green, Richard Kovsky, and Edwin Sumantha. “Echoes of the Past: The Burma Campaign and Future Operational Design in the Indo-Pacific R.” National Defense University Press, no. 109 (April 2023). https://ndupress.ndu.edu/JFQ/Joint-Force-Quarterly-109/Article/Article/3385559/echoes-of-the-past-the-burma-campaign-and-future-operational-design-in-the-indo/https%3A%2F%2Fndupress.ndu.edu%2FMedia%2FNews%2FNews-Article-View%2FArticle%2F3385559%2Fechoes-of-the-past-the-burma-campaign-and-future-operational-design-in-the-indo%2F.
Wilson, David. “Army Sustainment Capabilities: Instrumental to the Joint Force in the Indo-Pacific Region.” National Defense University Press, no. 108 (January 2023). https://ndupress.ndu.edu/JFQ/Joint-Force-Quarterly-108/Article/Article/3264632/army-sustainment-capabilities-instrumental-to-the-joint-force-in-the-indo-pacif/https%3A%2F%2Fndupress.ndu.edu%2FMedia%2FNews%2FNews-Article-View%2FArticle%2F3264632%2Farmy-sustainment-capabilities-instrumental-to-the-joint-force-in-the-indo-pacif%2F.
Wissler, John E. “Logistics: The Lifeblood of Military Power.” Heritage Foundation – Military Strength Topical Essays, October 4, 2018. https://www.heritage.org/military-strength-topical-essays/2019-essays/logistics-the-lifeblood-military-power.
Wolfe, Frank. “Joint Warfighting Concept Assumes ‘Contested Logistics.’” Defense Daily, October 6, 2020. https://www.defensedaily.com/joint-warfighting-concept-assumes-contested-logistics/pentagon/.
Wolfe, Robert, and Matthew Barnes. “Artificial Intelligence in the Marine Corps Logistics Enterprise: Parts 1, 2, and 3.” Marine Corps Gazette, November 15, 2023. https://www.mca-marines.org/gazette/ai-in-the-marine-corps-logistics-enterprise-part-1/.
Wuthnow, Joel. “A New Era for Chinese Military Logistics.” Asian Security 17, no. 3 (September 2, 2021): 279–93. https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2021.1880391.
Wuthnow, Joel, Derek Grossman, Phillip C. Sanders, Andrew Scobell, and Andrew N.D. Yang, eds. Crossing the Strait: China’s Military Prepares for War with Taiwan. Washington: National Defense University Press, 2022.
———, eds. “Introduction: PLA Modernization and Taiwan.” In Crossing the Strait: China’s Military Prepares for War with Taiwan, 1–26. Washington: National Defense University Press, 2022.
Wuthnow, Joel, Derek Grossman, Phillip C. Sanders, Andrew Scobell, Andrew N.D. Yang, and Michael Casey, eds. “Chapter 4: Firepower Strike, Blockade, Landing: PLA Campaigns for a Cross-Strait Conflict.” In Crossing the Strait: China’s Military Prepares for War with Taiwan, 113–38. Washington: National Defense University Press, 2022.
Yeager, Jake. “Expeditionary Advanced Maritime Operations: How the Marine Corps Can Avoid Becoming a Second Land Army in the Pacific.” War on the Rocks, December 26, 2019. https://warontherocks.com/2019/12/expeditionary-advanced-maritime-operations-how-the-marine-corps-can-avoid-becoming-a-second-land-army-in-the-pacific/.
Yung, Christopher D. “Sinica Rules the Waves? The People’s Liberation Army Navy’s Power Projection and Anti-Access/Area Denial Lessons from the Falklands/Malvinas Conflict.” In China’s Lessons from Other Peoples’ Wars, edited by Andrew Scobell, David Lai, and Roy Kamphausen, 75–114. Carlisle Barracks: US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 2011. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA553490.pdf.