Lt Col Andrew Gamache

Joint Maintainers

Lt Col Gamache with the USMC 2nd Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron aboard the S.S. Wright, Norfolk VA, 2 October 2024. (Photo by Charles Doyle, USMC)

Abstract

The sustainment construct that has supported the Air Force since World War II is not agile enough to support contested logistics within a sea-based or island chain conflict. This paper highlights the challenges and shortfalls of this legacy sustainment concept and offers a revisited look at forward logistics operations support ships, concluding with the best way forward for the Air Force to sustain their fleets well into the future from afloat.

About the Author

Lt. Col. Andrew Gamache is a 21A Aircraft Maintenance officer assigned to the Pentagon in the Aircraft Maintenance Division Weapons Sustainment Team as Branch Chief, Mobility Air Forces. He has had over nine years supporting the Indo-Pacific theater through multiple assignments, most recently as Commander of the 3rd Maintenance Squadron, Elmendorf AFB.

The Air Force aircraft repair and sustainment network is built around land-based facilities. These facilities are often large, robust, and highly capable of providing sustainment support from protected and geographically separated locations; however, they may not be effective for sustaining operations in the Indo-Pacific Theater due to limitations in agility, flexibility, and deployability. Further, the Air Force’s repair network has been significantly centralized over the past 2+ decades to maximize efficiency and cost-effectiveness. Considering contested operational environments, logistical lines of communication, and the resulting need for agile schemes of maneuver, that centralization and efficiency runs counter to requirements for operational effectiveness.

Only 29% of the globe is covered by land; the rest is covered by water. The US and its allies have historically relied on land-based sustainment, despite limited access and susceptibility to attack – a problem that is magnified for combat operations in the Pacific. As such, we must begin capitalizing on the remaining 71% of the globe covered by water, by staging maintainers and logistics support resources (e.g., replacement parts and equipment, munitions, fuel, repair capabilities, and sustaining engineers) on ships.

The Headquarters United States Air Force Directorate of Logistics Force Development and Organizations Division (AF/A4LM) is building on the current and historical use of aviation logistics support ships by the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps to explore new options for sustaining air operations in a Pacific fight. These logistics support ships are responsive, highly maneuverable, and large enough to avoid hundreds of C-17 sorties for pre-positioning or resupply, all while providing sustainment activities afloat. This Forward Logistics Operating Support Ship (FLOSS) concept dovetails nicely with the DoD’s Regional Sustainment Framework as well as ongoing efforts in Air Force Materiel Command and the Acquisition Community to optimize certain elements of the organic and contract repair network for Great Power Competition. AF/A4LM is the office of primary responsibility for making FLOSS a reality through a proof of concept in 2025. For this proof of concept, Airmen will be working aboard ships, potentially alongside Army, Navy, and/or Marine counterparts, to provide a level of sustainment (repair and resupply) in support of a major theater exercise.

This concept isn’t a new idea. The United States Army Air Forces (USAAF) used ships to sustain air operations in World War II. In fact, the USAAF had 34 ships in its inventory that provided intermediate and depot-level maintenance activities to support the scheme of maneuver for its Combat Support Groups (Hastings, Lynch, Drew, Forward Logistics Operations Support Ships: An Old Concept Revisited, RAND, Pg. 1 2024). Further, Allied Forces relied heavily on logistics support ships to support operations during the Falklands War (Privratsky, Logistics in the Falklands War:  A Case Study in Expeditionary Warfare, Pen & Sword Books Ltd, 2014).

The United States Marine Corps (USMC) has been operating their Aviation Logistics Support Ships (T-AVB) since the mid-1980s. Logisticians assigned to Headquarters Pacific Air Forces (PACAF), are very familiar with the mobile USMC aviation support capability across the island of Oahu at MCAS Kaneohe Bay. To gain insight into aircraft sustainment from a floating platform, HAF/A4LM visited Naval Station Norfolk, where we received an up-close look at USMC operations aboard the S.S. Wright (T-AVB-3)

The USMC has two T-AVB ships that support intermediate-level maintenance activities like those found in our Air Force maintenance back shops. T-AVBs can be configured to sustain either fixed or rotary wing aircraft, hold war reserve material, or any combination. A single T-AVB holds up to three hundred 8 ft x 8 ft x 20 ft mobile maintenance facilities (Fig. 2). This size is a standard Naval Sea System Command (NAVSEA) approved container, and the dimensions can be useful in future planning for Air Force Agile Combat Employment (ACE) requirements. (Fig 3). These mobile facilities are the same facilities that the USMC maintainers work in every day while in garrison. When they “deploy” to the ship, these same maintainers load their mobile work centers and admin areas onto the T-AVB and keep operating afloat.

The T-AVB can stow containers all over the ship, and if not needed while underway, containers can be placed in deep stowage at the bottom of the ship. The roll-on/roll-off (RO/RO) deck contains most of the operational mobile facilities. Up to 186 total facilities can be connected to the T-AVB’s aircraft power generators, and these generators are stable enough to run 5,000 amps to equipment and test stands while underway. This deck also provides shelter from the weather with watertight doors. (Fig 4). The main deck and flight deck are located above the RO/RO deck. To put the scale of this operation into perspective, it would require 75 C-17s to move these mobile facilities to and from land-based nodes.

The main deck has space for weatherproof mobile facilities and war reserve materiel that can also be powered while underway, and the flight deck contains vertical takeoff and landing spots for facilitating ship-to-shore resupply. The flight deck is certified for USAF HH-1, HH-53, and HH-60 rotary aircraft and the USMC MV-22. An expedient ramp can be attached and set atop mobile facilities to increase the size of the flight deck for bulk fuel storage, forklifts, or aviation support equipment (e.g., power carts) (Fig 5). In addition to providing ship-to-shore transport, vertical lift platforms could also contribute to personnel recovery efforts within a hub and spoke cluster.

In addition to the improved survivability and continuity of operations inherent to mobile operations, the capability this ship brings to combatant commanders is immense, which is why the USMC is in the process of designing a new ship with similar capabilities to be fielded in the next decade. Moving forward, the Air Force has three options to achieve this capability: (1) invest in a new ship specifically built for Air Force requirements, (2) lease an existing ship and modify it for Air Force use, or (3) pursue interoperability with the USMC.

Building a ship is costly, tedious, and takes a great deal of time. Estimates to purchase an Air Force ship with similar USMC T-AVB capabilities range from $1.2B to $1.5B, and that does not account for annual operations and recurring sustainment costs. Additionally, from design to underway, shipbuilding can take 10 to 15 years and the Air Force would be at the back of the line behind the currently funded procurements to replace aging Navy, Marine, and Army ships. Finally, procurement of a ship is a doctrinal departure from Air Force core competencies and may not compete well against requirements for force modernization and the recapitalization of aging aircraft fleets.

A more palatable and cost-effective alternative is to lease a ship operated by a Merchant Marine crew (civilian forces under Title 46) through a Maritime Administration contract under the Maritime Sea Command (MSC). The cost of a five-year lease is roughly $400M. The challenge with this option is the minimal availability of Merchant Marine crews and ships available for lease, as many ships have been put into reduced operating status. In addition, any leased commercial ship would require up to $125M in modifications to support aircraft power, defensive countermeasures, and galley and berthing needs for up to 300 personnel. Another challenge could be a civilian crew’s commitment to operate in wartime scenarios and contested waters.

The fastest and most cost-effective option for establishing this Air Force capability is to pursue interoperability with the USMC. The Air Force and USMC could support a larger footprint of air domain assets jointly while operating within the same area of responsibility. The procurement of mobile facilities and the furnishing of support equipment therein would cost less than the lease of the ship, and these mobile maintenance facilities could be customized to support the Mission Design Series (MDS) of aircraft in theater.

Through joint exercises and training, the Air Force can begin to refine the requirement and develop our Airmen to operate on ships. Even though this concept seems like a departure from Air Force doctrine, our sustainment and warfighting logistics doctrine is actively evolving, and a FLOSS-like capability addresses the root of the Pacific theater sustainment problem. It answers the question, “How do we preposition maintenance capability when we don’t have access to a location, need to preserve military response options, and need to sustain combat operations in a contested environment?” Once we prove this concept is viable in support of air operations, the Air Force should determine the best way to rapidly formalize and field the capability.

If the Air Force does not change its concept of support in contested theaters, combat operations will remain logistically constrained and dependent on exposed land-based sustainment activities and air-based resupply, hoping for vital support that may not flow fast enough to support agile schemes of maneuver. FLOSS offers the flexibility, tailorability, and maneuverability to fill a critical gap in our concept of support, and the capability has been proven successful by our sister services. Adapting floating logistics support for Air Force operations is the next evolution in sustainment, enables ACE schemes of maneuver, and allows our force to generate the combat power needed to ensure success in Great Power Competition.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Air Force, the Department of Defense, or the US Government.