Battling Sustainment: Contested Logistics and the War in Europe

By: Major General David Sanford

Soldiers load trucks with combat rations in preparation for a convoy to the frontline 21 December 1944 in the European theater of operations. (Photo courtesy of the U.S. Army)

Introduction

For nearly 80 years, Europe has stood as a beacon of stability, economic growth, and strong alliances. Anchored by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), nearly all Europeans enjoyed the peace and prosperity borne from membership in the international community. On February 24, 2022, this peace was shattered when Russian forces invaded Ukraine, sparking the most significant conventional conflict Europe has seen since World War II (WWII). For the US and NATO, the invasion resurrected a dormant concept: Europe as a contested logistics environment.

The US and Europe have an expansive history together but have been inextricably linked politically, militarily, and economically since the end of WWII, codified in one of the most successful military and political alliances in the history of the world: NATO. NATO successfully prevented great power conflict for decades, providing stability and accessibility to Europe. At its heart, NATO was prepared to defend against the Warsaw Pact forces, led by the Soviet Union. However, on July 1, 1991, in Prague, Czechoslovakia, the Warsaw Pact declared itself “nonexistent.” Later that same year, on December 26, 1991, the Soviet Union officially dissolved as a nation state. Since then, the US has viewed Europe as relatively uncontested, providing freedom of movement to and across the European continent as well as serving as a staging and power projection platform to rapidly deploy capabilities into Africa and the Middle East.

A U.S. Air Force CV-22 Osprey assigned to the 352nd Special Operations Wing, RAF Mildenhall, United Kingdom, prepares to conduct fast rope insertion and extraction system training with Ukraine Special Operations Forces and U.S. Army Special Forces near Berdychiv, Ukraine, Sept. 20, 2020. The 352nd SOW deployed to Ukraine for exercise Fiction Urchin to demonstrate commitment to the Black Sea region, support the Ukraine SOF capability and increase recruitment efforts through various training engagements. (U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Mackenzie Mendez)

The Russian Federation’s invasion of Ukraine has changed our views of Europe. As the conflict progressed, the need for material to sustain combat operations across large fronts increased at almost exponential rates. Nations rushed to supply Ukraine with weapons, ammunition, spare parts, and more to defend itself, placing increased emphasis on logistics planning, availability, and positioning. The furious pace, intensity, and ever-increasing duration of the conflict has highlighted production capability and supply chain vulnerabilities in the US and Europe’s capacity to “feed” Ukraine’s logistics and sustainment requirements. Military planners are poring over lessons learned to reduce gaps in logistics capabilities and minimize risks to operations. However, the enormity of the problem for logistics planners is not just limited to acquiring and managing inventory on a shelf, transportation of that inventory, or the how, where, and timeline for inventory to be produced and delivered. As Ukraine has successfully defended itself, prolonging the Russian campaign, aggressive and hostile political rhetoric increased from the Russian Federation and its Belorussian ally. The threatened use of nuclear weapons, sabotage, and overt conventional attacks shook the long-standing post-Soviet Union conviction that Europe was an uncontested operating environment. Nonetheless, logistics planners are mostly focused on the forward areas of the battlespace of Europe being contested. Title 10 of the US Code defines a Contested Logistics Environment as one in which the armed forces engage in conflict with an adversary [emphasis added] that presents challenges in all domains and directly targets logistics operations, facilities, and activities in the US, abroad, or in transit from one location to the other. Indeed, the war in Ukraine clearly illustrates such a conflict and necessitates a new focus on logistics planning and execution to overcome disruptions to US’ industrial supply chains and sustainment system. Such focus will be critical to ensuring the US’ ability to deter adversaries in Europe and globally.

Airmen from the 452nd Air Mobility Wing and Marines from the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force from Camp Pendleton, CA., load an M777 howitzer onto a C-17 Globemaster III at March Air Reserve Base, CA., Apr. 27, 2022. The security assistance the U.S. is providing to Ukraine is enabling critical success on the battlefield against the Russian invading force. (U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Shawn White)

Why Understanding Contested Logistics Matters

This is not the first time Europe has been logistically contested. During WWII, the US and its Allies fought a long, contiguous campaign from September 1939 to May 1943, called the Battle of the Atlantic. The Battle of the Atlantic represented a campaign between the Allied powers and the Axis powers to control Atlantic Sea routes.[1]  For the Allies, the battle had three objectives: blockade of the Axis powers in Europe to prevent them from obtaining the necessary finished goods and raw materials to feed their war machines; achieve security for Allied sea movements to sustain its own forces; and project military power into the European continent. Our adversaries may seek to limit or stop the movement of materials from Europe to the US. During the Battle of the Atlantic, the thought was to fight to get on the continent and the cost of victory in this vast area of operations was 3,500 Allied merchant ships (14.5 million gross tons of ships) and 175 Allied warships sunk, and 72,200 Allied naval and merchant seamen lost. The US does not possess the fleet sizes or capability to build ships at speed and scale to afford such losses in a European contested logistics environment in the future. Consequently, it is vital for Joint Logistics planners to gain and leverage a proper understanding of the modern global economy and future contested logistics environments to craft a resilient supply system that will fuel victory for America and its allies should we ever face a similar conflict in the future.

Europe has achieved almost eighty years of relative peace, allowing unprecedented integration leading to the creation of the European Union (EU). Historical investments in industry, foreign investments, and growing industrial capacity and capability have successfully supported demands across the global economy. The EU consists of twenty-seven nations on the European Continent and represents the majority of nations in Europe, twenty-three of which are members of NATO. The EU is the second largest economy in the world in nominal terms, after the US, and the third largest at purchasing power parity, after China and the US. The European Union’s Gross Domestic Product is estimated to be $19.35 trillion in 2024, representing around one-sixth of the global economy.[2]^,[3] European and relative global stability has enabled the natural expansion and entwinement of production supply chains, shipment of finished products, and services between the US and Europe. Based on economic power, we no longer think of Europe as individual nations but as a collective group that is critical to sustaining the US’ economy and all its components, such as defense.

That the US and EU are each other’s largest trading partners clearly shows the importance of the EU to US interests. In 2023, trade in goods and services between the European Union and the US totaled over 1.3 trillion US dollars. This represented approximately nineteen percent of total US foreign trade in 2023 (Total US imports and exports in 2023 were approximately 6.87 trillion US dollars). When including the non-EU nations of United Kingdom, Norway, Switzerland, the value of trade grows to almost 1.5 trillion US dollars. Goods comprise much of the trade between Europe and the US. They represent merchandise, supplies, raw materials, and products imported or exported into a country and could be products like clothing, automobiles, electronics, machinery, raw materials, and food that are bought and sold across international borders. Figure 1 illustrates the EU’s main trading partners in goods, further showing EU-US interdependencies and showcasing the need for Europe to remain an uncontested theater.[4]

A contested logistics environment in Europe will impede trade between the US and the EU, impacting efforts to sustain the Joint Force in conflict as well as consumer needs required of the population. A long duration conflict is expected to lead to a shortage of goods being supplied to the United States, which could negatively impact the American will to fight. The Russian Federation has deliberately targeted Ukrainian food production and its electric grid in an attempt to break the will of its people. A Joint Force logistics planner does not study impacts to consumer markets, but consumer markets affect national will and national will influences deterrence and victory in conflict. However, it is important for the logistics planner to understand the realities of the globalized economy and convey concerns to our Whole of Government teammates in order to address issues in a contested logistics environment. The national will to fight is critical to deterrence and victory should deterrence fail.

Figure 2 identifies the key exports from EU nations. As the EU’s largest trading partner, the United States benefits from these exports.[5] Commercial transportation, medicines, and availability of affordable fuel are key areas that enable the United States economy and impact the American psyche or cognitive abilities. The impact to trade in a contested logistics environment and the associated impact on the American economy and psyche highlights the need to work across the Whole of Government to ensure American success in a contested environment. We can expect our adversaries to make cognitive attacks on the American populace and its Service members intended to erode their will to continue.

The trade in goods between the EU and the US includes defense articles (including components that feed the Defense Industrial and Organic Industrial bases) as well as items the Department of Defense is dependent on such as integrated circuits, packaged medicines, pharmaceuticals, refined petroleum products, and raw materials. As logisticians think through how to address contested logistics on the European Continent, the military challenge includes more than the tactical aspects of getting to Europe and distributing supplies and material across the Joint operating area. To fully understand and assess risks to operations, logistics planners must elevate their thinking and understand the risks and realities associated with production and global supply chains. Finished goods or subcomponents are often not made in one place, as components may be produced from several places and then assembled into a finished product. The complete manufacture and assembly of a product in one country has become the exception. Thus, it is critical that logistics planners understand these larger supply systems in order to determine proper consumption factors of material in conflict, make resilient material sourcing plans, and ensure on-hand material to sustain Joint Forces in forward areas. Calculating one’s material needs is not inherent to one commodity type or class of supply, however. They are required for all classes of supply. A contested logistics environment will likely substantially delay the assembly or make these components or end items entirely unavailable, impacting the sustainment of the Joint Force. Figure 3 shows the location of major European suppliers supporting US defense requirements.[6]

The green circles are the number of suppliers in that country. Of note, the suppliers have locations in more than one area in Europe, but most are headquartered in the United Kingdom. For most logistics planners, understanding and assessing sustainment systems may seem a foreign concept requiring specialized training and experiences they do not have. Nevertheless, Joint Publication 4-0 links the concept of tactical logistics employment and capacity, stating, “Sustainment frames both the objective (ends) and provides the means, in both capabilities and capacity, to achieve those ends. Logistics represents the activity of planning for and employing the capabilities within the capacity available to achieve the stated ends.”[7] We must remember that a unit, regardless of Service or type, can only travel with limited sustainment material. Eventually, industry resupply must provide the preponderance of long-term sustainment. As an example, Figure 4 shows total US imports of defense goods in 2023 and the countries the defense goods originated.[8] While these numbers are miniscule compared to US defense goods exported to Europe, they show the US is not self-sustaining in defense, and illustrate the additional forethought and planning required by logisticians to understand the impacts of material that originates in Europe and may not be available in a contested logistics environment to support the Joint Forces. Figure 5 shows the weapon systems that the Defense Logistics Agency sustains and the percentage of support that comes from the EU (Meadows and Marlin, 2023) . Each of them is necessary to deter or defeat an adversary in Europe. This interdependency begs several questions. How vulnerable is the Joint Force to the disruption of supply in a contested logistics environment? How does such an environment impact the speed and scale of employment of the Joint Force in conflict? All questions, defined in Joint Publication 4-0, that a logistics planner must address to effectively sustain the Joint Force in the forward operating area.

Figure 5

Beyond finished goods for defense, the US industrial base draws significant raw materials from the European continent. Obviously, the flow of these materials will be impacted in a contested logistics environment. Figure 6 highlights the critical minerals, imported from Europe, that are used by the US (Meadows and Marlin, 2023). These imports support the production of artillery, body armor, targeting systems, medical equipment, lithium batteries, and more. The loss of these raw materials means we may be unable to produce critical items such as artillery, body armor, targeting systems, medical equipment, and more. Each of these items is needed, regardless of the Area of Responsibility. The information found in Figure 6 artfully communicates how critical understanding supply chain risks is to an overall understanding of a contested logistics environment in Europe, which is a fairly new phenomenon for the US. In WWII, the nation was focused more on fighting to get on the continent, as most raw materials required for defense production were resident and processed in the US. According to author Maiya Clark, “the US had developed a great deal of manufacturing capacity, as well as latent capacity, as a result of policies that were designed to mitigate the Great Depression. The US also had a large workforce and plentiful available labor for the same reason.”[9] As logistics planners look to determine how they will sustain the Joint Force on the European Continent in a contested environment, where Allies and Partners will play a more critical role, a holistic view is required to understand all facets of production to ensure a resilient supply system able to consistently distribute at the tactical level and at the quantities required to win a conflict.

Key Insights

Many have noted that the most important logistics lessons learned from the Russian Federation’s invasion of Ukraine was Russia’s logistics ineptitude in the beginning of the invasion. Poor demand planning, underestimation of consumption, and vulnerable lines of distribution prevented a crushing defeat of Ukraine and gave Ukraine precious trade space to stabilize itself and fight back. However, relying on an adversary’s planning gaps or other mistakes is not a viable course of action. What did we learn? We learned that we must adjust our timelines and transition from a peer fight being short duration and understand that a peer conflict will be a “long fight,” possibly 6-months to multi-year and be conducted across domains, e.g., land, cyber, kinetic, etc. This drives a different outlook and need for industrial preparedness and demand planning. Additionally, the character of war has changed but so has the “character of logistics” associated with sustaining units in conflict. Unit readiness includes generating the force, i.e., fight tonight, but more importantly, success should be measured in how long a unit can prosecute the fight. In the US, we call that sustainment, but sustainment typically starts at some distribution point such as a warehouse or organic depot and often assumes material will be available. However, sustainment begins much further to the “left” of distribution and into production. Production is not just the factory but includes how the factory is sustained (raw material availability, processing raw materials, assembly, and work force availability). Sustainment of that factory may involve capability from different countries or from across different continents. The Russian Federation learned that lesson. Their own industrial frailty has been exposed, causing them to make agreements with the Democratic People’s Republic of North Korea and the Islamic Republic of Iran to fill munitions and material shortfalls. The Russian Federation now has the advantage of the material they are receiving is from an uncontested environment.

Trade between the US and Europe is critical to each other, to sustain their economies, production, and ultimately their will to succeed in conflict. Therefore, our logistics planners must think more broadly and understand the strategic implications of production and international trade and factor them into sustaining the Joint Force in conflict. This represents strategic logistics thinking, and strategic logistics thinking will be the difference between victory and defeat.

The prevention of a rapid Russian victory and transition to a long war on the European continent offers the US a rare opportunity to learn from mistakes to better prepare our Joint Force and industrial base to succeed in future contested logistics environments. The size and scope of the US and European economies are a strategic advantage, but learning this lesson will require a much more holistic planning view (look beyond their own unit foxhole), engagement, and risk assessment than most Joint Logistics planners take. It requires an expansion of expertise from across the Whole of Government. This criticality cannot be understated. Contested logistics focuses on the need to sustain operations in a given area of responsibility while under cyber or kinetic attack; however, the interruptions in the flow of finished goods and raw material, in this case, out of Europe to the US and vice versa, will be key to victory in a long war. There are risks associated with the large amount of trade between the US and Europe and the disruptions associated with economic trade in a contested logistics environment. This material supports the US economy and the defense industrial base, impacting a nation’s ability to generate the diplomatic and economic power that is also needed to prosecute operations in conflict.

The US Defense Industrial Base has changed significantly since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, driving the industrial base to think globally to diversify customer and product base, generate new sources of revenue, and reduce costs. Whereas diversification of production and supply chains between the US and Europe can create strength, it could lead to unintended operational disruptions in a contested logistics environment. The business model makes sense, but if there are interruptions in the flow of material across the Atlantic Ocean, the Joint Force may not have the depth needed to sustain high intensity operations. As logistics planners look through their own stovepipes, current peacetime (or competition) supply demands will not provide the industrial base needed to sustain forces on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean. Understanding the second and third order effects of a contested logistics environment is a paradigm shift for logistics planners. It is no longer the tactical focus of what unit material is needed and where, but how is it produced, where is it produced, raw material challenges, labor availability, transportation lead times, and national trade implications. Understanding the interconnectivity of the US and European economies and the strengths and weaknesses of the economies is the key. Decoupling production supply chains is not the answer.

To reduce the risks associated with these challenges, the US must visualize the prosecution of combat operations, and corresponding logistics requirements, in their totality. The logistics forces of the Services are too decentralized to pull together this view, leading to stove piped assessments from the unit’s standpoint. It requires a dedicated team of experts to review operational planning and determine how to sustain the Joint Force from the proverbial factory to the foxhole. The US could take similar steps to strengthen our industrial capacity and capabilities and shield it from the effects of a contested logistics environment. In the late 1930s, the nation recognized the potential for conflict in Europe and realized it was not prepared. To rectify this, the US Congress chartered the Defense Plant Corporation in 1938 which, in anticipation of hostilities, was assigned the task of expanding production capabilities for military equipment. Its charter permitted both the building and equipping of new facilities and the expansion of existing facilities. It also had the authority to enlist the help of industrial organizations in establishing and operating facilities in the public interest.[10]

We have seen similar legislation with the Creating Helpful Incentives to Product Semiconductors (CHIPS) and Science Act. This legislation seeks to strengthen American manufacturing, supply chains, and national security, as well as invest in research and development, science and technology, and the workforce of the future. The objective of such efforts is to keep the US the leader in the industries of tomorrow, including nanotechnology, clean energy, quantum computing, and artificial intelligence.[11] The CHIPS and Science Act may have been born out of competition with China, but the national investments will support global US interests. It is generally recognized the US and Europe may be in a similar state as the 1930s, and today’s global security environment requires the US to consider a charter similar to the Defense Plant Corporation of 1938. However, new legislation must include Allies and Partners and would allow the US to reduce risks to production associated with contested logistics environments. Moreover, such measures will similarly inoculate the American economy from the shock associated with a potential peer adversary in a contested environment.

Next Steps

This paper is the first in a series on strategic logistics lessons learned from the Ukraine conflict. In a follow-on paper, we will delve deeper into sustaining a coalition high-end fight, supporting at the forward edge of the battlefield and discuss the growing need for “technical reach forward” instead of “reaching back” and what that means to the logistician. We will also discuss the concept of the “Forward Line of Technology” and how logisticians operate in that contested space as well as the need of multi-national, digital interoperability of logistics information systems to achieve transparency across digital boundaries.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Air Force, the Department of Defense, or the US Government. 

About the Author

Maj Gen David J. Sanford serves as the Director of Logistics Operations (J3) and Commander of Joint Regional Combat Support for the Defense Logistics Agency, Fort Belvoir, VA. Maj Gen Sanford received his commission in 1995 through the Air Force Officer Training School, Maxwell AFB, AL. He graduated from Georgia State University, Atlanta, with a Bachelor of Arts in Marketing. He is a Joint Qualified Officer who performed duties as the Chief, Distribution Division, United States Central Command, MacDill AFB, FL. He has served at all levels of command to include flight, group, wing, major command, and combatant command levels. Prior to his current assignment, he served as the Director of Logistics, Engineering and Force Protection, Headquarters Air Mobility Command, Scott AFB, IL.

david.j.sanford@dla.mil

Works Cited

[1] Milner, M, & Hughes, T. (2024). Battle of the Atlantic, World War II. Encyclopedia Britannica. https://www.britannica.com/event/Battle-of-the-Atlantic

[2] International Monetary Fund. (2024a). World Economic Outlook: The global economy in a sticky spot. https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2024/07/16/world-economic-outlook-update-july-2024

[3] International Monetary Fund. (2024b). Report for selected country groups and subject

[4] Eurostat. (2024). USA-EU – International trade in goods statistics. US largest partner for EU exports of goods in 2023. https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=USA-EU_-_international_trade_in_goods_statistics#EU_and_the_United_States_in_world_trade_in_goods

[5] Visual Capitalist. (2024). Cars and petroleum dominate EU exports. http://voronoiapp.com

[6] Meadows, & Marlin. (2023). PART application (Version 2.0) to analyze the data

[7] Directorate of Logistics, Joint Staff. (2019). Joint Publication 4-0. https://www.jcs.mil/Doctrine/Joint-Doctrine-Pubs/4-0-Logistics-Series/

[8] Statista Research Department. (2024). US arms imports by country 2023. Infographic. https://www.statista.com/statistics/248546/us-arms-imports-by-country/

[9] Clark, M. (2024). The US defense industrial base: Past strength, current challenges, and needed change. Heritage Foundation. https://www.heritage.org/military-strength/topical-essays/the-us-defense-industrial-base-past-strength

[10] National Research Council. (1999). Defense manufacturing in 2010 and beyond: Meeting the changing needs of national defense. The National Academies Press https://nap.nationalacademies.org/catalog/6373/defense-manufacturing-in-2010-and-beyond-meeting-the-changing-needs

[11] The White House. (2022). Strengthen supply chains, and counter China. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/08/09/fact-sheet-chips-and-science-act-will-lower-costs-create-jobs-strengthen-supply-chains-and-counter-china/