By Lt Gen Tom Miller, Col Brian Filler, and Lt Col Christopher Nettles

Airpower and Logistics have a symbiotic relationship; they are interdependent, and when well-orchestrated, achieve overwhelming effects. Wartime Logistics theory is ever evolving, from the first organized armies conducting raids against each other to modern militaries engaging in protracted wars across multiple domains. Sustaining war requires a lifetime of learning. The Wright brothers’ first flight and the inception of military aviation underpinned the foundations of airpower theory, expanding the boundaries of what militaries, sustained by professionalized Logistics, can accomplish. As limitations are pushed and aviation continues to advance across the ages, one thing has remained constant: the need for focused Logistics to take full advantage of the warfighting advantage of airpower, and need for professional Airmen skilled in the art of Logistics.

21st century logistics operations (USAF photo by Airman Justine Rho)

In his 1921 work, Command of the Air, early airpower theorist Giulio Douhet advocated for an independent Air Force, equal to that of the Army and Navy. He contended that making one service dependent on another would restrict freedom of action and diminish total effectiveness1. Since the creation of an independent Untied States Air Force, Logistics professionals, having logistics, engineering, and force protection capabilities, have formed a legacy of generating and sustaining airpower – anytime, anywhere.

Much of the Air Force’s warfighting heritage is captured in historical publications and eventually becomes codified as foundational truths, known as doctrine. Careful study of those artifacts paints a picture of the ever-evolving relationship between airpower and Logistics, giving insight into origins of the past, and what is yet to come.

 

Foundational Truths

World War II

World War II is one of, if not the, most studied conflict in written history. Covering prewar planning through post combat actions, there is extensive research and documentation of the war. One common theme is the strategic importance of Logistics on the success of operational plans. In 1950, the US Army published Prewar Plans and Preparations, often referred to as “The Green Book.” This account details the two primary planning policies of the Army’s approach to WWII. One, defeat Germany. Two, master Logistics difficulties.2 Mastering Logistics allowed Operational Plans to execute with the level of support required for an allied victory. The lessons learned in this period laid the foundation for the Airmen of an independent Air Force. Operating as a separate service was an unknown, and learning from the past was the only option.

World War II, unloading planes during the Berlin Airlift (USAF photo courtesy of the Air Force Historical Support Division)

Defining what it meant to be a professional Airmen was a new challenge that required innovation, adaption, and steadfast leadership. Early Air Force logisticians grappled with lessons from WWII that would shape the Air Force approach to sustainment. Lt Gen LeRoy Lutes, Director of Service, Supply and Procurement Division in the War Department, delivered remarks on the Logistics of supply at Maxwell AFB, AL, in January 1947. He noted that, “Even though materiel, methods, and tempo of warfare are changing so rapidly at the present, that future Air Force Logistics are difficult to prognosticate, there are certain cardinal principles of Logistics that I am sure will apply to all armed forces in any future war.”3

The sustainment lessons learned in battle were rooted in the essential mission of Logistics to get the right quantity of supplies and equipment to the right place, and on time. The congruent nature of Logistics mission in war remained foundational to the Air Force as early leaders determined what forces and their functions would be required to meet the sustainment demands of emerging conflicts. As with World War II, subsequent conflicts, primarily the Korean War and Vietnam War, presented the Air Force opportunities to test new operational models, theories, and form their own unique identity.

Korean War

 The Korean War presented challenges across the battlefield and decision space, often hampering the Air Force’s ability to execute their mission. When the Air Force became an independent service, not all mission support functions for airpower operations were transferred from the Army. For example, the Army retained troop construction, creating prioritization and deconfliction efforts to construct critical airfields. Army engineers assigned to the Air Force were deemed to be undermanned, undertrained, and under equipped at the start of the Korean War.4 The Army was also still responsible for unloading aircraft. Additionally, air police were often the only armed personnel on base providing security to combat air assets, and anything beyond installation security was still exclusively an Army mission.

Along with split operations, the Korean War was plagued by inadequate equipment. Engineering resources and aircraft resources were often remnants from World War II that were left in Japan. These equipment and parts did not meet the requirements needed for the geographic environment or advanced aircraft now in service.5 The first test of the Air Force’s operating model highlighted areas of concern. Air Force engineers needed their own organic repair capability, logisticians needed more control over supply chain management, adequate parts needed to be stored in theater, and air police needed training beyond inside the wire patrols. The importance of dedicated support that is inextricably linked to airpower was a key lesson learned shortly after the establishment of an independent Air Force.

Vietnam

 Vietnam challenged the Air Force to adapt to insurgent and limited war conditions. Operating from Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) and Main Operating Bases (MOBs), Logistics professionals were challenged with generating and sustaining combat power through untested tactics and in unfamiliar environments. Using the momentum from the post Korean War studies, the engineer community developed the Prime Base Engineer Emergency Force, known as Prime BEEF, producing an organic capability to recover a base from attack and provide sustainment support. The Rapid Engineer Deployable Heavy Operational Repair Squadron, Engineer, known as RED HORSE, was also established.6

USAF air police in Vietnam (Image courtesy of the Security Forces Museum)

This new capability relieved pressure from Army construction units who needed to meet Air Force operational requirements. Security police continued to shape their role to the meet the needs of airpower, but without doctrine in place, troops had no guidance on how to organize, train, or equip base defense forces. Organizational structures evolved and each base personalized their structure by adapting through trial and error, and necessity, creating units to meet the local need. Regardless of how they organized, working with ground intelligence, logistics, and engineering became necessary for police operations.7

During this time, combat airpower was hampered by supply chain issues. However, Airmen rotated aircraft between FOBs and in-theater MOBs and established centrally controlled supply chains, operating a push Logistics model, ultimately decreasing Not Mission Capable Supply (NMCS) rates.8 Some Logistics capabilities still needed maturation especially at the enterprise level. One major concern was stateside dependence on the Army and Navy for production and storage of non-nuclear munitions. This split of responsibility created a shortage of qualified personnel and parts to create complete and operational munitions in theater, resulting in cancellations of combat lines and a decrease in airpower effectiveness.9

Vietnam highlighted the Air Force’s need to document and codify lessons learned into operational doctrine. Post war downsizing pressures created hard discussions on which capabilities should be retained by each service, and where reliance on each other was a detriment to combat effectiveness. The Air Force learned, and still believes to this day, the best way to produce airpower is with Airmen sustaining airpower mission sets.

First Air Force Logistics Doctrine

 Air Force Manual (AFM) 400-2, Logistics, published in November 1968, was the Air Force’s first Logistics doctrine. Taking lessons learned since the inception of the Air Force, it codified the service’s foundational truths. This doctrine established core beliefs, such as the principles of retention of Logistics functions, simplicity, and flexibility. These principles advanced control of Air Force Logistics operations, equipment simplicity, and a flexible Logistics system capable of shifting to meet changes in the environment or objective.

Unlike Logistics, engineer and force protection communities did not establish their own doctrine until decades later. Key findings were captured and used as the source for improvement of equipment required to sustain an air war. These truths were the building blocks for the Air Force’s push to deploy Airmen, establish a base, and employ combat power with organic service capability and reduced reliance on sister services.

Cold War Innovation

It is no secret that peacetime and wartime militaries differ. Post-Vietnam era was defined by war fatigue and shrinking military budgets as a percentage of gross domestic product. Downsizing created a fight for limited personnel and resources. However, documented lessons learned and codified truths from recent conflicts allowed the Air Force to retain required wartime capability to organically employ airpower. The 1980s were a time of innovation and experimentation for the Air Force, testing the Logistics community’s ability to operate under attack.

Supported by the 1968 doctrine, Air Force Logistics tackled updating bare base equipment used during Vietnam. The older equipment proved too large for air transport and unable to withstand the rigors of longer deployments. With their intimate knowledge of airpower’s strengths and weaknesses, Airmen proved to be the professionals needed to conceptualize, acquire, and distribute new service equipment.

In 1969, Exercise Coronet Bare showcased the new bare base equipment signaling a new era in Air Force response capability.10 Bare Base Mobility, Project 3782, created bare base equipment packages which were modular, expandable, and made with aluminum and plastic to withstand the rigors of most environments.

Understanding the need for global reach and rapid deployment, the Air Force began distribution of NATO Prepositioning Procurement Packages at main operating bases, collocated operating bases, and aerial ports of debarkation, with the goal of reducing airlift requirements during potential European conflict. Areas that could not be allocated with prepositioned equipment would be supplied with newly developed air transportable bare base kits on an as needed basis.

Members of the 819th Civil Engineering Squadron rapid repair team dump pea gravel into a bomb crater while a tractor prepares to cap the hole with prefabricated cement slabs during Exercise SALTY DEMO in 1985.

One of the defining Air Force events during this period was Salty Demo, held at Spangdahlem AB, West Germany, in the spring of 1985. The events served as the premier test of the Air Force’s capability to sustain damage from a USSR attack, recover the installation, and generate combat power. Salty Demo highlighted the need to better defend against special operation forces, the need for more robust damage assessment and airfield repair capability, and the need to find ways to get assets airborne. One major output from this exercise was the organizational movement of explosive ordnance disposal from the Logistics Munitions Directorate to the Directorate of Civil Engineering.11

Air Force budgets and priorities were shaped by documented lessons learned, however the collapse of the Soviet Union prevented all the initiatives from reaching completion. In 1987 the Air Force published the first Combat Support Doctrine, AFM 1-10, which focused extensively on Logistics while minimally documenting other support functions. Define combat support as the art and science of creating and sustaining combat capability, this doctrine acknowledged combat support extended from the forward edge of the battle area to the national industrial base. Knowing that Logistics Airmen are needed to create airpower, this doctrine reinforced combat support is and must remain a service level responsibility.12

Gulf War Response

Saddam Hussein put the Air Force’s global reach and rapid deployment capability to the test when he invaded Kuwait in 1990. The Air Force Logistics enterprise response was swift and effective. Building upon experiences of the past, the use of bare base assets allowed the United States to launch the most effective air campaign witnessed in history. Logisticians deployed and distributed supplies, engineers built bases, security police provided safe operating locations, and flightline operations generated combat power.

The Gulf War proved that when executed properly, combat support, as a command responsibility, can create overwhelming military effects. Professional Airmen continued to show the world what it meant to specialize in delivering airpower anytime, anywhere. Codifying these successes, Air Force Manual (AFM) 3-2, Civil Engineering Combat Support Doctrine, was published in April 1991. In addition, superseding the 1987 AFM 1-10 was Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 40, Logistics, published in May 1994. Security police were still yet to be codified in Air Force doctrine but continued evolving as an essential capability from wartime tested combat experience.

Peacetime Consolidation

Understanding the need for organized, trained, and equipped forces on call, the Aerospace Expeditionary Force (AEF) was introduced in the mid-1990s. The AEFs provided stability to the deployment process and offered Combatant Commanders tailored responses to regional hostilities.13 However, the AEF process reinforced the Air Force’s force generation approach of fighting from established bases with uncontested air superiority. This experience evolved the Air Force’s foundational truths. As the complexity of systems increased, so did the need to reconsider the relationship between combat operations and combat support.

50 years after the establishment of an independent Air Force, Security Forces received their first doctrine, titled “Force Protection,” in October 1999.  This doctrine codified force protection fundamentals, organizational responsibilities, threat levels, and active and passive countermeasures to protect the force. This document solidified the major advancements made since the ad hoc days during Vietnam.

One month later, Air Force Doctrine Document 2-4, Combat Support was published, superseding AFM 3-2, and AFDD 40. The shift of Air Force Doctrine from functional “logistics” capability focused to collective enabler focused “Combat Support”, ended the desire for continued study into the Air Force theory of Logistics of war.

Global War on Terror

September 11, 2001 shocked the world and changed the direction of the United States military. The United States was no longer fighting a singular country or leader, it was now engaged in a war with violent extremist organizations, operating across dispersed locations. Changes in the enemy and their operating model forced the Air Force to adapt new approaches to employ airpower.

From the onset of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, Logistics professionals were required for the successful application of airpower and support to the joint force. A key Logistics hub for the region was Manas AB, Kyrgyzstan. Located near the capital, it was negotiated to be a launching point for aircraft, but it did not have the supporting functions required to wage an effective air war. Protected by Air Force security forces, civil engineers persevered through the harsh winter and built a 2,200-person tent city. With basic life support and security covered, logisticians could now flow aircraft, personnel, and cargo into theater, leading Manas to become one of the busiest Air Force installations in the world. At its peak, Manas transited 1,200-3,500 coalition troops per day and 6-13 million pounds of cargo per month.14

As the Global War on Terror expanded beyond the initial air campaign, so did the role of the Air Force. Airmen still operated from large, secure MOBs, but they were also required to support small FOBs, often in contested environments. Engineers built bare bases and established security perimeters, security forces conducted convoy security and performed outside the wire missions, and logisticians were required at every location to ensure airpower generation.

Learning from the first few years of the war, the Air Force published AFDD 2-4, Combat Support, in March 2005. This doctrine effort revamped much of the combat support focus, defining agile combat support and expeditionary combat support. Understanding the Air Force’s needs varied across the battlespace, this doctrine made efforts to differentiate between home station support and the highly mobile and flexible deployed combat support, which integrated with combat operations.

As the Global War on Terror churned on, the Air Force continued to present forces through the AEF force presentation model to sustain service and joint forces throughout the region. Prime BEEF and RED HORSE teams traveled around the theater to establish, repair, and retrograde installations for the United States and Coalition Partners. Air Force security forces continued to provide air base defense and convoy security while logisticians ensured the air power machine was supplied and ready. Over time FOBs shuttered and Airmen relocated to MOBs, sustaining the air operations from relative security.

Through decades in the Middle East, the Air Force optimized for the low-end fight. Airmen operated from large, secure, and uncontested installations. This environment produced the crowd sourcing deployment model the Air Force has grown accustomed to, forming teams from multiple installations that come together for the first time in the deployed environment. Looking forward to competition with great powers, Air Force Logisticians will still be the professionals required to deliver airpower anytime, anywhere, but through a changing force presentation and generation approach.

Chief of Staff, General Allvin’s “Case for Change” highlights the current inflection point the Air Force is facing in an era defined by competition between great powers. As shown through history and evolved doctrine, the Air Force has adapted to the security environment presented to the Air Force, often with a steep learning curve. Foundational truths established during the Global War on Terror, do not meet the requirements necessary to face a near-peer threat. Large teams, functionally focused, following a prescribed order of operations is not the future of warfare. What is required are fully integrated, mission focused, specialized teams whose sole priority is generating effects. To meet this need, the Air Force must be ready to shed outdated and obsolete methods of action. The ability to adapt not only current doctrine, but the entire history of doctrine, is a necessity to deter, and if required, prevail in conflict.15

USAF security forces in 2024 training for the future fight (USAF photo by Senior Airman Spencer Kanar)

 The Era of Great Powers

Change is inevitable. To maintain warfighting effectiveness as the character of war changes, the Air Force must evolve. These changes require careful study of the past, taking lessons learned forward into the future with innovative ways to solve vexing problems. The past holds information on threats the United States faced, what worked and what did not, and ensuring we do not make the same mistakes is imperative. We can’t be comfortable with our success as an indicator of what is in front of us, we must leverage it but not use it as a crutch.

As the Air Force shapes its new organizational structure, fundamental changes are happening.  New units of action will be created, current units will change their composition, and there will be new alignments at all organizational levels. However, the mission of the Air Force will remain the same. The mission, as it stands today and into the future, will require professional Airmen executing Logistics with high-level skill to generate and sustain the mission.

Aligned, integrated, and professional Logistics is required to generate sorties and sustain airpower. Logistics, at its core, is strategic; therefore, the Logistics community must align their ways and means to achieve the desired end state set by its leaders. History has shown time and time again, when Logistics and strategy align, the Air Force becomes an unstoppable force. As the Air Force moves through this current inflection point and leans forward to meet the challenges posed by great power threats, foundational truths will change. Through the sea of change, one thing will remain constant, Logistics professionals will remain the lynchpin to delivering airpower anytime, anywhere.

About the Authors

Lt Gen Tom D. Miller is Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Engineering, and Force Protection, Headquarters US Air Force, the Pentagon, Arlington, VA. He is responsible to the Chief of Staff for leadership, management and integration of Air Force Logistics readiness, aircraft, munitions and missile maintenance, civil engineering and security forces as well as setting policy and preparing budget estimates that reflect enhancements to productivity, combat readiness and quality of life for Airmen.

Col Brian A. Filler is the Director of Security Forces, Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Engineering and Force Protection, Headquarters US Air Force, Arlington, VA. He is the focal point for ensuring base defense operations, the physical security of Air Force nuclear assets and planning and programming for more than 43,000 Active-Duty and Reserve component Security Forces at locations worldwide.

Lt Col Christopher Nettles is a Civil Engineer assigned to the Strategic Integration Division, Director of Staff, Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Engineering, and Force Protection, Headquarters US Air Force, the Pentagon, Arlington, VA.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Air Force, the Department of Defense, or the US Government.

References

  1. Douhet, Giulio. (2019) Command of the Air. Air University Press. https://media.defense.gov/2019/Oct/03/2002190002/-1/ 1/0/B_0160_DOUHET_THE_COMMAND_OF_THE_AIR.PDF
  1. Watson, Mark. (1950) Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations. Center of Military History, United States Army. https://www.history.army.mil/html/books/001/1-1/CMH_Pub_1-1.pdf
  1. War Department General Staff Logistics Planning and Future AAF Preparedness document (1947) – Ms. Aldridge sent to us on 19 Dec.
  1. Hartzer, Ronald. (2014) The History of Air Force Civil Engineers. U.S. Department of Defense. https://media.defense.gov/2015/Apr/02/2001329844/-1/-1/0/AFD-150402-022.pdf
  1. Captain Forney, James. (1988, Sept) Logistics of Aircraft Maintenance During the Korean War. Defense Technical Information Center. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA201545.pdf
  1. Hartzer, Ronald. (2014) The History of Air Force Civil Engineers. U.S. Department of Defense. https://media.defense.gov/2015/Apr/02/2001329844/-1/-1/0/AFD-150402-022.pdf
  1. Major Chamber, James. (1999, Apr) Force Protection for the 21st Century Expeditionary Aerospace Forces: Security Forces Need for Organic Ground intelligence. Defense Technical Information Center. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA395785.pdf
  1. Major Ray, Randall. (1987, Sept) An Analysis of United States Air Force Supply Support in Vietnam. Defense Technical Information Center. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA188272.pdf
  1. Major Ray, Randall. (1987, Sept) An Analysis of United States Air Force Supply Support in Vietnam. Defense Technical Information Center. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA188272.pdf
  1. Hartzer, Ronald. (2014) The History of Air Force Civil Engineers. U.S. Department of Defense. https://media.defense.gov/2015/Apr/02/2001329844/-1/-1/0/AFD-150402-022.pdf
  1. Hartzer, Ronald. (2014) The History of Air Force Civil Engineers. U.S. Department of Defense. https://media.defense.gov/2015/Apr/02/2001329844/-1/-1/0/AFD-150402-022.pdf
  1. Department of the Air Force. (1987, Apr) AFM 1-10, Combat Support Doctrine. Hathi Trust. #1 – Combat support doctrine – Full View | HathiTrust Digital Library
  1. Hartzer, Ronald. (2014) The History of Air Force Civil Engineers. U.S. Department of Defense. https://media.defense.gov/2015/Apr/02/2001329844/-1/-1/0/AFD-150402-022.pdf
  1. Toktomushev, Kemel. (2015). Regime security, base politics, and rent-seeking: the local and global political economies of the American air base in Kyrgyzstan, 2001–2010. Central Asian Survey, 34(1), 57–77. https://doi.org/10.1080/02634937.2015.1008796
  1. General Allvin, David. (2024) The Case for Change. Air Force. https://www.af.mil/Portals/1/documents/2024SAF/GPC/The_Case_for_Change.pdf